Role of Jamiat-Ul-Ulema in the Freedom Movement (1937-1947) by Jamshed, Qazi Mohammad
ROLE OF JAMIAT-ul-ULEMA IN THE 
FREEDOM MOVEMENT 
(1937-1947) 
DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FDR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY 
m 
Political Science 
BY 
Qazi Mohammad Jamshed 
Under the Supervision of 
Dr. Shan Mohammad 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY. 
ALI6ARH (INDIA) 
1987 
IVt ^ 
2 7 SEP »88 
DS1252 
C 0 N T E iv T o 
t-fiee 
P r e f a c e 
C h a p t e r 1 ; 
C h a p t e r I I 
C h a p t e r I I I 
Ij\TROijUCTIO)\ 
1.1 rtole o i i^eobanai blema 
i n t h e F i r s t war of 
I n d e p e n d e n c e . . . . . 
1.2 Fo rma t ion of t h e Jam if t -
u l - U l e m a - e - n i n a , H i r a s 
ana Objective^, . . . . . . 
1.3 Jamiat-ul-Ansar and 
Jalsa-e-Dastarbanai 
The beobandi rrnup, ,... 
1.4 Founder of'the Jamiat-
ulr'dXenia. .... 
1.5 Reaction to the Nehru 
.Report. .... 
1.6.Khalifat Movement .... 
1.7 Kuttafiqa Fatwa .... 
1.8 ^huddhi and oaneathan 
Kovement. ... . 
1.9 Council entry .... 
1.10 C i v i l D i sobed i ence 
!-'iovement. . . . . 
GOV£Hl\r.£,..T OF IKDI^ aCT 1935 
AK'D MU^Ll!^ . I>ASS CONTACT' 
MOVEWEUT. . . . . 
2.1 Forma t ion of t h e f.uslii,', 
League P a r l i a m e n t a r y 
£o--'rd. . . . . 
2 . 2 Muslim Mass C o n t a c t 
campaicn . • • . 
JAMIAT FROM THE WORLD WAR 
I I TO THE UUIT INDIA MOVEMEI^ I 
3 .1 Reac t i on t o t h e V, o r l d 
War I i . . . . . 
1 
1 
v i i 
6d 
1 - 6 
7 - 1 2 
1? _ 1Q 
1 9 - 2 2 
2:^  - 50 
3 - 3 8 
38 - 4b 
47 
50 
49 
61 
61 - 68 
69 - 109 
9 - 85 
85 
110 
109 
134 
10 - 115 
- ii -
Page 
3.2 The August Offer .... 116 - 123 
3.3 Crlpps Mission •••• ^23 - 128 
3.4 Quit India Movement ..•• 128 - 134 
Chapter IV t JAMIAT AND THE DEMAND FOR 
PAKISTAN. ,.,, ;l35 - 193 
4.1 Lahore Resolution and the ••.•• ^^^ - 147 
Formation of All-India Azad 
Muslim Conference. 
4.2 Muttahida Qaumlat. •••• ^^'^ ' ^^^ 
4.3 J ami at-Analysed the ,^^ ^ 158 „' 152 
Lahore Resolution. 
4.4 Not an Islamic State. 162 - 171 
4.5 A hindrence to the "••• ^^ ^ " •'•^^ 
Missionary activity. 
4.6 Various Aspects of •••• '^'^  " ^''^  
Pakistan analysed. 
4.7 Jamiat Formula. ,,,, 178 - 182 
4.8 Pakistan not an alter- •••• ^^2 - 186 
native. 
4.9 Formation of Jamlat-ul- •••• 187-188 
Ulema-e-Islam as a 
Counter Organisation. 
4.10 General Election of .... 188 - 190 
1945 and the defeat 
of Ulema. 
4 . 1 1 The l a s t Phase , . . . . 190 - 193 
C o n c l u s i o n . . . . 194 - 206 
APPENDICES . . . . . 207 - 212 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 2 1 3 - 2 2 7 
P R E F A C E 
In the twilight of a vague religio-political discon-
tentment of the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
there appeared on the dark political horizon of India ah 
organisation of Ulema known as the Jamiat-ul-Ul«na-e-Hind, 
comprising of the Ulema of all shades of opinion. It was 
the exigencies of time which produced the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, 
The Muslim leadership at that time was like a house divided 
^nongst themselves. It goes to the genius of Mawlana Abdul 
Bari who tirelessly tried to forge an united front with 
the help of the Ulema and brought them on a canmon platform. 
He showed a rare example of organisation and persuatiori 
and brought Ulema on a common platform and made them realise 
the acute need to organise themselves into a religio-
political body for safeguarding the Islamic Shariah. The 
achievement of independence was always one of its prime 
goal. Though the Ulema were making their presence in 
different organisations in their individual capacity, but 
they always felt the need of an All-India Association of 
Ulema, through which they could ventilate their grievances 
and act as a pressure group on the Government and to speak 
more unitedly and authoritatively on behalf of Muslim India, 
An analysis of the aims and objective of the Jaraiat-
ul-Ulema reveal its^  dual loyalty to Islam and Islamic 
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countries on one hand and to India on the other. However 
it goes to the genius of the leaders of the Jamiat that 
their determination to safeguard the Islamic shariah did 
not come in their way to contribute to the cause of freedc»n. 
They made a happy blending of religion and politics and thus 
justified through their role that there was no need of 
divorcing religion from politics. Both could operate side 
by side provided the hold of string remained in the hands 
of men of qualities as the ulema proved to be. 
The Jaraiat rightly diagnosed that it was only because 
of their supremacy over Muslim countries of Middle East 
that the "Imperial England was keeping its hold on India, 
On account of this the Jamiat thought it to be its religious 
as well as national duty to fight against British imperialism. 
At that time the two principal centres of Muslim learning-
Aligarh and Deoband had emerged as rival camps, each pro-
jecting the view of the rival Muslim political parties -
the Muslim league and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema respectively. 
On one hand the Muslim League incited the Muslims for 
the vivisection of the country, then on the other hand 
there were Ulema-e-Haq# who from the Jamiat platform, devoted 
their indefatigiable energy to oppose the partition, keeping 
before their eyes the better future of Islam and Muslims in 
India, Their sincerity and devotion to the cause was beyond 
doubt. But their contribution to the cause of Indian 
- Ill -
independence has been totally forgotton and it is the 
crying need of the time to highlight their role in the 
struggle for freedaa. Therefore an attempt in the present 
dissertation has been made to study what the Uleraa* and 
nationalist Muslims had done in the freedom movement in 
India. They opposed the partition as they were convinced 
that it would be of no use for the people. They dreamt 
of an united India which could have best solved the Hindu-
Muslim problems. 
The first chapter deals with the political background 
and highlights the political development of the period under 
study, I have presented a gist of the role of Jamiat-ul-
Ulema from the days of its formation to the Partition of 
India, In this chapter, besides other issues, I have dealt 
extensively with Jamiat-ul-Ansar and Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi 
which have wrongly been regarded as the predecessors of 
the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, I have also touched the controversial 
points regarding the founder of Jamiat-ul-Ulema, 
The second chapter describes the formation of the 
Muslim League Parliamentary Board and the Muslim Mass Contact 
Movement, The Jamiat-ul-Ulema had joined the Muslim League 
in the general election of 193.7 as Jinnah had made it clear 
that he was tired of the reactionary elements in the Muslim 
.League who looked to their interest more than the community 
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and national interest and were always ready to sacrifice 
them to suit British policy; The Jarniat leaders seized 
this opportunity to ke'ep the reactionaries out of the Legis-
lature, But the attitude of Mohammad All Jinnah_ at the very 
first conference of the working committee of Muslim League 
Parliamentary Board at Lucknow was shocking to the Jarniat 
leadership. At this meeting of the working committee Jinnah 
tried to enlist the agriculturists in the League as he 
realised that there was no way out but to gain their 
support, due to the paucity of fund* Thus the wrong policy 
of the Muslim League alienated the Ulema and they, at the 
Allahabad meeting of the Muslim leaders. Joined the Congress 
as the Congress creed was in consonance with the Jarniat 
creed in fighting the reactionary elements, CcMjplete 
cleavage between the Jamiat and the Muslim League was thus 
accured and the Jamiat cooperated the Congress in its 
programme of Muslim Mass Contact which was very much dis-
turbing to ~ • Jinnah, 
The third chapter deals with the war situation and 
other constitutional proposals which followed the Quit-
India Movement. 
In the fourth chapter the Lahore resolution and the 
opposition of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema has been discussed. This 
period presents an interesting picture of Muslim politics 
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in India. By that time the two principal centres of Muslim 
learning - Aligarh and Deoband collided against each other 
in deciding the final destiny of Muslim India, each accus-
ing the other of doing fatal damage to the cause of Islam, 
It would have been better if they had cooperated with 
each other in deciding the final destiny of Muslims in 
India, Both quite sincerely desired the welfare to the 
Muslims, but differed in their approach to the problera.lt 
puzzles the readers that if the Jamiat was very much 
concerned for the preservation and safeguard of the 
Islamic Shariah then why it did not demand Pakistan. I have 
to my best ability tried to answer these questions. 
The whole theme has been s\immarised in the 
conclusion. 
With great esteem and reverence I wish to acknow-
ledge my immense debt of gratitude to my Supervisor' Dr. Shan 
Mohammad/ Department of Political Science, for his valuable 
guidance, timely suggestions and assistance in the present 
work. His constant encouragement^ affection, dedication and 
constructive criticism have enabled me to finish this work. 
My interest in this subject was aroused by my erudite 
teacher professor A,P.Usroani, Chairman, Department of 
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Political Science, Aligarh Muslim'University, Aligarh. He 
suggested me to undertake this project. His constant 
guidance and valuable suggestion guided and shaped my study. 
I am beholden to him. 
A number of institutions have aided me in the pre-
of 
paration of this dissertation. The librariar^/Zakir Husain 
Library, Jamia Milya Islaraia^provided me full sets of the 
Madina which has now practically been extinct in India. I 
am thankful to Nigar Noman- of Zakir Husain Librairy also for 
helping me. The National Archives of India, New Delhi 
enabled me to have access to the proceedings of the Home 
Department* The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library placed 
at my disposal the All India Congress Committee papers and 
Abdul Bari papers, I am thankful to the staff of the 
microfilm section who allowed me to see the microfilm of 
the Hindustan Times, The Times of India, The Statesman, 
The Muslim outlook. The Leader, The Al-Jamlat, The. Bombay 
Chronicles etc. The Presidential Address of the Jamiat-
ul-Ulema and the minutes of the Working Comnittee/available 
on microfilm in the Nehru Memorial Museum,greatly helped 
me in cleating various cobwebs surrounding the crucial period 
of Jamiat-ul-Ulema. I am thankful to the Director, Indian 
Council for Social Science Research for granting me study 
grant which/to a some extent, solved the monetary problem. 
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C H A P T E R 
INTRODUCTION 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
• The ulema had been very active in politics since the 
rise of British power in India. They led the v;ahabi Movement 
against the- British and participated in the first war of 
independence in lbb7. m this struggle the Ulema of Dar-ul-
Uloom Deoband were in the forefront. 
Prominent figures amongst the Deobandi Ulema involved 
in the revolt were Haji Imdadullah, Mawlana Rashid Ahmad 
Gangohi and Mawlana Qasira Nanautavi, Shamli, near Saharanpur, 
1 
was their secret meeting place. Mawlana Qasim Nanautavi 
succeeded in overcoming the difficulties created by the fatwa 
of Mawlana Sheikh Mohammad, an'authority on Muslim Shariah 
at that time, who declared that Jehad against the Britishers 
was neither obligatory nor lawful in the then prevailing 
2 
condition. 
However, by the counter efforts of Mawlana Qasim 
Nanautavi, Jehad was launched against the British Government 
in India. Haji Imdadullah, Mawlana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi 
v/ere named as Imam of the Jehad, Commander of the forces 
1, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Nagsha-e-Hlyat, Volume II, 
(Deoband, 1954), p. 43. 
2, Mawlana Sheikh Mohammad was not against Jehad against 
the Britishers but his contention was that time was 
not ripe and they v;ere ill eaxd.pped. 
Ibid., pp;-42-43. 
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3 
and Qazi respectively. Mujahideen running into thousands 
gathered Ground them and made great sacrifices under their 
leadership. Mawlana Husain Ahmad gives an account of how 
these people defied the British attempt to capture them and 
falling into the hands of the Britishers following the 
4 
suppression of the upsurge. 
The biographers of these throe Ulema of Deoband have 
tried to raise a controversy regarding their participation 
in the Mutiny. For example Mawlana Mohammad Yaqub Nanau'tavi 
has given an entirely different version of Mawlana Qasim*s 
activities during the stormy period of 1857/Which he published 
after the death of Ma*lana Qasim in 1880. To Mawlana Mohammad 
Yakub Nanaxitavi who himself had witnessed the revolt, men 
like Imdadullah, Mawlana Qasim and Mawlana Gangohl were 
5 
miles away from creating any disturbance. This impression 
has also been confirmed by Ashig Ilahi* the biograpner of 
6 
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, 
3. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, op.cit., p. 43. 
4. Ibid.« pp. 53-62. 
5 . Mohammad Yaqub Nanautavi , Savanih Umri (Bhawalpur, 
1897), p . 4 7 . 
6. Ashiq I l a b i , Ta2kirat-ul-3?ashid (In 2 volumes). Volume I , 
(Meerut, 1908), :^.73, 
- 3 -
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Another biographer Mawlana Manazir Gilani holds that 
Mawlaha Qasim had nothing to do with the activities of those 
who participated in the Mutiny for wholly worldly benefits. 
While pointing that Qasim was miles away from creating any 
disturbance Mawlana Gilani thinks that since the time was 
not favourable when the first biography was written, the 
biographer used words vjhich could give the impression that 
the f<lawlana was not involved in the revolt but at the same 
time could be understood to mean that he had participated 
8 
in the Mutiny with a different and a nobler motive. 
About Ulema Professor Mushirul Haq says that they 
were wanted by the British Government, " But as a. matter of 
fact, the Ulema were not on the official list of the rebels 
for aoout 2 years after the mutiny was suppressed in Thane 
9 
Bhawan. 
Ashiq Illahi says that they were branded as rebels 
to their Government, on rhe basis of false infoinnrtation 
10 
supplied ,by Qazi Mahbub Ali in August 1859. This version 
7, Man*j»zir Ahsan Gilani, Savanih Qasimi, volume I, 
(Deoband, 1953). 
8, Ibid.,Volume II,pp.95-96. 
9. Mushirul Haqq; Muslim Politics In Modern India 
(Meerut, 1970), p.r4. 
10. Ashiq Illahi, op.cit., p. 73. 
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is supported by Mushirul Haq on the point that since Qazi 
Mahbub All was the main rebel, so the foruier one tried to • 
divert the attention of the Government by directing their 
attention to the wrong direction (to the Ulema and other 
religious personalities), which was not strange and the 
11 
Ulema were no exception. 
The official report about the Mutiny contained in 
12 
the book entitled Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh, does 
not mention the name of any of these three prominent Ulema 
i.e. Mawlana Imdadullah, Mawlana Qasim and Mawlana Rashid 
•Ahmad Gangohi or the part played by them in the revolt. The 
said source refers Inayat Ali as the leader. It is said 
that Qazi Inayat Ali rose in rebellion against the Britishers 
13 
to avenge the execution of his brother Abdul Rahim. 
In fact, there were a class of well known Ulema who 
actually did not cooperate or otherwise remained aloof from 
the mainstream of the revolt. Rahmat Ali has enlisted the 
name of 5 iJlema out of 76 originally declared by the British 
11. Mushirul Haqq, op.cit.^ p. 15, 
12. Freedom Struggle in Uttar Pradesh ; Source Material, 
six volume,- Lucknow, 1961 (consolidated Index and 
cnronology). 
13.- Ibid., Volume, V, p.133. 
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14 
Officers who had taken part in the revolt. Refuting this 
allegation Mushirul Haq argues that Mawlana Mohammad Ismail, 
now known as Shah Ismail Shahid,whose name was found in the 
Mutiny papers had died long before the revolt, his name 
appears in the Mutiny paper as the putative writer of a 
book Risalah-e-Jihad, Three of the five alims like Fazl-i-
Rasul Sadauni, Mufti Sadruddin and Fazl-i-Haq' Khairabadi 
were in the service of the East India Company and had hardly 
15 
any sympathy with the activities of the Mutineers, The fifth 
alim far from being in the good books of the rebels had 
actually oftended the rebel leader Bakht Khan, because he had 
16 
given protection to a number of Christians, En the light of 
these authentic sources, Mushirul Haq concludes that even 
those five Uiema whose name was referred to in the Mutiny 
17 
records were not actually on the side of the Mutineers, 
Here it must oe admitted that the British officers 
did not have any clear conception about "What and who was 
the Ulema"as according to Mushirul Haq, the subtle distinction 
between an alim and his counterpart misled many of the British 
14. Rahman Ali, Tazkirah Ulama-i Hind ed. and translated 
into Urdu by Mohammad Ayyub Qadiri (Karachi, 1961),p.412, 
15. Mushirul Haq, op.cit., p. 3, 
16. Freedom S t rugg l e , o p . c i t . . Volume V, p . 3 2 9 . 
17. Mushirul Haq, o p . c i t . , p . 4 . 
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18 
officers of India, especially during the revolt of 1857. 
Hence it can be derived that there might had been other 
Ulema who actually participated in the revolt, than those 
actu-ally recorded by the British officers in the Revolt, 
The development in the West-Asian countries had 
greatly pained the Indian Muslims. The annulment of the 
partition of Bengal had further administered a severe blow 
to them. The Tripoli-Balkan wars was another straw into 
the camel's back. Tne Khilafat episode proved to be the 
last nail. The Muslim divines and theologians came out of 
19 -
their slumbering life of Khanqas and Madrasas and started 
taking part in the political activity, to (guide the Muslims 
both in political and religious matters. They regarded them-
' selves as the sole interpreter of Islamic Shariah, Any 
political activity in which they engaged was to them an 
18, Ibid., p.2. 
19. Though a number of prominent Ulema like Mawlana Abdul 
Bari, and Ali brothers etc. were already a"ctive in 
Indian politics, the Balkan Wars, the Kanpur mosque 
crisis, the development in West Asia were such issues 
which attracted theologians to undertake heavy respon-
sibility. But the Khilafat issue brought all shades 
of Muslim opinion on the national platform .and they 
clustered around the Ulema like Abdul 3ari and Ali 
brothers. Hitherto, they were confined to the Muslim 
roiigious institutions and spending an inactive life 
but now they were active. 
- 7 -
extension and their primary role as the custodians and 
•20 
intepreters of Islamic Law and religious practice. This 
attitude was exemplified in the efforts to organise an 
All- India Association of Ulema under the supervision 
of Mawlana Abdul 3ari, and Mufti-e-Azarrt.Mufti Kifayatullah 
21 
in October 1918. This quest for an organisation of Ulema 
reached perfection when the Ulema after the Khilafat Con-
ference in Delhi assembled in a meeting end consequently the 
22 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind came into existence. According to 
Qazi Adeel Abbasi, the editor of the Urdu newspaper the 
'Zamindar' and a man who was involved in the Khilafat Move-
ment/ the Jamiat-ul-Ulema came into existence in the wake 
of the Khilafat Movement, Ulema of different school of 
thought had assembled at Delhi to attend the Khilafat Con-
ference followed by a meeting of Ulema, with the object of 
creating a political organisation which was to be guided by 
23 
the law of Shariah. 
20, Gail Min^ult r The Khi-Iafat Movement ; Religious 
Symbolism and Political Mobilization In India, (Oxford 
Press, Delhi, 1982), p.79. 
21.- Gail Minault, op.cit,, p.79. 
22. Syed Tufail Ahmad, Ruh Roshan Mttstaabil (Badaun 1946), 
pp. 84-85. ' 
23. Qazi Adeel Abbasl, Tahrik^e-Khilafat (Taracqi Urdu 
Scard, Kew Delh:., 1978), p.60. 
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i'hough the Ulema had oeen actively participating in 
different organisations in their individual capacity but 
they needed an association through which they could speak 
24 
to the Government with a''^ united authoritative voice. 
At the Amritsar meeting of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema held 
on 28th December 1919, the aims and objectives of the Jamiat 
25 
were laid down. The chief feature of its aims and objectives 
24. Gail Minault, op.cit./ p. 8, 
25. The aims and objectives of the ^amiat were the followings 
(1) To guide the followers of Islam in their political 
and non-political matters from a religious point 
of view, 
(2) To defend Islam, centres of Islam (Jazirat-ul-Arab 
and seat of Khilafat), Islamic Rituals and Customs 
and Islamic Nationalism Against all odds injurious 
to them. 
(3) To achieve and protect the general religious and 
rational rights of the Muslims, 
(4) To organise the Ulema on a common platform. 
(5) To organise the Muslim coiwaunity and launch a 
programme for its moral and social reform. 
(6) To establish good and friendly relations with the 
non-Muslims of the countries to the extent permitted 
by the Shariah-i-Islamiyah. 
(7) To fight for the freedom of the country and religion 
according to the Shariah objectives. 
(3) To establish Mahakim-e-Shariyah (religious courts) 
to meet the religious needs of "the community. 
19) To propagate Islam by way of 'missionary activities 
in India and foreign lands. 
Contd 
- 9 -
was the safeguarding of Islamic Shariah and to give political 
guidance of the Muslim conmunity in accordance with the 
tenents of Islaniic Law, But its determination to safeguard 
the Isla.Tiic Shariah did not come in its way of contributing 
to the cause of freedom struggle, 3y giving emphasis on 
Islamic Shariah it never intended to establish an Islamic 
state. The motivating factor behind this emphasis was simply 
the prosecution of Islamic law which concerns the personal 
life of Muslims e.g, marriage, divorce and inheritance etc. 
The Jamiat considered the very presence of British 
rule in India to be the root cause of British supremacy 
(Continued from the previous page) 
(10) To maintain and strengthen bonds of unity and 
fraternity (as ordained by Islam) with the Muslims 
of other countries. 
See Asasl Usui-o-Aqhaz-O-Magasid-o-Zawabit-'e-Jamiat-
ul-Ulema-e-Hind: Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind, Mukhtasar Halat 
Inaqad, b.l6. In order to meet the exigencies of time 
clause 2,7/8,9 was amended and replaced by the following 
provisions: • 
(2) To protect Islam, centre o.f Islam- (Hijaz and Jazirat-
ul Arab) and Islamic rites and usages and defend 
Islamic nationalism against all odd injurious to it, 
(7) Complete .independence of the nation and the country 
according to Sharia objectives. 
(8) To organise the Millat-Islamiyab into a Shsria body 
• and establish Mahakin-i-Shariah, 
(9) To v;ork for the religious, educational, moral, social 
-c.r\6 '^cor.onic ref:-—:: of the "lurli.T.s and to rropagcte 
Islam by way cf .T.lssionary activities in India. 
Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, Deoband School and Demand 
for Pakistan (3ombay,1966),p.68; See also Mohammad Mian 
Jamiat-ul-Uiema-^iya Hai, Volume I, (Jamiat Ulema,U.P, 
n»&,),' p. 9. -
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over the Muslim countries of Middle^ East. On account of 
this perception the Jamiat thought it to be its religious 
as well as national duty to fight against the British 
imperialism. So the achievement of independence was its 
prime motive. Moreover, the Jamiat also considered the 
British Government to be chiefly responsible for the bitter 
communal relations and for creating a sort of fear in the 
mind of the Muslims, 
The above ideas are also reflected in the Presidential 
Address of Allama Shah Muinuddin Ajmeri in the 9th session 
held 
of th'fe Jamiat Ulema/iJi 1930. He is reported to have said, 
"Our greatest enemy is Great Britain who having India and 
her vast resources under her tyrannical occupation is the 
main cause for our degeneration and destruction and for the 
untold miseries and ruin in Islamic countries outside India, 
It is crystal clear that we will remain subjugated and 
downtrodden as long as India is under the 3ritish occupation. 
This is why the India Muslims have only one objective regard-
ing the independence of India and that is that India must 
26 
win complete freedom at all costs," 
In Independent India, the Jamiat visualised the 
future confederation of two relicfious and political commu-
26. Khutbe-e-5adarat, delivered &t the 9th session of the 
Jamiat-ul Ulema, held at Amroha, Hay 1930 (Al Jamiat 
Press, Delhi), p.25. 
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nities - Hindus and Muslims which would have fought shoulder 
to shoulder in ousting their common enemy from their mother 
27 
land. Speaking at the Jamiat meeting in November 1920 as 
its president Mohmood-ul-Hasan pleaded for Hindu-Muslim 
28 
entente in order co furnish their joint venture. Notwith-
standing the overwhelming power of the majority community^ 
the Jamiat neld that so long as Hindu and Muslim remained 
united against the British, it had little effect if they 
were divided by religious or by different customs. 
The Jamiat held the view that it had been enjoined 
on Muslims by Islam to fight for the freedom and independence 
of the country in which chey live against the oppressor as 
only in an independent country the mandates of Islam as 
interpreted by the Ulema be applied to the Muslim community. 
3ut if Muslims fight single handed to achieve this objective, 
29 
only grief and humiliation would be in store. This would be 
27. peter Hardy, Partners in Freedom and True Muslims : 
The Political Thought of Some Muslim Scholars in British 
India 1912-1947 (Scandivanian Institute of Asian Studies 
1971), p. 32; See also Mohammad Mian, op.cit., pp.40-42, 
28. Ibid., p. 32; Mohammad Mian, pp. 40-42. 
29. Maktubat-e-Shalkhul Islam, Volume 2, compiled and 
edited byNajmuddin Islahi, Maktuo No. 33,pp. il5-128. 
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disadvantageous from political and economic point of view 
top. Hence it was conceived that this could only be achieved 
successfully in cooperation with the other conmunities in 
India. Though the form of Government which would be estab-
lished would not have an Islamic flavour, it v^ ould depend 
entirely on the missionary capacity.of the Muslims to turn 
the tide in their favour. Viewed in this respect, the Jamiat 
considered the systems of Government which would be followed 
30 
after independence as a lesser evil (AHUNUL 3LATIN), Infact, 
the basic premises of the Jamiat was that once the British 
regime withdrew from this country, the Hindus would come to 
terms with the Muslims as thfe Muslims would be forming a 
strong minority and their legitimate interest could not be 
31 
swamped by the majority.. 
JAMIAT-UL-ANSAR AND JALSA-E~DASTAR3ANDI 
THE DEOBANDI GROUP 
There has been a great deal of misconception about 
the Jamiat-ul-Ansar, an association of.the old boys of 
Deoband, as being the predecessor of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. 
Jals€i-e_Dastarbandi, held in 1910 at Deoband, had been 
30. MuVtubat-e-Shalkhrul..Islam,Volume, 2, op,cit.,pp.115-128 
31. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit.,- p. 70, 
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regarded as an attempt to popularise the programme of the 
JaiTiiat-ul-Ansar, 
Mawlana Mohammad Mian in his book^Ulema-e-Haq 
Volume I,holds that because of the vigilance of the Govern-
ment everything was kept in secret. He further says that 
in order to popularise the programme of Jamiat-ul-Ansar 
Sheikhul Hind Mawlana Mah m:ood-ul-Hasan instead of convening 
a conference on political level persuaded his colleagues in 
the administration of the Darul Uloom to hold the famous 
32 
Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi. 
Refuting the above allegation as false Mawlana 
33 
Hafeezur Rehman in his booklet says that the presidential 
address of Shamsul Ulema Mawlana Hafeez Mohammad Ahmad 
would unfold motives behind 'Dastarbandi' crystal clear. He 
says that, "The benefit of holding Jalsa-e-Dastarbandi on 
the one hand is to make known to the Muslims about the ability 
and skill of the Dastars and on the other hand,, to induce 
and stimulate the students, • And its major benefit would be 
that the Muslim would be ready to contribute more actively 
32, Saiyid Mohammad Mian, op,cit,, pp. 130-131, 
33, Hafeezur Rehman Wasif, Jamiat-ul-Ulema oer Ek Tarikhi 
Tabsirah, (Kama! Press, Delhi, 1969), p,7. 
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to the Danil Uloom seeing their aid being utilised in proper 
34 
manner." Ke further added that "being a Fan-Islamist 'we can 
become a trustee to the p^ace and public welfare, and also 
may be loyal and trusi-'orthy to the Government, Shariah ~ 
35 
never teaches us ingratitude, rebellion or brpach of peace.' 
Thus as a matter of fact Darul Uloom Deoband vas 
primarily meant for Islamic teachings. It was miles way 
from political overtures, '-.'ell concerted and watchful 
attempts were made to keep it away from political issues in 
the country, 
36 
Mawlana Obaidullah Sindhi, the Chief Director of 
of Jamiat-ul-Ansar himself elaborated the aims and objectives 
34, Madarsa Islami Arabi, Deoband Ka Zarrin Mazee our 
Mustegbil, p,27. 
35, Ibid,, p, 19, 
36, Mawlana. Obaidullah Sindhi originally belonged to Sikh 
family. He embraced Islam while he was a school boy. 
The books like Tahfutnl Hind and Tagwiyatul Islam by a 
Muslim preacher and Shah Ismail Shaheed respectively, 
had a revolutionary effect on his mind which prompted 
him to renounce Sikhism . and accept Islam, After having 
served Hafiz Mohammad Siddiqui of Bharchondi (Sindh), 
a sufi^Obaidullah Sindhi finally came to Deoband where 
he was closely associated with Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hasan 
who acquainted him with the teachings of Shah Waliullah 
and Mawlana Qasim Nanautavi. Their teachings remained 
a torch bearer and guide throughout his life. 
For a detailed study of Obaidullah Sindhi's early 
life and socio-policial ideas see, Neimullah Khan, 
Political Ideas and roie of Mawlana Obaidullah 
Sindhi (an unpublished thesis) Aligarh Muslim 
University, 1981, 
Contd,.,,-. 
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37 
of the Ja-niat-ul-Ansar. He says: 
"Jamiat-ul-Ansar is the association of the old boys 
of Deoband which may taXe part subject to certain restraints. 
(Continued from the previous page) 
Obaidullah Sindhi wanted to enlist the graduates 
of Deoband in spreading the doctrine of Jehad throughout 
the sub-continent, 3at the problem with the management 
of Deoband was to save the institution from the British 
Government's onsl&ght. In the meantime differences arose 
between him and the Ulema of Deoband for his unorthodox 
ideas on the curriculum which led to his expulsion from 
professorship. Defeated from within he tried to achieve 
his objective from without and organised Naza'ratul 
Ma'arif in Delhi with the help of Hakim Ajmal Khan and 
Nawab Viqarul Mulk. The motive behind Ma'arif vas to 
make the Muslim youths uninfluenced from the British 
Indian secular education by popularising the Islamic way 
of teaching. Ihe school could not last long due to his 
involvement in the silk letter conspiracy which forced 
him to go abroad. See Mawlana Madani, op.cit.. Volume II 
pp. 144-145. 
37. Jamiat-ul-Ansar was the outcome of the bitter doctrinal 
battle between the nationalist group headed by Mahmood-
ul-Hasan and puritanical and antinsovemment group headed 
by Obaidullah Sindhi. The issue at point was certain 
reforms in the curriculum of the Deoband school and a 
straight forward struggle for power be,tween the rival 
groups, Outraonoevered' in his attempt Sindhi tried to 
achieve it from without by forming Jamiat-ul-Ansar. 
Francis Robinson, Separatism Amoncr Indiatti"Muslims, 
("ew Delhi 1975), pp. 269-70. 
Though Prbfessor Ziaul Hasan Farooqui is of the 
opinion that Jamiat-ul-Ansar was formed by Mahmudul Hasan 
yet in the light of the statements of 1917 by Mawlana 
Mahmood-ul-Hasan and Nasrat Husain, his finding appear to 
be incorrect. Their statements testify that Mav/lana 
Obaidullah was the founder of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar. 
See, Home Poll, July 1918,^92-101. 
Peter Hardy is vrong in saying thot the Jamiat-ul-
Ansar was founced to bridge the gulf arid strengtnen the 
fraternity between the Alumni of Deooand and Aligarh. 
See, The Mu/^ lirs of British Indie. (Camoridge 
University Press 197'2) , p. 181, 
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in the affair of the Madarsa, as a brain and hand of the 
guardians of Deoband School, It has no relation with the 
national matters. The members of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar are the 
old boys of Deoband^ on whom lies the duty to devote their 
energy in the development of funds and educational standard 
38 
of the school," 
The first session of the Jamiat-ul-Ansar was held at 
Muradabad in 1911 where its President xMawlana Ahmad Hasan 
Amrohavi remarked that Jamiat-ul-Ansar was not an imitation 
of any other association, nor was it an embodiment of any 
one's personal and wordly ambitions. It included a\l the 
. • » 
necessary arid ijnportant object ives whose achievement was 
J9 
urgently needed. 
l^ e clause "necessary and important objectives" has 
been interpreted by Professor Ziaul Hasan Farooqui as nothing 
40 
than the motives underlying the programme of Shaikhul Hind, 
an indication to the political objectives, 
# 
This assertion of Professor Farooqui• c-omes in clash 
in the light of the aforesaid Muradabad session held in 1911 • 
In the 5th sitting the members came out with seven proposals 
38, Al-Qasim, a monthly Journal/ DeobancJ,Volume I ^ Shumarah-9, 
39, Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq, Volume Z, op.cit., p.134. 
40, Farocqui, op.cit., p. 58. 
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of purely academic and religious nature. One of theni was 
to publish such magazines on a large scale, containing the 
teachings of Islam, and answer to the sectarians and faith-
41 
fulness with the Government, 
THE D50BANDI GROUP 
It has to be kept in mind that the session in which the 
42 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema was founded the Deoband group was not present. 
This shows their aloofness with the movement. Again in its 
first session at Amritsar under the presidentship of Mawlana 
43 
Abdul 3ari in December, 1919 the DSobandi element was absent. 
At the special session of the Jamiat at Calcutta on 6th 
December 1920 under the presidentship of Mawlana Taj Mohammad 
Sindhi, one does not come across the name of any Deobandi 
Ulema although Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani had returned from 
44 
Malta at that time also did not attend the special conference. 
41, Al Qasim, op.cit,, p. 9, Volume I. 
42, See, Mukhtasar Kalat Inaaady op.cit., p, -16, 
43, See, The Proceedings of the First-Session held at 
Amritsar on 28th December 1919, available in the 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Li':rary (microfilm), 
44, Husain Ahmad Madani, op.cit,, p. 215, 
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When Shai'khul Hind arrived India from the Malta prison 
he was warmly welcomed oy the prominent leaders of both Hindu 
and Muslim at Bombay in 1920 and was acquainted with the 
latest political atmosphere of the country and when he was 
explained that the Ulema had formed their Jamiat-ul-Ulema 
Association he became very glad, and when he came to know 
that his disciples/who could have actively participated in 
the formation of the Jarr.iat, remained aloof, he expressed 
45 
his profound sorrow and displeasure. 
Complete aloofness of the Deobandi group had been to 
such an extent that Shaikn-ul-fUnd had to order Mawlana Shabbir 
Ahmad and Mawlana Murtasa Hasan to come from their home and 
cooperate with Mawlana Kifayatullah and Mawlana Ahmad Saeed 
in the management of the Jamiat -session scheduled to be held 
46 
in Delhi, 
Moreover, Professor Farooqui has himself written that 
the Jamiat had started as a body of Muslim religious leaders 
belonging to different schools but after the collapse of the 
Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements when the communal 
question had taken a different turn it generally came to be 
45, Gail Minault, op.cit., p. 362. 
46, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, op.cit., Volume I, 1:1.262. 
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47 
dominated by the Deobandi Ulema. 
THE FOUITOER OF THE JAMIAT-UL-ULE'^ 
"^ Shaikhul Hind Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hasan has .widely 
been accepted as the toundeir of this organisation by several 
writers on Muslim politics in India. This seems paradoxical 
since at the tirr.e of the formation of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema he 
48 
was interned by the British Government at Malta. He was 
in strict vigilance and there was censorship on his letters 
49 
and correspondence. Thus he was completely cut off froni what 
v;as going on in India and elsewhere. In this situation it 
was not even possible to be aware of relatives and friends 
not to talk of political matters. 
There are a lot of conflicting and con.tradictory views 
expressed by writers about the men who happened to organise the 
47. Ziaul Hasan Farooqi, op,cit., p.67, See also Robinson 
op.cit., p.354. 
Shaikhul<Hind Mawlana Mahmood-ul-Hesan got t h e 
Deobandis i n t o the Kh i l a f a t Movement. U n t i l l t h i s t ime , • 
they had not been p a r t i c u l a r l y a c t i v e in what they 
perceived t o be es~sential ly a p o l i t i c a l movement, in s p i t e 
of. i t s r e l i g i o u s background, Ga i l M i n a u l t , o p . c i t . , p . l 7 . 
4 8 . Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Safarnama A s i r - i - M a l t a / 
Deoband Saharanpur 1953-54), p . 7 2 , 
49. Husain Ahmad Madani, ITeqcha-e-Hiyat, Volume I I , o p . c i t . , 
p . 216. 
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movement within Indian politics. The version given by 
Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, Inayatullan of Firangi Mahli and Mawlana 
Sanaullah regarding the men who brought different Ulema are 
50 
contradictory. If Mawlana Inayatullan Firangi Mahli says 
that Mawlana 3ari was the founder of this organisation^ 
Mawlana Ahmad Saeed and Sanaullah give some other names. That 
51 
these accounts are based cannot be ruled out. 
A 
According to Qazi Adeel Abbasi, who was very active 
in those days the idea to unite the Ulema representing wisdom 
and vision belonging to different school of thought on a 
common platform was conceived by Mawlana 3ari who took the 
lead. He organised the Ulema on the tomb of Syed Rasulna of 
Delhi and acquainted them of the gravity of the situation and 
the necessity of finding an organisation exclusively of Ulema. 
He said: 
"We solemnly take a plea to forge an united front on 
all the problems which concerned the nation and the Mi Hat and 
all the ideological differences should not be allowed to 
52 
undermine the unity " 
50. For detail see, Hafeezur Rehman Kasif, op.cit., p.53. 
51. Ibid., p. 54. 
52. Qazi Adeel Abbasi, op.cit., p. 39. 
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If one keeps a close eye towards the activity of 
Mawlana 3ari one would find that he was very much concerned 
with the unity of Ulema and his various speeches speak the 
truth themselves. 
In his letter to an unnamed person in early 1919 
Mawlana 3ari wrote that the problem of defending the Khilafat 
and the noiy places was essentially one of elucidating the 
Shariah and thus the Ulemg should be the leaders of the Muslims 
in this issue, 3ut he regretted that the Ulema were not 
organised into a body to express unified opinion on the law 
53 
and thereby to direct the Muslim opinion. 
The spirit of this thinking is very much reflected 
in his address to various provincial Anjuman-e-Ulema and Sufi 
gathering during the year, in Bengal he quoted verses from 
the Holy Quran exhorting the followers ta support one another 
for unity among the Ulema, and only then could they truly act 
54 
as an spiritual guide for the community. 
53, Letter of Mav/lana 3aci to an unnamed person sometimes 
in early 1919, Mawlana AMul 3ari Papers, 
54. Abdul Bari, "Presidential Address to the An1uman-e-Ulema» 
Bengal/ Chittaqonq"? (Al Nizamiah, Lucknow, December 
191S-1919), pp. 1-13. 
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f 
Another effort to bring Ulema on a common platform 
was done in the presidential addreas in which he' appealed to 
the Ulema representing different conflicting schools of 
thought to cooperate among themselves _and give a lead to the 
Ulema of Deoband, Bareilly, 3adaun, Lucknow and Aligarh schools 
55 
of thought. 
At the annual pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh 
the 
Muinuddin Chisti of Ajmer'he togk/gdvantage of the presence 
of 3ufis and thsir disciples and urged them to unite on "the 
Khilafat- question. He further asked them to offer their 
pravers for the Caliph and called them tc an All-India 
56 
Conference. 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema throughout its existence stood 
for unconditional cooperation v;ith the Indian ITational 
Congress for the freedom of the country. The Ulema associated 
with it played a leading role in the Non-Cooperation and the 
Khilafat Movements and served ss a bridge between Muslim masses 
and the Congress leadership. Due to this role the Ja^iat 
leaders had to face persecution of the British Government in 
India on one hand and the wrath of Muslim League leaders on 
55, Abdul 3ari, Khutba-e-Sadarat (Presidential Address to 
the Anjuman-e-Ulema U.?. Ksnpur April 1, 192C),p?.l-2. 
56. Home (Fell) Deposit 1919, Proceedings ^. 
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the other who called them as traitors to Islam and mercenary 
57 
agents of Hindus, 
However, inspite of its close association with 
nationalist movement Jamiat in pre-independence always 
tried to cha-npion the cause of Muslims in its own way. This 
role of Jamiat can be seen in its opposition to the !Tehru 
58 
Report which was also opposed by the Muslim League. 
The J^ehru Report v;as published on 16th of August 1928 
and on 28th December 1928 an All-Parties convention was to 
be held to revi-'^ ^^  the recommendations of the report. In 
view of urgency the Jamiat hurriedly called a meeting of the 
orking co.nmittee v.'hich reflected its thought on divergent 
issues. The Jamiat criticised the psychology of the supporters 
of the Dominion Status and visualised that although the report 
v; 
57. :ioha-nmad Nora an, r^ .uslim India, Rise and Grovrth of the All-
India Muslim League, (Allahabad, 1942), pp. 213-214. 
58, The Nehru Committee formed under the Chairmanship of 
Motilal Nehru, ai:ned at framing an agreed constitution' 
for India in consultation with the elected members of 
the provincial and central legislative councils and 
leaders of tne other communal organisations. But the 
deliberations of the All-Parties Conference convened in 
February 1923, failed to satisfy the Muslims League and 
other Muslim organisations. The issue that was heavily 
debated v;as the reservation of Muslims in the provincial 
legislatures of Bengal and Punjab which was uha'niable 
to the Hindu Xahasabha and Sikh delegates. 
See, Ram Gopal, Infian 'uslim_3 ; A Political 
Eiogrcphy (3oi*opy 1"'5?) ," pp. 19B-2ou". 
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did not shut t"e door for further struggle of independence 
yet it V7as quite repugnant to the motto of the Jamiat v/hich 
59 
stood for complete independence. The Jaraiat said that it 
could accept a constitution v/ith only one Article, namely 
that India shall be independent. Dominion Status meant to 
the Jamiat as India's connection with the British empire in 
one v;av or the other^ which it could not tolerate. Pointing 
60 
to the other drav/backs of the report the review committee of 
the Jamiat pointed out that the report had gone a long way 
in minimising the autonomy of the provinces. The Governor-
general had been given over-riding powers, and the concept 
of Provincial Autonomy had become a farce. It emphasised that 
the autonomy was a prime necessity to ensure the development 
and oroaress of the provinces and maintain the balance amongst 
61 
them,, 
The Jamiat f u r t h e r r e j e c t e d the Kehra Report on the 
ground t h a t i t did not safeguard adequate ly the Muslim major i ty 
i n Bengal end t h e Punjab and did not g ive Muslims s u f f i c i e n t 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at the c e n t r e . ihe -Jamiat a l s o advocated for 
59 . Mawlana MohaTumad Xian, Jamiat-ul-uleme-e- ' - ' ind Kiva Hei, 
Volume I (Al-Jamiat P re s s , I'ew D e l h i ) , p , 147, 
60. I";iG., pp. 147-143. 
6 1 . Proceedin-g of the '''or'':i"^7 Committee cf t h e J a n i a t - u l -
Ulema-e-Hir.d, 1 r2S-'-'!inut6s of the 'Aor>:i"cr Commit'^^e, 
a v a i l a b l e in the I^ehru "emoria l >'useum and Library or. 
::icr'of i lm. 
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f 
the separation of Sind from 3ombav which was the popular 
62 
dernand of the inhabitants of the province. 
It had been agreed by the Jatiiat alongv.'ith the Congress 
and the Khilafat Coomittee that no bill in the 4egislature be 
introduced without the prior consent of the concerned co.-nmunity 
and could not be passed thereof unless and untill it had been 
voted by 3/4 majority of the concerned communities. The 
report fell far short of what the Jamiat had been striving 
for. Consequently the Jamiat caine heavily on the Nehru 
Report and claimed that while doing away with this demand, 
the com-nittee did not offer any alternative safeguard to 
63 
protect the interest of the minorities. They warned that the 
independence of the country depended on the recognition of 
64 
due safeguard>> to the interest of the minorities. 
Though the Muslim League and the Khilafat Conference 
joined the convention of December 1923 after sometime but 
the Ja-niat-ul-Ulcma adhered to its prior stanS, In response 
to the invitation of the Secretary of the All-Parties Conven-
tion addressed to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, for ^ participating in 
the Convention to review-the report, the forking Committee of 
62. Ibid, 
63. "-lav.-lana :^oheTnad Mian, op.cit., p. 149. 
64. Ibi-i., p. 149. 
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» 
the Jamiat-rul-Ulema at its Muradabad Session on 23rd Deceniber 
65 
1926, ruled out the recorfunendations of the Kehru .Report -and 
complained that the Kehru Committee was irregularly consti-
tuted and had no adequate Muslim representation in it and 
was not placed before the Muslim All-Parties Conference for 
its ratification. Therefore it did not consider it suitable 
in the interest of the Muslims to depute its representative to 
the Calcutta Convention. The JaTiiat-ul-Ulema further said 
that it could attend the Convention only when it first accepted 
the demands of various Muslim associations and another conven-
tion was appointed to prepare a constitution on the basis 
of mutual relation. This was a hope again'st hope and so it 
66 
never materialised. 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind realising a greater sen'se 
67 
of responsibility came out with their own proposals to solve 
the constitutional deadlock in India, "Ao lews were to be 
taught in school inimical to Isla'n, Cazi" courts were to be 
instituted, a department was to-be created to erect and main-
tain Muslim religious buidlings and th'::re were to be consti-
tutional safeguards for Muslims- Voting rights ' v.'ere to be 
65, A.M.Zaidi, Evolution of Muslim Political Thought in 
India, Volume III-- (S.Char.d and Company, Kew '^elhi 
pp. 378-90, 
-66, The Injisn Dailv Mgfl, Decernber 24, 1928. 
67. :iawl_ana Mohammad Mian, op.cit., -z-o. 161-165. 
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proportional to population and restricted to adults men only; 
the rights of the Muslim majority in Punjab and Bengal were 
to be guaranteed? Sind was to become a separate province; 
Muslim representative in Central Legislative Assembly was 
to be 1/3 of the elected membership; legislation affecting 
community interests were to be banned. 'There was to be 
reservation of seats for minorities and there was to be no 
relinguishing of separate electorate untill all these 
provinces agreed and safeguards had been enacted into a 
fundamental constitutional law, 
Jamiat^s stand on the question of separate electorate 
was yet another reflection of its adherence to the cause of 
Muslims. The Jamiat-ul-Ule:,na declared that the separate 
electorate was an absolute necessity for the Muslims and 
they wo-:ld hold fast to their right and never accept any 
68 
proposals wnich would snatch their rights from them. 
68, 8th Conference of Jamiat-ul-Ulema; December 2-5, 1927, 
The Jamiat came out with 7 proposals of its own 
for solving the constitutional problems; 
''1) There should be a separate province of Sind; 
(2) Complete reform should be introduced in the Frontier 
Provinces and Baluchistan; 
(3) There should be separate representation in Punjab 
and bengal too, proportionate to the population. 
14) The right to vote should be fixed accordinc ro the 
strength of population. 
Contd 
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These demands v;ere the result of the decision taken 
on 20th March, 1927 in Delhi where Jinnah presided over a 
69 
conference of Muslims, 
It was the triumph of the Jamiat Ulema that the 
Congress Working Committee and the All India Congress Committee 
(Continued from the prev ious page) 
-(5) No such bill should be allowed to be presented 
for consideration in any elected Assembly, which 
was considered harmful to the members of a minority; 
{6) The representation of the Muslims in the Central 
Legislative Assembly should be not less than l/3rd. 
(7) If a minority was given some concession in one 
province other minorities of other provinces too 
should become eligible to it. 
The Indian Annual -"^ errister, 1928. 
69. The Leader, 23 March 1927. 
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simply agreed to their demands as it was anxious to win the 
favour of the iluslim politicians and thereby taking the Janiiat 
into confidence. However, for this decision of the Congress 
Motilal Kehru, had to face the wrath of the Hindu messes and 
70 
the Congress leaders equally 
Even the press severely criticised Motilal for showing 
sympathetic attitude and supporting their cause. The quote 
Surya, "the Congress had become a handmaid " of Motilal Nehru 
and the sole function of the All India Congress Committee is 
to register their decrees. It was, therefore, a foregone 
conclusion that this views in the matter of Muslim offer 
71 
v;ould prevail and it is an open secret that he favours Muslims." 
In fact/ separate electorate, was the outcome of 
communal differences. The proolem was essentially one of 
mutual trust, Seoarate electorate should have been unnecessary 
in an atmosphere of confidence and cordially. 
The system of mixed representation was quite detrimental 
to the "^'.uslim interest. It was only through separate electorate 
^^- ^^g Leader, 25 March 1927. 
71» The Sur^ -a.- 5 June 1927. 
72. A Hemid, 'lus^ lim Seo^ r'tis-n in In^ie ; ^ 3rief Survey 
1959-1947, (Cxford, 1957), p.192, 
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that the Muslim interest and due representation could best 
be secured. The system of Joint electorate?, would have-
enabled Hindus to elect only those Muslims who were under 
tneir influence. The election to the Central Legislative -
Assembly from the mixed constituency of the city of Delhi 
in 1927 where -^.saf Ali, a Muslim Congressman of long stand-
ing and proven loyalty, was defeated by a Hindu candidate 
sponsored by the Hindu Mahasabha, can be quoted as an instance 
of the stranglehold of Joint electorate, , On the contrary 
separate electorate; had never prevented Congressite -luslims 
from making their v.'ay in purely Muslim.' constituencies. It 
is not insignificant that the twenty faithful Muslim followers 
of C.R.Das in the Bengal Legislature had been all elected on 
the basis of Separate represen;f:ion, 
KHILAFAI MOVEMENT AMD THE JAMIAT-UL-ULE?4A.-E-HIND 
The Khilefat Movement v;a3 a turning point in the 
aistory of Muslim politics i^ Iniia an'^  a rare exposure of 
Hindu-'luslim unity. The Uleraa v:ho vere already alarm'ea »;ith 
the growing threar to Islam and tampering with the religious 
institutions thought it the exigencies of time to lead the 
luslims in political, social and religious sph^ros. The 
7 " —^ A ^ ^ „,• . ^ -I o-> 
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Khilafat issue gave a further cause to their apprehension 
and forgetting their doctrinal dispute assembled on a conamon 
platform of Jamiat-ul-Ulema to give lead to the Muslims in 
a religious cum pglitical issue. The Muslim League though 
in control of progressive Muslims like HaXim Ajnal Khan, 
Dr. ^ 'i.A. Ansari and Ali Brothers, was set aside by the 
Khilafat Committee and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema whose leaders 
were bent upon undergoing all sorts of sufferings and 
74 
sacrifices in order to achieve their goal, without going 
into the details of the origin and progress of the movement 
one should only have to assess the role of the Jamiat in it. 
Mawlana 3ari endorsed the Non-Cooperation programme 
under the guidance of tiandhi. At the Jamiat meeting Abdul 
^ari said," I have accepted his support in getting our aims 
fulfilled and tor that matter I think it necessary to follow 
his advice. I knovj that the strength of Islam lies in 
75 
association v;ith him." The Congress resolution passed at the 
ITagpur session was strongly supported by a fat>.'e issued by 
Jamiat-ul-Ulsma, calling_ upor. "-'-^e I'.uslims to boycot- elections. 
74, Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 63. 
75, Speech delivered by Mawlana 3ari on 5th October 1920 
at the Jamiat meeting held in LucSnow,ABdul 3ari Papers? 
Heme Fell Deposire 1921, 4, 
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Government schools and colleges, end law courts and to renounce 
titles and ranks conferred by the Government. The decree 
76 
was signed by nearly 900 Ulena. In June 1920 Ma\'.'lana 3ari 
of Luclnow issued a fatwa signed by eminent divines declaring 
India to be Darul Harb, which oresented to the Muslims with 
' " 77 
the alternative of Jehad or Hij rat. This v^ as reiterated in 
November 1920 as the Muttafiga Fatawa. A large number of 
Muslim divines were sent to Jail. The appeal of the decree 
v;as so strong that a large number of Muslims migrated to 
78 
Afghanistan where only miseries and sufferings were in store. 
Earlier, tne first session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, 
presided over by Mawlana 3ari, appealed to the British Govern-
ment to send Mr. Asfahani and Mushir Masan Kidwai to represent 
Indians in peace negotiation alongv/ith Mr. Lloyd 3eorge^ The 
Jamiat-ul-l'1' ".a was suspicious that tne peace terms would not 
be in consonance with the religious feelings of the Muslims 
If Indians v.'ere r.ot r£"rcce--ea in the conference it v.ojld 
79 
hcve to face the wrath of the. crores of Indians. 
76. 1921 Move-ient Heminiscencet Published by the Government 
of India, p?. 21-22. 
77. Jbid._. pp. 31-32. 
78. Rajendra Prasad, Ind ia Divided 3rd e d i t i o n , (Hind Ki tabs 
l t d . Bombay, 1942), p . I 2 l . 
79. I s t Session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulcma held on 29th December 
1?19 at ;j-'-ritser (Al-Jamiat 3cok Depot, De lh i ) , p . 7 . 
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Again, speaking at the Bengal provincial Conference, 
held at Calcutta under the Presidentship of A^ awlana-Azad, 
Mawlana 3ari in his most vi61ent and forceful speech said 
that the Muslim of India would abandon their loyalty to the 
Government if the decision of the peace conference with regard-
80 
to Turkey went against their wishes, 
Mawlana Bari also used his good offices to resolve 
the apprehension of the Indian Muslims with regard to the 
possible peace terms offered to Turkey. In a telegram to tne 
3egum of Shopal Mawlana 3ari requested to use. her influence 
in Governcnent for the preservation of the se.nctlty and 
integrity of holy places and supreme soiritual authority of 
81 
Caliphate as well as the independence of Muslim countries. 
Mawlana 3ari in his anothertfelegrara to the Secretary of State 
for India also briefed him v:ith the feelings of the Indian 
Muslims with regard to the Khilafat issue, 'deferring to the 
proposal to convert St. Stophia into church in Constantinople 
he criticised the Government for unnecessary-interference with 
religious institutions of the Muslims vmich v;as contrary to 
the declaration of statesmen of England and Allies that the 
80. Confidential Report on the Non-Cooper=tioh and Khilafat 
Movements in India by Deputy Director, Central intelligence 
3'areau, Home Department Government of India, pp.240-242. ^  
81. -.Uome Deott. Political A, ^roceedinc June 1919 r.os. 362-76. 
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holy and sacred places of Islam shall remain free from all 
82 
interference. 
The British Government assured the Indian Muslims, 
regarding the fate of the Khilatat in~I\irkey that the question 
of the Khilafat \/as one for Muhammadans to decide and that 
83 
tne Government had no desire to interfere. The Secretary 
of State further assured that whatever decision the British 
v/ould take it would be in- keeping with the sentiments of 
.••'.uslim India. Similar assurance were given bv the British 
84 
Prime Minister as well. 
True to the apprehension of the Jainiat-ul-Ulema the 
peace terra issued to 'I'urkey were not palliative to the 
Muslim India. This caused the deepest concern and the whole 
country, was ablaze. On 22nd June 1920 a Muslim delegation 
presented a memorandum to the Viceroy Lord Reading, requesting 
him to ask the Government of Britain to .revise its peace terms 
and threatened that in case the Government did not meet their 
85 
demand they would stop cooperating with it. 
82. Ibid. 
^ -^ Home Deott. Political A, Proceedings June 1919 Nos. 
362-76; Home Deptt. Political F.No.16/1971 
^^ - Home Deptt. Political A, Proceedings June 1919 Nos. 362-76 
^^' Home Deott. Political A.November 1920. 19-31, 
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3ut finding Government ctherxvise the Jarr.ist directed 
86 
the students to boycott the Snglish Schccls and Col-leges, " 
The Jamiat further in viev/ of the uneven distribution of the 
Muslim community directed its members to mobilise the >'uslim 
masses for the non-cooperation with the Government. 
3efore the session of the Khilafat Conference, held 
at Congress Pandal on 15th September 1920 at Calcutta, Mawlana 
Syed Husain Ahmad Madani moved a resolution on the non-
cooperation. The resolution declared that non-cooperation was 
a religious obligation binding on all Muslims of India and 
they should therefore carry out their religious duty most 
successfully and devotedly with united effort in connection 
87 
with the Khilafat Movement. 
Thereafter in October 1920 Shai>:hul Hind Mahmood-ul-
Hasan gave a call for the boycott of educational institutions 
manned by the British Government which was the greatest enemy 
of Islam and Muslims of India. He gave a religious sanction 
88 
to it by a Tatwa. He also made a tour of the united provinces 
exhorting the Muslims to follow the lead of the Congress and 
work for the success of the non-cooperation. 
86. A.M.Zaidi, oo.cit.. Volume 2, p. 518, Second Session of 
the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, December 17-19, 1920. 
87. The Indian Heview 19207 p. 584. 
3S. Bashier Ahmad, TahriM-e-M'^ .velat [Deozand 1 = 20), p.53. 
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The Ja-Tiiat-ul-ylema at its Third Session of Lahore 
under the Pres identship. ' of Mawlana Azad declared, t h a t 
hence fo r th i t v;ould be an ac t of s in on t h e p a r t of t he 
I'luslims t o be in the p o l i c e end m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s . The 
r e s o l u t i o n f u r t h e r a s s e r t e d t h a t in pursuance of the Is lani ic 
s h a r i a h the Muslims should t r y t o d i s s o c i a t e themselves from 
t h e B r i t i s h as i t ( the B r i t i s h force manned by Indian Muslims) 
was being used aga ins t t h e Muslim s t a t e s for k i l l i n g Muslim 
p o p u l a t i o n . The Jamiat f u r t h e r forbade t h e Muslims t o d i s s o -
c i a t e themselves from j o i n i n g t h e non-Muslims ( B r i t i s h e r s ) 
i n the b a t t l e aga ins t t he Muslims as i t would add to t h e 
grandeur of the i n f i d e l s ( B r i t i s h e r s ) with the l o s s of t h e 
89 
p r e s t i g e and s t r e n g t h of I s lam. The Jamiat got quick r e s -
ponse . In NoveiTiber 1921 a l a r g e number of Muslim policemen 
tendered t h e i r r e s i a n a t i o n s . They v/ere 31,40/ and 17 in 
90 
U . P , , Bengal, and Bombay r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Notwithstanding i t was a p i t y t h a t t he re were a 
number of Ulema of g r e a t s t a t u r e who did not cooperate with 
t h e i r c o - r e l i g i o n i s t s i n the Kh i l a f a t and rlon-codp^ration 
Movements and went on c r i t i c i s i n g and accusing those involved 
in t he se movements for coopera t ing with the Hindus. Mawlana 
39 . A.M..,6aidi> o p . c i t . . Volume 2, pp. 520-521. 
50. J.M.Brownf Gandhi 's Pdse t o Power ;^ Ind ian P o l i t i c s 
1915-1922 -(Cambridge, J 9 7 2 ) , p . 309. 
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i 
Ahniad Raza Khan, the founder of 3 r e l v i School \-ias a r taunch 
c r i t i c of t he Kh i l e f a t and Non-cooperat ion M<?ve-;entg, He 
91 
formed t h e , JaTiaa t - i -Ansar -u l - I s lam t o counter the K h i l a f a t i s t s . 
Mawlana Mohemiiiad Mian in h i s P r e s i d e n t i a l Address et the 
J a m a a t - i - A n s a r - u l - I s l a m Conference denounced the Khi la fe t 
Movement and opposed the advocate of Kh i l a f a t and I'Ton-
coopera t ion Movements for j o i n i n g hands with Congress. E a r l i e r 
i n 1920 Raza Khan had i s sued fatwa fo rb idd ing the Muslims 
t o j o i n the Hindus and h a r s h l y a t tacked t h e Ulema for coopera-
92 
ting the Congress in the Khilafat and Non-cooperetion Movement. 
Ke considered jandhi as the enemy of Muslims who exploited 
them to further the political objectives of the Hindus, 
Ironically enough Jinnah, more concerned v,'ith champion-
ing the cause of the Muslim community than the Jamiat (as the 
leaguers claim) criticised the Pseudc^-religious flavour of 
the Non-cooperation !lovement'Vigo^O"S and tiresome labour of 
Mawlana 3ari and Mohammad Ali, to convince him in favour of 
93 
the movement, ended in a fiasco. 
91, An article by Syed Jalaluddin f The Brelvis and the 
Khilafat Movement; edited and compiled by Mushirul Hasan 
in comnunalism and ?an Islamic trends in colonial India/ 
.'New Delhi, 1?S1), p. 3 49. 
r3. '-Mushirul Hasan, I'etio-elis"^  ?nd CgmT.ur.el Pclitics in 
India, or.cit., c, 175. 
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Later Jinnah opposed a purely rsligioijs issue like 
Khilafat Movement and then dennanded a separate state in the 
forn:i of Pakistan on purely religious grounds. This v.'as nothing 
but ? political gimmikery. In fact, the Janiiat politics was 
much more desirable than the Srelvis or the !luslira Leaguers • 
'.'vTiile Jamiat stood for unflinching cooperation with other 
comnunities, Jinnsh or Brelvis dissociated themselves from 
the Hindus. The Jamiat leaders knew and rightly diagnosed 
that the Khilafat agitation would not be a success without 
the cooperation of the Hindus, Although, the wrongs done 
to institution of Khilafat could not be rectified against 
the ruthless vengeance of British imperialism yet Jamiat's 
intention and sincc-rity for the good of the Muslims could not 
be challenged. Nevertheless its close relations v;ith the 
nationalist forces in the country, the Jamiat throughout 
its existence acted in accordance with the Shariah and gave 
its preference over the cause of proedom Mov3^Gnt. Its role 
with regard to. the Khilafat question, !'ehru Report, communal 
riots of 1922-27; its opposition to the Sangathan and Shuddbi 
Movements,- speaks the truth of its adherence to' the cause. 
MUTTAFIQA.,' FATV'A: 
:ieanwhile Mawlana Abdul 3ari was t r y i n g t o get an 
unanimous fetw^ i n favour of Non-vio lent Non-coopera t ion . 
In t h i s endeavour he "had t o t r ? v e l t o thp nook pnd co rne r 
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of the country in order to moioilise the people for the 
Jc -t-ul-Ulema at its historic meerin T at Delhi in Novc;nber 
1920, The ''^ tw? v/as in zhe form of religious verdict based 
on the Quranic Vc^rses and Hedith (Prophetic traditions), v;hich 
beca-ne famou^as the Muttaf igua- Fatv;a in the history of the 
Khilafat Move.nent:. The f_a^tv/a_ bore the seals of the celebrated 
Muslim divines such as Mav;lana Kifayetullah. of Delhi, Mawlana 
Syed Sulaiman Nadwi, a former disciple of Mawlana Shibli, 
Ma\/lana Azad, Mawlana Daod Gha^nevi, Mawlana Sanaullah of 
Amritsar, Mawlana Azizur Rehman, Mufti of Darul Uloom Deoband, 
Shah Sulaiman Phulwari, a leading Sufi of Bihar and all the 
95 
followers of Abdul 3ari of Firangi Mahal. 
Follo\;ing are the main points of the Patwa: 
1. It v;as unlawful ^-O be the me.-nber of Legislotive Council. 
2. It was unlawful to practise in Covernm-nt courts, 
3. It was unlawful to get education in Government schools 
and colleges find in those aided by the Government. 
4. It was unlav/ful to keep honorary magistracy, honorary 
ranks and the titles given by the Government. 
'^4. Home Deptt. of Political 1921 F.Mo. 137. 
95. CID list of names of Mawlvis Signing Fatwa .^ arch 15, 
1^19. '!ome Political A, 415-26, 7-\u7Ust 1919. 
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5. All the Goveranent services from vjhich the Government 
received help v/ere forbidden (Harara) specially of the 
army and police. It was a serious sin as they were duty 
bound to shot their brothers end God says in Holy Quran, 
Surah Mairaj, "Whoever will intentionally slaughter any 
Muslim will be punished in hell for ever" and the holy 
Prophet had said "whoever lifted weapon against Muslim 
96 
v.'ould cease t o be a Muslim." 
However, t he fgtwa^ was not unanimous, A number of 
c e l e b r a t e d Muslim d iv ine s who refused to endorse the fatwa, 
V7ere "'lawlana Abdul Hamid and Abdul Majid, Abdul "Bari 's old 
r i v a l s a t F i r ang i Mahal, Ashraf Al i 'Thanvi , a d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
97 
produc t of Deoband and Habibur Rehiaan Khan Sherwani of A l iga rh . 
Mav;lana Hafiz Mohammad, t h e Rector of Darul Uloom, though 
agreed with t h e objec t of t h e Fatvra was r e l u c t a n t i n view of 
98 
t h e anti-Government tone of Abdul 3 a r i . He s t i l l be l i eved 
i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o l i c y t c p e t i t i o n the Government. He 
a l s o objected t h a t t h e fatwg_ h^s taken l i b e r t y v;ith the 
Shr.r iah. .'-lawlana Raza Khan had talccn l i b e r t y with the Shariah,* 
96, Conf iden t i a l Report on the non-cooperct ion and Kh i l a f a t 
Movement by Deputy D i r e c t o r I n t e l l i g e n c e Bureau, Govern-
ment of I n d i a , pp . 162-163, 
97, Home P o l l , 415-25, August, 1919, 
98, Hafiz "lohammed Ahmad, t o Abdul 3 a r i , February 11,23 and 
March 25, 1919, Abdul 5a r i ?at)ers . 
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In his long rejoinder he questioned the validity of the Fatwa 
from Islamic point of view. His contention was that if it 
with 
v;as wrong to have Mavalat / the British (Kafir) the same 
99 
-would have been true to the Hindus. The other point of objec-
tion was certainly the extent to which the authority of the 
fatv;a had gone in cooperating with the Hindus. Swami 
Shraddhananda/Who later organised Sangathan Movement/was 
taken in a procession to the Jama Masjid, Delhi and was 
100 
allowed to address the psople from uhe pulpit of Jama Masjid. 
This was the extent tc which the Ulema should had not gone 
and this vvas highly objectionable to the non-followers of the 
101 
•Fatwa^  
Inspite of the criticism levelled against the MuttafJQa 
Fatvja_ it had produced good results. Much hatredness v;as created 
against the British and the loyalists. The hatredness against 
the loyalists v;as so great that the dead body of a Nawab 
102 
remained unburried for many days.' Hartals were organised in 
99. Ishtiaque Kusain Qureshi, Ulema in PoliticS/Op.cit./P.270, 
100. Ibid., p, 270. 
101. Ibij., p. 270. 
102. K.M.Ashraf/ A Political Hiszory of Indian Muslims 
\ J.->~i i—j.y-r I/ xij .-iuax.i.ai jLu^xa-/ cruiteu JJ^ ^ a t a r xiuaiii 
(Delhi , 1975), p . 35. 
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various parts of the country and anti-British slogans shouted. 
The effect of the fatwa v.'as causing great anxiety to the 
103 
Government so, it ordered for its confiscation. 
Despite its proscription the Khilefat leaders con-
tinued to circulate it to every segments of society. The 
Government waited for an opportunitv to remove the Khilafat 
104 
leaders from circulation. Amongst the Xhilafatists only 
Mohammad Ali and Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani were posing 
threat to Government. Their arrest became crucial for the 
British authority which had been suggesting some 'strong 
action against the individuals who attemoted to tamper the 
• 105 
loyalty of Indian troops. Reason was obvious. Mohammad Ali 
V7as the leader of the Khilafatists and Mawlana Husain Ahmad 
was the author of the resolution v;hich v/as oassed in the 
106 
Karachi Khilafat conference in July 1921, This conference had 
passed the resolution which asked the soldiers and police to 
107 
resign from Government services as it v/as hg^ ram. At the 
103. All Indian Congress Committee Papers F.:7o.6/1922, Part I 
104. Gail Minault, op.cit., p. 169. 
105. The statements of C.W.Jacob Rawlinson, 'W.S.Delamin V.'.H. 
Vincent See^Home Deptt.Politicgl F.ro.155/1922. 
106. K.L.Gauba, Famc^ jis and Historical Trials; (Lahore 1946) 
p.23. 
107. Home Peptt.Political F.No.155,1922 and F.No.114/1922. 
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instigation of these Ulei.na leaflets were circ-ulated in t'he 
Indian Army v;hich directed the Muslims serving in the Army to 
renounce their services because their service raay be used 
against their ovrn breth-rn. The leaflet further rem infd them 
of the Quranic verses th?.t if a Musliti murdered a fellow 
M .slim, he V:OU1Q be punished in the hell for ever and v;hosoC'Ver 
raised the v;eepon against a Muslim was out of the pale of 
108 
Islam. The resolution and the leaflet were a clear act of 
sedition against the Crovn v/hich would have shaken the whole 
fabric of British imperialism. Due to such seditious activi-
ties of Ali Brothers and Mawlana Husain Ahmad, their arrest 
became imminent. They v;ere thus rounded up alongwith Dr. 
Kitchlew, Kisar Ahmad, Shanker Acharya and Pir Ghulam Mujadid 
109 
on the charge of sedition against the Crown. Mav;lana Husain 
Hadani alongvjith others/excluding Ali Brothers, x-^as charged 
110 
under Section 120-3, 131 and 505 of Indian Penal Code, and 
111 
was sent to the Karachi Jail to await "trial. The Government 
found him guilty of making statements conducive to mischief 
112' 
and sentenced him to two years of vigorous imprisonment. 
108. The'Pioneer, July 30, 1921. 
109. The Madina , (Bijnor) August 12, 1921, 
110. Ibid., p.7 in the editorial. 
111. The Madina . September 20, 1921. 
ri2. Ibid., October 15, 1921. 
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The arrest of J^ li Brothers and others created country-
wide. consternation. Their arrest had added more to their 
power and influence. But Minault does not believe that -he 
113 
agitation was bec-ause of the arrest of the Karachi prisoners. 
On the other hand she feels that there was no agitation 
because the Ali Brothers had apologized for their deeds and 
thus thev had get no influence. lut the Government confidential 
114 
reports speak otherwise. Truly neither did Ali Brother apolo-
gize to the Government nor j was there any dearth of meeting 
115 
for the cause they stood. 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Bombay in its resolutions con-
demned the arrest and called it a direct interference in Islam, 
as the Karachi Fatv;^  was in accordance with the Quranic 
116 
injunctions.-
113. Gail Minault, op.cit., p. 170. 
114. -ome Deptt. (POL), 459, 1921, See also K.L.Gauba, 
op.cit., p. 32. 
115. Home ?oll, 459, 1921, See, also K.L. Gauca, op.cit., 
p. 32. 
116. The - Independent, November 25, 1921; See also proceedings 
of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind available on microfilm 
at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library; ' The Bombay 
Chronicles, September 1921. 
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The Khilafat leadership felt the need to renew their 
campaign to embrass the Government and issued a manifesto in 
which they upheld the Karachi resolution declaring army service 
117 
as unlawful. The Ulema and the Khilafat Committee resolved 
that the Karachi resolution was in accordance with the Quranic 
re 
injunction as it was a further endorsement of the Muttafiqa 
Fatwa. The Government's utterances and its action to arrest 
the Khilafat leaders and the proscription of the Fatwa was 
widely condemned as they thought it to be an attack on Islam 
itself. Consequently they expressed their determination to 
reprint the fatwa which must be channelised through every 
' - 118 
platform including the religious institutions and pulpits. 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Delhi showed great courage in 
responding to the call. The provincial Jamiat-ul-Ulema of 
Delhi telegraphed Gandhi for perroission to start civil dls-
119 
obedience to protest against the arrest of the Khilafat 
leaders and the confiscation of fatwa but Gandhi did not 
respond. The Jaraiat on getting no reply from Gandhi decided 
117, Bombay Chronicles/ October 5, 1921, 
118, Gail Minault, op.cit., p.171, 
The fatwa generated great enthusiasm amongst the 
people especially in the areas in which the Karachi 
seven defendents had large followings; 
Sail Minault, op,cit,, p.172, 
119, C.A.Barron Chief Commissioner of Delhi to H.D.Craik/ 
Secretary to the Government of India, Delhi, 2 
September 1921. Home Deptt. (POL) 1921 F.No. 137. 
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to fight the battle at its own. Several private and public 
meetings were held in Delhi to forntula e the way of action. 
The first public meeting on the subject was held on 23rd of 
August at Pataudi House in Delhi. It was reported that there 
was more religious enthusiasm among the Muslims than had been 
120 
witnessed since the Ulema conference in November 1920, This 
meeting was addressed by Mawlana Musain Ahmad Madani, riawlvi 
Ahmad Saeed of Delhi and Kifayetullah in which the conscription 
of Fatwa was condemned, Mawlana Ahmad Saeed-viewed the pros-
cription as Sacrilege for it was an abstract of the orders of 
121 
God, He further asked the Jamiat to start civil disobedience 
at its own to be backed by the Muslims. But this move of the 
122 
Jamiat was objected by Hakim Ajmal Khan and Azad. As a matter 
of fact they were more positive in their approach than the 
Jamiat/ for a purely Muslim civil Disobedience Campaign could 
have alienated the Muslims from the Hindus, which would have 
been followed by communal cleavage. 
120, Home Department (POL) 1921, F,No,137, 
121, Ibid,, the resolution passed at the meeting condemned 
the action of the Government of prescribing the fatwa 
of Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind by Police and viewed it as a 
great insult to Islam and Ulema and expressed its deep 
indignation*see; Ibid, 
122, Home Poll, 1921, F,No,137, 
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SHUDDHI AND SA^ TGTHAN M0VExME2?T AITO THE ROLE OF JAMIAT 
Alarmed by the shuddhi M ovement,started by the Hindus 
to reconvert Muslims and the Malkana Rajputs who had retained 
Hindu customs and practice, and Sangthan movement for popularis-
123 
ing warlike exercise among Hindus , the Jamiat-ul-lllema-e-
Hind formed the Tablighul Islam to combine various schools of 
124 
thought for joint action against Shuddhi and Sanghthan. It 
exhorted the Muslim youths to be up in fighting the enemies 
of Islam. A special department of Tabligh was constituted by 
125 
the Jamiat to look after the problem and funds of the Muslims 
raised by the Jamiat Ulema. The Jamiat regatded the Shuddhi 
and Sangathan Movement as an attack on Islam and Islamic 
nationalism. In its view it was the religious duty of the 
Indian Muslims to exhibit sacrifice both in terms of men and 
money,for even a slight unawarenesa^ would be catastrophic 
126 
both to Islam and Islamic nationalism. Efforts of the Jamiat 
did not go waste. A number of the prominent Ulema and Sufi 
123. Peter Hardy, True partners in freedom and true Muslims-' 
Political Thought of some Muslim Scholars in British 
India 1912"1947 (Scandinavian institute of Asian Studies, 
1971), p. 161. 
124. Mushirul Hasan, op.cit., p. 251. 
125. Mohammad Mian, op.cit., p. 61, 
126. Ibid., p. 62, 
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i n c l u d i n g Khwaja Hasan Nizaiii of the s h r i n e of Nizamuddin 
127 
Auliya in Delhi began a Muslim miss ionary movement. This 
e f f o r t was applauded by t h e Jamiat -u l -Ulema, The Ahmadiya 
128 
group of Muslim sect also cooperated with the Tabligh efforts. 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema, thus, as a counter reaction "Organised their 
troops and started their rationale.'' 
Even in such an atmosphere of mutual hatred the Jamiat-
ul-Ulema, an apostle of Hindu-Muslim unity, had been trying 
to passify the Hindus and Muslims. Syed Husain Ahmad from the 
Jamiat platform told that as Islam required every Muslim to 
do his utmost to overcome his enemy, the Hindu-Muslim entente 
could above enable them to work for it. The Jamiat resolved 
that as swaraj depends on unity both Hindus and Muslims should 
work together to bring about it. The conference condemned 
those Activities which are likely to weaken the basis of unity 
129 
and considered their promoters as enemy of the nation. The 
Jamiat held that it was the duty of every man to preserve and 
preach his faith and religion. But the manner in which that 
campaign had been carried on showed that its sponsors were the 
127. Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiya Movement, A History and" 
Perspective, Chapter 6 (Manohar 3ook service, ueihi 
'1974) . 
128. Gail Minaul-^ , op.cit., p. 193, 
129. Indian Ann^aal Reg i s te r Volume I I , 5th Session of t h e 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema .Conference, Cocanada, 29 December 1923. 
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worst enemies of Islam, The Jamlat affirmed that conversion 
campaign must keep in view that those were to be taken back 
130 
who really believe in that faith. 
Meanwhile the Muslims accused the Arya Samajists of 
coercive method to achieve reconversion. Khwaja Hasan Nizami 
131 
received a number of letters threatening his life. These 
unhealthy trends pained the Jamiat. Mawlana Abdul 3ari, the 
erstwhile apostle of Hindu-Muslim unity, urged the fiuslims to 
restart the sacrificing of cows, which the Muslims on the 
132 
appeal of Bari had abandoned, it was mainly due to the anti-
Muslim propaganda carried on by the Sangathan which eventually 
133 
led to communal riots in Ajmer in July 1925, An Inquiry 
Committee formed to visit the riot striken area blamed the 
Shuddhi and Sangathan Movement -which in their own turn gave 
134 
rise to counter agitation amongst the MusaLnans. 
Despite the repeated onslaught on the Muslims and their 
religion, there were other schools of thought who did not 
130. Ibid. 
131. Home (Poll) 6/IX, 1Q24. Mawlana Mohammad Mian, Volume 2, 
pp. 57-59. 
132. Robinson, op.cit., p. 339, 
133. Home Deptt. (Poll) 1S24, F.No. 249. 
134. AICC Papers rM-:o.3, 1Q2?.. 
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cooperate with the Jamiat, Although various other organisa-
tions like the Anjuman-e-Tahaffuz Islam, Anjumana Hifa2at-4-
Islam and Anjuman-e-Hurriyat-i-Islam had started but they 
could not come closer to each other due to bitter doctrinal 
135 
disputes. The Majlis-e-Ahrar/a group of a nationalist Ulema 
136 
of Habibur Rehman^remained aloof. But credit goes to the 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema who succeeded in meeting the challenge of the 
Hindu zealot. Its efforts not only brought back more than 
11,000 apostles into the fold of Islam but also resulted in 
the conversion of more than 2,000 non-Muslims who accepted 
137 
Islam and became part of the Indian Muslim community. In 
this endeavour it organised missionary activities among the 
malkanas and Mawlana Mohammad Irfan, who was attached to the 
138 
Jamiat as an active missionary, did good field work, i»o over-
come the paucity of fund, the Jamiat forced the Khilafat 
Committee, much against the will of some politically minded 
139 
Khilafatists, to donate Rs. 50,000, 
135. Home Deptt. (POL) 1925, 140. 
136. I.H.Qureshi, op.cit., p, 259, 
137. Mohammad Mian, op.cit., p. 62. Also craoted by Ziaul 
Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p. 77. 
138. I.H. Qureshi, op.cit., p. 289, 
139. Robinson, op.cit., p. 337. 
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The Jamiat Uleraa-i-Hind's adherence and determination 
to protect the Islamic Shariah.was reflected in its opposition 
to the tampering of Shariah by the British Government, The 
Muslim League under M.A. Jinnah gave its full support to 
these amendments to the Muslim Personal Law. This was too 
much for the Jamiat to tolerate. They protested, agitated 
and organised campaign against this unjust enchroachment of 
the Government and the misguided Muslim Legislatuires„Qnrthe 
140 
provision of Islamic Law. Moreover, the Civil Marriage Act 
of 1912 introduced by Shopendranath and endorsed by Jinnah, 
141 
the Shariah Bill of 1937, provides a significant testing ground 
of the role of Jamiat to the cause of the jjreservation of 
Islamic Shariah. 
The Muslim League called the Jamiat-ul-Ulema as the 
,• 142 
traitor and the campfollowers of the Congress. But there are 
instances when the Jamiat everM^ - went on to oppose the decisions 
of the Congress as and when the Muslim interest came in the 
way* At such occasions violent remarks were passed against 
Gandhi and Congress by the J&miat leaders. Mawlana Abdul Bari 
if 
was vehemental ly opposed t o Gandhi ' s p o l i c y of non-v io lence 
t o achieve t h e i r ends . Bari sounded warning t h a t i f Gandhi 
140. Z iau l Hasan Farooqui , o p . c i t . , p . 77 See f o o t n o t e s . 
141 . For d e t a i l a n a l y s i s see Chapter l V , p . / 6 3 ^ /^V 
142.' Sa iy id Tufa i l Ahmad, Iijusalmano Ka Roshan Mustaobi l , 
fnplhi 1945), p . 73 . 
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did not change his strategy of moderation and caution, the 
143 
Muslims may desert him and recourse to the violent method. 
To Mawlana Bari the non-violent methods was a weapon to get 
their grievances redressed but they never Committed themselves 
144 
to always adhere to this principle. 
The Jamiat leadership could not reconcile themselves 
with Gandhi that complete independence could not be incorporated 
in view of the disharmony between Hindus and Muslims. The con-
tention of the Jamiat was that the question of Swaraj should 
145 
be defined in terms of complete independence, Mawlana 
Kdfayetullah./ the President of the «^amiat-ul-Ulema, said that 
rejectior^f the proposal of complete independence had dis-
heartened and disappointed the Musalmans. If it is 
accepted it would remove that feeling but if the Congress 
146 
rejected it the Musalmans would in a body demand it. Abdul 
Majid Badauni reacted in a rather harshword. He was reported 
to have remarked, "if Gandhi does not favour complete indepen-
dence we would advise him to join the illustrious group of . 
i 
143. Statement by Bari to the press entitled "We are forced 
to revise our proggamme" June 1921; Home Deptt. (POL) "1921/ 
45, 
144. Ibid. 
145. P.C. Bomford, Histories of the Non-Cooperation and 
Khilaf-at Movements; (Deep Publications. Delhi, 1974), p.201. 
146. Home Deptt. (POL), 868, 1922. 
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147 
Jee-hazoors who would welcome him with open arms." Abdul Barl 
also expressed his apprehension that Swaraj would prove bene-
148 
ficial to the Hindus but not to the Musliias. 
AnunHrid<3f€able gap was thus created between the Ulema 
and the Congress. At a time when the ijon-cooperation and 
Khilafat Movement was at full swing and gaining wide currency 
the decision of Gandhi to suspend the entire movement on the. 
pretex of Chauri Chaura incident amazed the Jamiat leaders 
greatly. Mawlana Bari condenned the 3ardoli resolution passed 
149 
by the Congress Working Committee in February 1922, In a 
fiery speech he comclained that non-violence had failed in 
getting their demand fulfilled and asked the Muslims to 
150 
advance their demands themsevles. This resolution was latter 
supported by a number of Ulema. Criticising Gandhi for his 
wrong policies, Mawlana Sari said that Gandhi had exhausted 
all the items of his programme and no arrow was now left in 
his quiver. The Mtisalmans would not remain silent but need 
151 
some forward progra-rune for the achievement of their aims. 
147. The Zulqarnain, 120 June, 1922 
148. A.C.Niemeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India 1919-1921 
(The Hague 1972), pp, 148-149, ~~ 
149. Robinson, op.clt., p. 334, 
150. The Madina.., (Bijnor) March 7, 1922. 
151. Home Deptt. (POL) 1922, F.No.501. 
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In a reply to a question about Bardoli decision Bari was 
reported to have said, "to me Gandhi is like paralytic whose 
limbs are not in control but whose mind is still active, I 
am doubtful of his future (success) because he has not yet 
acquired much success from (non-violent) method," There was 
152 
general repression all over. Although Gandhi succeeded in 
extracting a temporary recantation from Bari but he remained 
153 
firm on his prior stand. In a welcome address to the Annual 
Session of Jamiat held in late December 192,3 Mawlvi Abdul Rauf 
touching the political issues in the counti-y said that the 
non-cooperation had revolutionised the Indian mind but its 
great success was prevented by the BardoliImistake of its 
154 
author in suspending the offensive, 
"CONTROVERSY OVER COUNCIL ENTRY AND THE JAMIAT" 
^ Soon after the collapse of the non-cooperation fresh 
political turmoil was in the offing. Both Pandit Motilal Nehru 
152, Press Statement of Mawlana Abdul 3ari, 22nd February, 1922 
Abdul Bari Papers, 
153. Francis Robinson, op.cit., p, 339. 
In a statement to the Tribune on 21st March 1922 
Mawlana Bari said, "Proceeding of the Bardoli and Delhi 
meetings had depressed me and I said so in my speeches. 
I have now met Gandhi and he has fully satisfied me that 
further efforts on our part can make the movement a 
success. I am determined to continue peaceful non-
violence 6o long as I am convinced of success of the • 
pacific movement as I have already made it quite clear 
in my speeches," 
P,C, 3omford, op.cit., p.201. 
154,- Khutba-e-Sadarat Jamiat-Ulema-e-Hjnd, Fourth Session of 
the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, available at Nehru Memorial 
Museum and Library (See tiiccofilm)., .J^e also A Moin Zaidi 
op.cit., p, 615, 
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and Chitranjan Das could not reconcile th^selves with the 
Gandhian strategy to boycott the elections to the Council. 
C.R.Das true to his realistic conviction doubted the-efficacy 
of direct action in the prevailing circumstances and advocated 
the political fight inside the legislature. Now the issue 
at discussion was not to revive the Civil Disobedience Move-
ment but whether or not to fight the council elections of 
1923, Both Khilafat Committee and Congress were divided 
amongst themselves on this issue. While the Khilafat enquiry 
committee advocated against the council entry. Sheikh Zahoor 
155 
Ahmad differed and the issue could not be solved. The Khilafat 
Committee decided to postpone the decision till December 1922, 
The Congress was sharply divided on the issue. Though Hakim Ajmal 
Khan,Motilal Nehru and Patel agreed with the proposals but forward 
by C.R.Das but he was vehemently criticised by a Section of 
156 
Congress,-led by Shri Rajgopalacharya and Kasturiranga Iyengar,The 
contention of the non-changers was that the acceptance of 
157 
the proposal would mean the repudiation of Gandhis leadership, 
Mawlana Azad thinks that Rajgopalacharya*s contention was not 
based on sound foundation. Das was only resorting to recon-
cile with the Government. The pro-changers proposed the 
resolution in the Central Legislature for the release of Gandhi 
155, Robinson, op,cit., p, 336, 
156, Mawlana Azad, India Wins Freedom ; An Autobiography 
Narrative, "(Orient Longman's Calcutta, 1959), p.11. 
157, Mawlana Azad, op.cit-., p. 11. 
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ise 
from Jail. 'So there was no question of defsiining or aversion 
of Gandhis leadership. Like the Khilafat Conference the All 
India Congress Committee also postponed its decision till the 
159 
Gaya Session. 
Like the Congress and the Khilafat Conference the 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema was too divided into the two schools of 
thought. The issue at point was that if the Jamiat won the 
election would it join the Legislature or boycott the council 
altogether. 
In his welcome address to the Fourth Annual session of 
the Jamiat Mawlana Abdul Rauf-. of Danapur denounced the idea' of 
entering the council without any constructive programme. His 
contention v/as that the Congress would not achieve any subs-
tantial gain through the council than the present councillors 
and the idea of bringing the Government machinery in the 
Legislature to standstill was just like to promise the attain-
. 160 
ment of Swaraj within 3 months. 
This division in their rank was very much reflected in 
the Presidential address of Habibur Rahman of the same session 
158, Ibid., p. 12. 
159, Robinson, op.cit., p, 336, 
160, 4th session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema held at Gaya'in 
December 1923; See Indian Annual Register, 192*4,p.260, 
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of the Jamiat. In his long speech he appealed- to save the 
division in their rank by adopting a middle path between the 
161 
two extremes. 
It was amongst heavy odds that the Jamiat succeeded 
in overcoming the crisis and declared its stand on the Council 
entry even before the Congress and the Khilafat Committee 
162 
could make up their mind. In its resolution that follov;ed after 
a long deliberations in the same session the Jamiat considered 
the participation in the next General election as against the 
163 
Shariah even if their intention may not be to take the oath. 
This was the refutation of the resolution taken by the Jamiat 
executive Committee at Delhi in November 1923/permitting 
164 
election with an object not to enter the Legislature, 
,• The Khilafat Conference also followed the Jamiat but 
this was due fio doubt to the unbending attitude of the Muslims 
161,, The Jamiat-ul-Ulema executive Committee had passed a 
resolution on 11th November 1923, permitting the capture 
of seats but refusing to take the oath of allegience, 
•According to a fatwa of the Ulema "the Muhammadans could 
neither cooperate nor take the oath of allegience. They 
should not therefore sit in its councils, even if they 
are successful at the polls," The Indian Review, January 
1923, pp, 23-25. ' " 
162. Moin Zaidi, op.cit.. Volume 4, p. 648, 
163. The Indian Annual Register, p, 24, 
164. The Indian ''<eviewyJanuary 1923/"P,25, 
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les 
divines who constituted the Jaxniat. At the Gaya session of 
the Congress the pro-council entry group was also defeated by 
a majority vote. This was only due to the Muslim extremist 
166 
group guided by the divines who constituted the Jamiat.- The 
Government too recognised the Jamiat as a force to be reckoned 
with. The Qovemment observed that if Hindu-Muslim conflict 
was to be avoided the Congress must look to the divines for the 
guidance for they were the group who held the strings of the 
167 
Muslims, It was this group of Muslim divines who guided the 
Congress to boycott the council at" the Calcnitta session in 
168 — 
September 1920, 
The period under review present an interesting position 
of the Muslim leadership in India, The middle class leader-
ship was divided on the stand to be taken in the changed cir-
ciimstances. Some were in favour of total alienation from 
Congress, while others to stick to the Congress, But the 
Jamiat leadership continued to keep uncompromising attitude 
165, A .CNeimei je r , o p . c i t , , _ p . 52, 
166, I b i d , , p . 54. 
167, Home Deptt ," (POL) 1922 F, No,18. 
168, Robinson, o p , c i t , , p , 337, 
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with the more radical group of the Congress, As a matter of 
fact it.seems that the Jamiat was moving on the pattern parallel 
to the position of an exclusive Muslim leadership putting aside 
169 
the western middle class element. Hence Mawlana Habibur Rahman 
deserved to proclaim the superiority of the Jamiat over all 
170 
other Muslim organisations or conferences in India. 
After their defeat in the Congress Gaya session the 
council entry group formed Congress-Khilafat Swarajya Party, 
as a party within the womb of the Congress. Only Ansari was 
amongst the prominent figure who did not join the group as 
others did. Meanwhile the council entry groap intensified 
their convassing in favour of council entry and attempted to 
compromise with those opposed to their movement. The 
Swarajists succeeded in wining over the disgruntled group 
within the Congress with the result that now the All-India 
Congress Committee decided to cease its stand against the council 
171 
entry. M.A.Ansarijan erstwhile no changer, also changed his 
169. A.C. Neimeijer* o p . c i t . , p . 153, 
170. Khutba-e-Sadara t»Four th Session of the Jamiat-ul -Ulema, 
Al-Jami-at P r e s s ; a v a i l a b l e on microfi lm a t Nehru Memorial 
Museum and L i b r a r y . 
171 . P.C.3omford, o p . c i t . , p . 9 1 , 
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172 
mind and joined the swarajists group. Next to follow were 
173 
Moazzam Ali and Khwaja Abdul Majid. 
Mohammad Ali was the only hope for the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, 
when he was released from jail on 29th August 1923 was asked 
to persuade the Ulem<i to withdraw the jatwa against the council 
entry which they had promulgated at Delhi in November 1920 
at the conference of the Jamiat. He replied that "if non 
cooperation was haram two years previously, it could not become 
174 
halal today " But the Jamiat leaders were taken by 
surprise when only after 3 weeks it was the same Mohammad Ali 
v/ho moved the resolution in the Congress working meeting at 
Delhi in September 1923, which allowed those Congressmen who 
had no religious or other conscientious objections against 
175 
entry into Lsgislatures. Again at the annual session of 
Congress held in December 1923 at COCONADA Mohammad All as its 
President lobbied and used his influence to bring a compromise 
resolution which was proposed by Rajagopalacharya and seconded 
176 
by C.R.Das. The Jamiat severely criticised Shri Rajgopalacharya 
172. Ibid., p.88. 
173. Francis Robinson, op.cit., p.340;See also The Leader 
(Allahabad)/ 26th May, 1923. ' 
174. The Leader. September 1923; See also P.C.Bomford, 
op.cit., p. 90. 
175. P.C.aomford, op.cit., p. 91. 
176. P.C.Bomford, op.cit., p. 93. 
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177 
for his act of betrayal. 
This Was the defeat of the Jamiat Jj^ atwa at the hands 
of its own friends and allies. The influence of the Jamiat-ul-
yiem^ had been considerably declining due to Lausane Peace 
Treaty, its defeats at the hands of its own friends proved to 
be the last nail. They were left high and dry. They had " 
become a despondent inactive 5&nd isolated. A press statement 
of Mawlana 3ari speaks the condition of the Ulema at that time. 
He is reported to have said, "I would like to call attention 
of the Muslim in general and the Ulema in particular to the 
critical condition which had arisen in India, The position 
of the Muslims has been rendered very awkward. Those who 
pretended to be our friends at one time and made a catspaw 
of the Ulema now seen anxious to get rid of them. An inviduous 
method has been adopted to get rid of their religion which is 
the only source of their pride end strength. I have nothing 
to say against the party which exploited the Muslims for their 
178 
own purpose, for, I know what they wanted." 
"JAMIAT>UL-ULEMA VIS-A»VIS CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT 
In marked contrast to the days of Khilafat and non-
cooperation Movements the Muslims in general and nationalists 
177. The Madina.- (Sijnor) 31 December 1923. 
178. Statement to the Press, 20th August, 1923, Abdul Bar! 
Papers. 
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Muslim leaders within the Congress in particular boycotted the 
civil disobedience Movement Isinched by the Congress. In a 
letter addressed to Ansari, Khaliquzzaman wrote, "as for 
Mahatmaji's Civil Disobedience programme to tell you the truth 
I have not been able to understand much less appreciate it, 
Mahatmaji is sadly optimistic and we shall have to reap its 
179 
consequences. Other nationalist Muslims were also reluctant 
180 
participant. 
But there were few Muslims whose vision was fixed 
primarily on the greater interest of the country and on seeing 
free 
Independent Indie/from foreign yokes. They responded posi-
tively to the Gandhian call of Civil Disobedience, which ensued, 
181 
after the Viceroy rejected the demand. The first to jump in 
179, Khaliquzzaman to Ansari, 1 March 1930. 
180, Ansari joined the Civil Disobedience Movement mainly -
due to the efforts of Azad and partly because he thought 
that as a disciplined soldier he should not refuse the 
marching orders of-his officer. It is pertinentto note 
here that initially he was against launching a country? 
wide mass movement because of its being turn into violent 
campaign. Ke tried to convince the Congress Working 
Committee to his line of thaaght but having failed in his 
efforts, he resigned from the Delhi Congress Provincial 
Committee and refused the General Secretaryship and member-
ship of the Congress Working Committee, 
See, Mushirul Hasan, Muslims and Congress, edited, 
(New Delhi, 1984), p.121, 
181, The Viceroy though promised Dominion Status for India'and 
announced that the Round Table Conference would be 
organised to workout the'future constitution for India 
Contd 
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the fray were the Muslim divines who from their platform, the 
Jamlat-ul-Ulema, which adopted the resolution in favour of 
182 
the Civil Disobedience, 
The Congress Working Committee welcomed the resolution 
of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema passed at its Ninth Session held at 
Amroha making coraraon cause vlth the Congress in its cajapaign 
of Civil Disobedience and appealed to Musalraans to strive for 
the liberty of their country and religion by joining the 
(Continued from the previoas page) 
but made it clear that issue would not be fashioned in 
accordance with the right of the majority vote, un-
challanged by Parliament, Gandhi was not satisfied with 
this statement and consequently a programme of Civil 
Disobedience was t hjist upon the Indians much against the 
majority will of the Muslims and without taking them in 
confidence, 
Khaliqu22aman, Pathway to Pakistan (Longman 
Pakistan Branch 1961) pp. 105-106, 
- In fact, Gandhi was a little bit hasty in launch-
4 
ing a mass movement. He should have fully utilised the 
offer made by the Viceroy and should have not closed the 
door of further negotiation, 
# 
182, Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, A Political History (Asia, 
Publishing House, Bombay 1959), pp. 223-224.., 
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183 
Congress whole heartedly in the fight for independence. 
The Ali Brothers tried to exert pressure on the Jaiiiat-
ul-Ulema to reverse its decision of joining hands with the 
Congress in its programme of Civil Disobedience Movement, but 
184 
could not succeeded in persuading them. 
It seems that there had taken place a cleavage in the 
rank of the Jamiat leadership. The Nawab of Bhopal in one 
of his letter to the Viceroy is reported to have said, "In 
a letter to your Excellency I have forecasted a split in the 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema and it did take place. The Ali Brothers with 
a strong and influencial body of Ulemas(Sic) have started a 
new Jamiat-ul-Ulema....they have advised the Muslims to keep 
aloof from the present struggle and to dissociate themselves 
from the Congress, The new Jamiat is also in favour of parti-
185 
clpating in the Round Table Conference." 
Differences did become acute between the office bearers 
of the Jamiat^Mawlana Nisar Ahmad of Kanpur and Mawlana Abdul 
Majid Badauni went on to organise the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kanpur 
183, Moih Zaidi, op.cit.. Volume 4, p, 279, 
184, Mawlana Al-Hafiz and A.H.Siddiguii J ami at-u1-Ulema Ke 
Chand Aham Khidmat-e-Milli, (Delhi 1940), p.9, 
185, Thg Kawab of Shopal to Irwin, 10 May 1930,- Irwin Papers 
(152/24) , 
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as they were not in favour of joining hands with the Congress 
in the Civil Disobedience Movement. The new organisation 
attracted a number of leading Ulema who unanimously elected 
186 
Mawlana Mohammad All as their President. 
To counterpoise the move of Mawlana Mohammad All in 
persuading the Muslims to boycott the Civil Disobedience 
Movement, the Congress made an special appeal to the Muslims 
to cooperate, Jamiat along with other nationalist Muslim 
Political Parties was pressed into service to enlist the 
187 
support of the Muslims for the Civil Disobedience, The 
Congress also tried to exploit the religious sentiments of the 
Muslims by often pointing out their obligation to their 
brethren in Palestine, Turkey and Egypt who were subject to 
188 
the tyranical rule of the Britishers. But the Muslims in a 
marked contrast to the Non-cooperation days showed no inclina-
189 
tion tov/ards the movement. So in order to win over the support 
186. Rais Ahmad Jafri, Awrag-i-Gum Ghashita, (London 1968), 
pp., 577, 
187. Home Poll. 1930, 483, 
188. Mushirul Hasan, Muslims and the Congress (edited) 
(Manohar Publication, New Delhi 1984), p).106. quoting 
Bulletin of the Bombay Satyagrah committee, 11 June 1930/ 
K.E.Hawkins Papers^entre for South Asian Studies, 
Cambridge! 
189. The Indian Muslims visualised the programme of Civil 
Disobedience Movement as an attempt to establish a 
"Hindu Swaraj" in India. The Indian politics was very 
much communalised after the failure of the Khilafst 
Contd 
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of the Muslim the Congress, considering to the exigencies of 
time, passed a resolution reiterating the resolution passed at 
the Lahore session of the Congress that no solution of communal 
question will be accepted to the Congress that does not give 
full satisfaction to the Muslims and other minorities and 
assured the Jarfiiat and Muslims in particular that the Congress 
will at all times respect the liberty of all religions and 
culture in India and appealed to Musalmans to cast off all 
doubts and misgivings created in the minds of the Muslims by 
190 
interested persons. 
It must be mentioned here that the Jamiat did not join 
the non-cooperation and the Congress unconditionally as some 
writers on Muslim politics allege. In this connection the 
assertion of I.H.Qureshi deserve full treatment . He says, 
"V^en the Jamiat had not Jettisoned Mawlana All's leadership 
it nad supported the resolution of the All parties Muslim 
Conference condemning the Nehru Report. That resolution 
instead of unconditional surrender demanded definite safe-
191 
guards for the Muslims." First of all, it had been the creed 
(Continued from the previous page) 
Movement, followed by the communal riots throughout the 
country. The attitude of the>Indian Muslims was further 
stiffended by the Congress virtual surren-ier to the Hindu 
Mahasebha over the Muslim demands at the All Party's 
conference. Most of the Khilafatists had parted company 
with the Congress with a determination never to join the 
Congress in any Undertakings whatsoever^ 
See/Ram Gopal, op.cit., p. 223. 
190. Indian Annual Register, 1931. 
191. I.H.Qureshi, op.cit., p. 303. 
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of the Jamiat to attain complete Freedom at any cost which 
it had repeatedly been making clear at various meetings and 
conferences both from own platform and outside. The main issue 
which had created gulf between the Jamiat and Congress was the 
Congress attitude towards the Nehru Report and Jamiat's stand 
for complete independence. By 30 December,1930 the Congress 
at its Lahore Session had rejected the Nehru Report and 
192 
adopted the complete independence as its creed. It may 
further be mentioned that the Jamiat had been pressurising 
the Congress to start the Civil Disobedience Movement since 
the arrest of the Khilafat leaders and the confiscation of 
f atwa. •« When the Congress gave up the call for the Civil 
Disobedience it was actually the endorsement of the Jamiat 
decision taken in 1926. The Jamiat seized the opportunity 
and declared at its Amroha Session^held on 9th of May 1930» 
•f 
that since the Congress had rejected the Nehru Report and end-
orsed the complete independence creed of the Jamiat, the 
Muslims should cooperate the Congress and extend their support 
193 
to the cause. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani in one of his 
"letter said that it had been the ttvain plank of the Jamiat to 
i 
achieve freedom and whosoever would extend their support to 
194 
the cause would be his friend. Moreover, the Jamiat did not 
192. Indian Annual Register, 1930^ 
193. Saiyid Tufail Ahmad, Ruh-i-Roshan Mustagbil, (Nizami 
Press Badaun, 1946), p .16, ' 
194. See Husain Ahmad Madani, Jawaz-i-Shirkat Congress aur 
Azal-i-Shukook, (Jamiat-ul-Uleraa, Delhi 1944), p.29, 
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cooperate v.'ith the Congress unconditionally. In fact, it was 
only after the Congress gave assurance and made its attitude 
clear with regard to the Nehru Report and the religious 
freedom of the Muslim at the Lahore session that the Jamiat 
decided to join hands v;ith Congress. 
C H A P T E R I I 
THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935 
AND THE MUSLIM MASS CONTACT MOVEMENT 
GEI'JERAL ELECTION AND THB FORMATION OF MUSLIM 
LEAGUE PARLIAMENTARY BOARD: 
Indian politics in 1935 entered altogethe'r a new" phase. 
This period saw the Indian politics on the threshold of major 
1 
constitutional change. A joint committee of the two houses 
of the British Parliament deliberating for 18 months on the 
future Government of India, in the light of the White Paper, 
gave their recommendations on the constitutional proposal in 
India. The publication of the committee's report, the most 
^ 3 
powerful parliamentary committee that had ever been setup,, 
got the attention of nationalist India. iTiere ensued a long 
debate in the Indian Central Legislative Assembly on these 
recommendations. In the summer, the Government of India Act 
1935 was passed with some modifications. The Act^passed 
after a prolonged gestation of seven years since the appoint-
ment of Simon Commission, gained considerable controversy in 
4 
Britain and conflict in India. 
1. Pakistan historical society publication, A History of the 
Freedom Movement, Volume IV, 1936-1947, p.l. 
2. After the last session of the -third Round Table Conference 
a white paper embodying the proposals of the British 
Government for constitutional reforms were issued. Hiis 
was infect a reproduction of the results achieved" in the 
conference. 
See Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian National!sm^-l928-
1940 ^ Manohar Publication 1977), p.94, 
3. R.Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India^(Oxford 
1944), Volume, I, p.l32. 
4. R.Palme Dutt, India Today, (Bombay 1947), p.409. 
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In the Act the Indians saw a departure from the previous 
British constitutional measures. The Provincial Autonomy had 
been recommended with so many limitations, envisaged in the 
garb of the 'minority and special interest.,' For the first 
time the people were entrusted with the task of Governing 
themselves. It seemed that the road to the attainment- of 
self-Government was clear but there were shortcomings in it. 
special powers were reserved to the Governors to declare a 
state of emergency and once a Government did so he could 
suspend the constitution and assume all powers to himself. 
Democracy in the provinces could therefore function so long 
as the Governor permited it. The position was even worse 
so far as the Central Government was concerned. Here there 
was an attempt to reintroduce the principle of Diarchy which 
had already been discredited in the provinces. Not only was 
the federation to be a weak federation but it was also over-
weighted in favour of the provinces and other vested interests. 
These could generally be expected to side with the British 
5 
rule in the country. 
Obviously the Act was denounced in most strong words 
by almost all political parties in India except the liberals 
6 
like M.R.Jayakar and Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. Although they 
5. Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, (Calcutta 
1959), p.13. 
6. R.Coupland, Volume II, op.cit., p.7. 
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were critical of the recommendatitm imposed by the Act on the 
self Government but they were in favour of utilization of the 
Act in toto as they thought that liie Diarchy and safeguards 
would give way to full responsible Government and would lead 
to a vast expansion of powers equal to those enjoyed by the 
7 
dominion. 
But the temper of the' nationalist India in 1935 was 
some what different. If the Act had been introduced soon after 
the world War I it could have been hailed as a great step 
to self-Government, But in the changed circumstances the 
8 
Act received a rigid reception, it was condemned by all the 
political parties although their approach to the problem 
differed. If the Congress was most emphatic in denouncing 
9 
it -as a charter of slavery, the Muslim League though condemned 
the Act vigorously like the Congress, but while denouncing 
the safeguards as making the responsible Government nugatory, 
it recommended that having regard to the conditions prevailing 
at present in the country the provincial scheme of the cons-
10 
titution be utilized for what it was worth. 
As expected the Jamiat-ui-Ulema with its pronounced 
nationalistic and democratic leanage was most vocal in 
8, S.R, Mehrotra, Towards India's Freedom and Partition, 
(New'Delhi 1984), p.132» 
9. The Congress condemned the Act in roost "strong words at its 
Lucknow session in April 1936. For detail analysis about 
the Congress reaction see, Mohammad Noman* Muslim India 
(Allahabad 1942), pp. 327-28. 
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condemning it. It is important to observe that the 
Jamiat-ul-Uleraa had ta'ken a lead over other major political 
parties for v;hile they were still deliberating, the Jamiat-
ul-Ulema at its Delhi conference came out with its ovm view 
11 
on the Act. Mufti Kifayetullan, the President of the party, 
strongly denounced the unwanted constitution and declared 
that no amount of repression could suppress a whole nation 
of 350 millions from demanding its rights to manage their 
12 
home. The conference regarded the present Act as worse than 
the Montague - Chelmsford Reforms, The special powers given 
to the Governor in the garb of special interests with regard 
to the minorities and danger to the peace and tranquility of 
India was an example of the British imperialism to perpetuate 
13 
their rule in India, said Multi Kifayetullah. He further 
declared that Islam stands for freedom and honour and no true 
Muslim can rest contented under a foreign Government. It is 
the duty of every Muslim to fight for freedom. A life without 
honour was disgrace to a true Muslim and he exhorted all to 
14 
contribute their full share towards the country's freedom. 
11. The Madina, 26th March, 1936, 
12. The Hindustan Times, 28th March, 1936. 
13, Al-Jamiat, 28th March, 1936. 
14, The Hindustan Times, 28th March 1936, 
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The Chairman of the reception committee, Haji Abdul 
Ghaffar, touching t'le controversy on the Comrnunal Award, 
described it as a cup of poison 'which the Muslims had foolishly-
agreed to sov;allo\\' because they were hinted that it had been 
15 
advantageous to them. He further added that the Award had only 
benefitted the Europeans and the untouchables. The idea 
underlying it was to strengthen European and Anglo-Indians 
so that they could rule over Hindus and Muslims, The chairman 
also condemned the separate electorate and said that the 
interests of Bengal and Punjab Muslim had been vigorously 
16 
sacrificed to strengthen the foreign hold. 
Husain Ahmad Madani who could not reach in time to 
attend the conference as the president also spoke at length 
17 
on the evils of the new constitution and communal Award. 
This period was also marked by the re-entering of M.A, 
Jinnah into active politics. At that time the Muslim political 
parties were divided among themselves. Though their aim was 
the same to certain extent but their approaches to the issues 
had been different from each other. It was this pitiable 
condition which induced Mr. Jinnah to open a negotiation with 
15. The Statesman, 28th March, 1936. 
16. The Independent, 28th March, 1936, 
17. The Madina , 30th March, 1936. 
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Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema 
and an influencial.personality in the Unity Board, through 
the intermediary of Mr, Abdul Mateen Chaudhary, the Secretary 
of the Independent Party led by M.A.Jinnah in the Central 
- 18 
Legislature. Mateen met the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema and acquainted him with the message of Jinnah that he 
had become tired of the reactionary elements in the Muslim 
League which consisted of landlords, title holders and selfish 
people and wanted to purify the Muslim League from such 
19 
elements. He requested Mr, Ahmad Saeed to help him by forging 
an united front of the Muslim political parties. At first, 
the Jamiat l^ eaders were not ready to join hands with the League 
because it was not inconsonance with their tempera*ent. But 
when Abdul Mateen assured them that Mr, Jinnah was serious 
in his sayings, they showed some interests to meet him. The 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema whose goal v/as set for complete independence 
found this offer as a golden opportunity to purge the reaction-
aries from Indian politics who were the great enemy of 
independence. 
A board consisting of Nawab Ismail Khan, Mawlana Shaukat 
Ali, Khaliquzzaman, Murtaza Kazim and Abdul Mateen was appointed 
18. I.H.Qurechi, Ulema in Politics, (Karachi 1972), p,347. 
The address of M.A.Jinnah from the platform of Jamiat-
ul-Ulema conference in March 1936 shows that some sort 
of prior understanding had already been reached between 
Jinnah and Ahmad Saeed, See, the Hindustan Times, 28th 
March, 1936, 
19, Sir Muhanimad Yamin, Namah-i-Amal, (Lahore 1970) ,pp.631-32. 
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to meet Mr, Jinnah and apprise him with the talk and seek the 
answers of the Questions raised by the Jamiat representatives 
in the Unity Board. Jinnah -showed willigness to meet them, 
A meeting was thus arranged at the residence of Mawlana Shaukat 
Ali which was attended by some members of the Unity Board and 
21 
the representatives of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, Mr,Jinnah 
expressed that he waw tired of the reactionary elements in 
the Muslim League who looked to their interest more than the 
community and national interests and were always ready to 
sacrifice them to suit British policy and wanted to relieve 
22 
the Muslim League of them. During the speech he further said^ 
I would like to see the Muslim League organisation purified 
and revived and v;ith that end in view I am going to hold a 
Muslim League session on 10th May at Bombay where I would ask 
the Muslim League to give me a mandate to form a parliamentary 
Board for the forthcoming elections. And I promise you that 
in that board I shall give people to your party a majority. If 
we have to fight election on the Muslim ticket it would not 
be in the interests of either of us to split our-.vote. Let us, 
therefore, fight from the cpm-non platform of the f-luslim League' 
20,. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Jinnah Ka Pur Asrar Mqamma 
our uska Hal, (Delhi 1937), p.11. 
21. I.H.Qureshi, oo.cit., p. 347, 
22, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, (Lahore 
1961), p. 141;: 
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23 
Parliamentary Board, " Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madarii who was 
amongst the chief negotiations asked Jinnah that if they 
failed to bring the progressive elements in the Parliamentary 
Board what would be his position. To this Jinnah, with 
great exitement, replied that in that case he would merge 
24 
with them and leave the Muslim League, Husain Ahmad further 
asked that they were committed to complete independence for 
the country while the League organisation did not approve of 
it, Ho\/ was this differences to be reconciled, Mr, Jinnah 
replied that v;hen "I give you a majority in the Parliamentary 
25 
Board you can do everything," 
As announced by Jinnah the session of the All India 
Muslim League was held at Bombay from 11 to 12 April 1936 
under the Presidentship of Sir Wazir Hasan, a liberal known 
26 
for his nationalistic views. In this meeting even those not 
related to the :iuslim League were also invited. Chief among 
them was Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, the Secretary of the Jamiat, The 
session recorded emphatic protest against enforcing a consti-
tution upon the people of India against their will but decided 
.2-7 
to use the provincial part of the Act for what it was worth. 
2 3 . I b i d , , p . 4 1 . 
24 . Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, o p . c i t . , p . 1 4 1 , 
25 . Khaliquzzaman, o p . c i t , , p . 1 4 1 . 
2 6, Z ,H,Zaidi , Aspects of the Development of Muslim League 
Pol icy 1937-1947, an a r t i c l e publ i shed in th-P P a r t i t i o n 
of Inc i s - ?n1 i r iAc =hd P(^r<^ver.tiv&j 1935-1947, e d i t e d by 
C.H,Phi l ips and M.O.Wainwright, (London 19"70), p . 2 5 1 , 
2 7, The Times of I n d i a , 28th March, 1936, 
- 77 -
The session also authorised Mr. Jinraah to constitute, a Muslim 
League Parliamentary Board of atleast 35 members from all over 
India which would prepare its election manifesto and rales 
and regulation for the forthcoming general election at the 
28 
Lahore meeting of the Parliamentary Board. 
Mawlana Ahmad Saeed had been a constant source of 
strength to Jinnah through all these days. He had been instru-
mental in bringing the Jamiat-ul-Ulema to compromise with the 
Muslim League to fight the election from one platform. He 
was an important personality in the Unity Board and succeeded 
in bringing the members to compromise with the Muslim League. 
He had been constantly advising Jinnah how to conduct the elec-
tion campaign" and bringing the Muslim political parties to 
cooperate. In one of his letters addressed to M,A.Jinnah 
29 
he said, "Unless you visit a good number of important towns 
28, Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.144? 
Soon after this Jinnah addressing a large number 
of Muslims in the Badshah Mosque explained his mission 
and the decision taken by the Bombay Session of the 
Muslim League. He emphasised that the object of the 
League was not to create division but to unite Muslims. 
The constitution as based on the communal electorate 
they had to organise communal bodies not hostile to sister 
communities to work in cooperation after entering council 
with such of them as had similar ideas as their own. 
The Hindustan Times^ 1st May 1937. 
29. Z.H.Zaidi, op.cit., op. 246-247. ^^J^-^ '-?J<?^ 
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in different provinces, it ts very difficult to form represen-
tative local boards on proper lines I would request you 
with all the force at my command to start on a tour and visit 
certain important centres of political activity we have 
not yet started with . earnest. The continuous publicity 
of the aims and objectives of the Muslim League and its 
present policy is essential for educating the public and 
and the press alike. An Urdu Daily, atleast a bi-weekly, wholly 
devoted to the cause of the League, is badly needed. I have 
already written to the members of the Jamiat-ul-Uleraa to make 
effective speeches in support of the Muslim League in public 
meetings and appeal to the Muslim voters to reserve their 
votes for the candidates of the Muslim League only." 
Hence, Jinnah before announcing the Parliamentary Board 
toured the whole country in order to repose faith in the Muslim 
masses and getting support from' the Muslim political parties 
of various provinces of British India ccHnprising of all shades 
of Muslim opinion. And in the words of the Statement from the 
saffron growing olains of far Kashmir,•'^ Jinnah announced his 
30 . . -
team. The list of the Boards show that Jinnah had tried his 
level best to remove the undesirable elements from the Muslim 
League Parliamentary Board. Apart from the representative of 
the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and Unity Board the old Khilafatists. 
30. Mohammad Koman, op.cit., p.331. 
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31 
Ahrars were included in the list of Parliamentary Boar'd. 
Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani Shaukat Ali and Khaliquzzman. 
from U.P,, Mawlana Ahmad Saeed from Delhi and Multi Kifayetullah 
from Bihar were brought in. 
First session of the Parliamentary Board was held 
on 8th 1936 at Lahore where the election manifesto of the Board 
was : framed in consultation with the members of the Parliament-
tary Board, The representatives of the Jamiat took active 
part in the deliberations and were in constant touch with 
the framing of the Board manifesto, Mawlana Ahmad Saeed and 
Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani told the United press of India, 
in an exclusive interview, that the meeting of the Board at 
Lahore was a complete success in as much as it had combined 
all the nationalist and • .progressive forces among the Muslims 
32 
of India, 
The e l e c t i o n manifes tp of the Muslim League Par l iamen-
t a r y Board Was as f o l l o w s : -
1, To p r o t e c t t h e r e l i g i o u s r i g h t s of t h e Musalmans- "^^ ' 
e l l m a t t e r s of pure ly r e l i g i o u s c h a r a c t e r due weightage- -
w i l l be given to the opin ions of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind 
and t h e Majahids. 
3 1 . Khaliquzzaman, o p . c i t . , p .144 ; for d e t a i l s see Appendix-I , 
c i t e d in Khaliquzzaman, pp . 416-417. 
32. The Hindustan Tj-nes, June 11, 1937. 
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2, To make every effort to secure the repeal of all 
aggressive laws. 
3, To resist all measures which are detrimental to the 
interest of India* which enchroaches upon the funda-
mental liberties of the -people and lead to economic 
exploitation of the country. 
4, To reduce heavy cost of administrative machinery, 
central and provincial and allocate substantial funds 
for nation building departments. 
5, To nationalise Indian Army and reduce the military 
expenditure, 
6, To encourage development of, industries including 
cottage industries, 
7, To regulate currency, expenditure, exchange and prices 
in the interest of economic development of the country, 
8, To sponsor measures for the relief of agricultural 
indebtedness, 
9, To stand for the social, educational and economic 
upliftment of th'e rural population* 
10. To make ele-nentary .education free and compulsory. 
11, To d«?vise measures for the amelioration of the general 
condition of Muslims. 
12. To take steps to reduce the heavy burden of taxation. 
13, To creat a healthv public opinion and general political 
33 
consciousness throughout the country. 
33.' See Appendix I, cited in Khaliquzza-nan, op.cit.,pp.416-41. 
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Ishtiaque Husain Qureshi has tried to blame the 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema for its breach of contract and intrigue. To 
quote him when the Muslim League Parliamentary Board was 
established a secret understanding was arrived at through the 
intermediaty of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema with the Congress high 
command that the Congress and the Muslim League would work 
together in the Provincial Legislatures and form coalition 
ministries in which the Muslim League would get representation 
in proportion to their population. In the United Provinces 
35 
the League was to get two ministerships. This is only to 
opportion blame against the jamiat- for its "disgraceful role" 
and not to testify this alleged charge through any tangible 
evidence, Mr. Ishtiaque Husain Oureshi, impressed by 'the 
congress - League reapproachment during the election failed 
36 
to see the under current conflict that was taking place 
between Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru. The situation at the time 
during whicn this alleged understanding had arrived had not 
been conjugal for such enchantment. Even the way both the 
parties conducted the election campaign suggest that there 
v;as no any prior understanding and hence the charge against the 
Jamiat has been ill-founded. 
34. I.H.Qureshi, op.cit., p. 349, 
35. Ibid., p. 348. 
36. R.Coupland, o p » c i t . . P a r t I I , p . 1 4 ; S i r Bijoy Prasad 
Singh Roy, Par l iamentary Government in I nd i a ( C a l c u t t a , 
1943), pp. 366-357? Both J a i J i p a l , o p . c i t . , and Khal id 
B.Sayeed Wrongly c i t e d R.Coupland. The re fe rence t o t h i s 
has been made on page 14 and not on pp» 11-16, 
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• In. the,-, election .the CoAgress pitted the Muslim G-andi*^ -»-
dates against the League candidates in most of the provinces 
and in U.P, where this alleged coalition"agreement had been 
reached the Congress fielded 14 Muslims on its tickets, four 
37 
of whom contested against the League candidates and lost. 
This shows the type of understanding within the."Congress, 
During the whole election period Jinnah had been 
focussing on the idea that the Congress should not challenge 
the credentials of the Muslim League as the sole representa-
38 
tive of the Indian Muslims, Jinnah opened the election 
caTipaign in Bengal by highlighting the differences between 
the Congress and the Muslim League. Jinnah is reported to 
have said; "I warn my Hindu friends and tne Congress to leave 
the .Muslim alone. We have made it clear and we mean it that 
we are already and willing to cooperate with any group or 
groups of progressive and independent character, provided that 
their programme and our programme are approximately the same, 
we are not going to be the camp followers of any party or 
39 
organization."" Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is also reported to 
have said in Calcutta that "there are only two parties in the 
country, namely the aevernment and the Congress and other . 
3'^ *' The Leader,February 9-20, 1937; The --ioneer^  February, 
9-2, 1937. 
38. "Dr.Jai Ji ?al, Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan (a 
• published thesis submitted to Meerut University 1980.,p,102, 
39, The Statesman (Weekly overseas edition), Calcutta, 
7th Januerv 1937, 
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must line up. yinnah refused to line up with the Congress 
and replied that there was a third party in this country also 
and that was the .Muslinis^  and it was not going to be dictated 
41 
by any body. 
Nehru was also perturbed about the rerrjarks of M.A.Jinnah 
that the xMuslims and the Hindus were different from each other 
in respect of economic an<§l social matters and that the Muslims 
42 
must deal with other groups as one nation deal with the other. 
Nehru could not allow to go this statement unchallenge^ and 
remarked with great exitement that "I come into greater 
touch with the Muslim masses than most of the members of the 
Muslim League. I know more about their hunger and poverty 
and misery than those who talk in terms of percentages and 
43 
seats in the councils and places in the state services. 
In such an atmosphere of antagonism it would have been 
miracle if any understanding had reached fo^ ^ coalition Government 
So the charge of Ishtiaque Husain Qureshi, that a secret 
negotiation had been carried on and understanding had been 
40. Khalid B.Sayeed, Pakistan - The Formative Phasel857»1948 
(London 1958), p.83. 
41. The Statesman/ 14th January, 1937, 
42. ' I.H.Q-areshi, op.cit., p. 348. 
43. S.R.Mehrotra, the Congress and the Par t i t ion of Inc ia -
an a r t i c l e in the F a r t i t i o r of Incia - Pol ic ies and 
"F^espective» o p . c i t . , p.'13. 
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arrived, through the "stooges of the Jamiat", between the 
Congress and the :^slim League, stands refuted. 
I.H.Qureshi further says that in order to ensure full 
cooperation^the manifesto of both Congress and the League 
Was made corresponding ..and on sevecal issues their stand 
Was the same. The representatives of the Jamiat had parti-
cipated fully in drawing up the manifesto while at the same 
44 
time •)^ eping in close contact with the Congress. At the 
first place it may be asserted that a slight similarity in 
the manifesto could not be the basis to think that there was 
any pre-election understanding between the Congress and the 
Muslim League through the Jamiat Office bearers. Infact, the 
election manifestoes of almost all political parties in 1937 
was conspicuously the same, having a progressive and socialistic 
45 
outlook. The League manifesto was aimed at conciliating the 
Radical Muslims who considered the League to be the conserva-
tive and a dumping ground for the reactionaries. It was aimed 
at drawing the attention of the peasants and middle class 
Muslim voters because in most of the constituencies the Muslim 
Leaguers were pitted against the agriculturists party headed 
46 
by Nawab of Chettari. Moreover, in respect to the policy and 
44. Ibid., p. 193. 
45. Khalid 3.Sayeed, op.cit., p. 82, 
46. S.R..Mehrotra, Towards Indies Freed~om and Partition, 
op.cit., p. 162, 
85 
attitude towards the Communal Award, separate electorate, the 
A. of 1935, the expropriation of private property, the 
language issue, both the Congress and the Muslim League were 
47 
sharply divided between each other. 
"MUSLIM ?Li!^3S CONTACT CAMPAIGN AND THE BY-ELECTIONS; 
LEAGUE-JAMIAT GLEyAGE." 
Although the achievement of the Congress was commendable 
in the general election held under the provision of the Govern-
ment of India Act 1935, but so far as the Muslim Majority 
provinces v;ere concerned, it did not fair well except in 
North-West Frontier Provinces where the Congress could boost 
her support from the Muslim masses. The Muslim Leaguers 
interpreted this pathetic show of strength of the Congress 
as the repudiation of the Congress policy towards the Communal 
48 
Award, Commenting on the outcome of the election Jawaharlal 
47. Ibid., p. 163. 
48. The Communal Award announced by r^ amsay MacDonald on 4th 
August 1932, as a temporary settlement formula of the 
communal guestion allowed the communal electorate to 
other communities like Sikhs, Indian Christian and 
Europeans viith reservation of seats to the Muslim in all 
provinces and weightage in the province where they were 
in minority. 
See Ram Gopal, Indian Ilusli.ns, op.cit., p.23. 
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Nehru conceded that the latter had failed in enlisting ai>3 
winning over the support of the Muslim masses. Only in regard 
to the Muslim Seats, he said, "did we lack success we 
failed because we had long neglected working among Muslim 
49 
masses and we could not reach them in time." 
So in order to provide flesh to his hope Nehru started 
campaign for reaching to the closed doors of the Muslims. 
Hence, there started an intensive effort to establish contact 
with the Muslim masses. In a circular addressed to the 
50 
provincial Congress committees, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then 
Congress President, asked them to appoint- a special Committee 
to facilitate the work of contact with the Muslim masses and 
to make the Muslims, of niral and urban areas both, acquainted 
with the programme and ideology of the Congress. A .special 
Department of Muslim Contact was set up in the office of the 
All India Congress Committee with Young Muslim leftists like -
51 
K.M.Ashraf and Z.A.Ahmad as its members. The idea behind 
constituting a Department of Mass Contact was to streamline 
the v;ork of contact by assisting the Provincial Congress 
49, The Times of India, 3 March 1937; The Medina, 3 March 1937, 
50, Circular dated 31st March 1937, Rai'endre Prasad Papers, 
51, A Hlstor'7 cf the Freedom Movement, Volume IV (Pakistan 
Historical Society Publication 1961), p.25. 
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Committees in their v/ork of contect with the Muslims, 
Orders v;ere also sent to the Provincial Committees to 
issue noti'ces in Urdu in the areas where a sizable number 
52 
of Urdu-speaking people resided. 
3y that time a clear cleavage betv;een the Muslim 
League and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema was in the offing. The 
JaTiiat leadership interpreted the meeting of Mr.Jinnah 
with the Nawabs Yusuf and Chattari, at the time of the 
Working Committee -Meetings at LucSnow in March 1937, as 
53 
an attempt to bring the reactionary elements in the League, 
It had been the creed of the Jamiat co fight the 
reactionary forces in the country. These elements were 
righting considered as the great hurdle in the way to 
freedom. With this conviction in mind the Jamiat entered 
the Muslim League Parliamentary Board as Mr,Jinnah had 
made no secret of his conviction that he wanted to get rid 
of them, Chaudhary Khaliquzzaman nas tried to rebut this 
charge of the Jamiat leaders that the intended meeting of 
Jinnah with these Nawabs was an attanpt -co enlist their 
54 
support. This is a mere denial of facts. 
52. Rajendra Prasad Papers, op,cit. 
53. Khaliquzzaman, Pathvay to Pakistan, (Longman's, Pakistan 
branch 1Q61), p.154. 
54, Ibid., p, 154, 
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The Ja'.-niat did not join the Muslim League Parlia-
mentary Board on the pretax that Muslim League had changed 
its creed and switched over to the policy of Complete 
independence/ as contemplated by Jinnah in his press 
55 
release. 
These allegations received a better treatment at the 
hands of Husain Ahmad Madani in his booklet entitled 
"Mr. Jinnah Ka Pur Asrar Moamma Aur Uska Hal". He contended 
that he had never given the statement in any meetings that 
had been referred to by Jinnah, as the creed of the Muslim 
League till the Lucknow session of August 1937 was not 
of Complete independence, although many responsible Muslims 
56 
were trying for that. This fact has been supported by 
Khaliquzzaman himself. He writes in his autobiography that 
he tried his level best to change the creed of League to 
the full independence from Us prior creed of full respon-
sible Government but "to my great suprise Mr, Jinnah started 
opposing this change, in the constitution and a discussion 
ensued ultimacely I made last appeal to Mr, Jinnah 
not to become a party to the finishing of the ::uslim League 
and to agree" to my proposal to save the Muslim League from 
possible disruption. Therefore he stood up rather excited 
55, Mawlana Husain .shnad Macani, Mr. Jinnah Ka Tur Asnar 
• Icv.'ma aur Uska hal (Jamiat-ul-Uleme, Hew 3elhi, n.5,), 
?.16; The Madina 22, March, 1937, 
56. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Ibid., p.17. 
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and said "well I say full independence and not Complete 
57 
indeoendence." 
The only grievance Husain Ahmad Madani had v;ith the 
League was the latter*s betrayal of assurance that the 
League was fighting against the reactionary elenients in 
the League and would try to recruit the propressive and 
enlightened nationalist Muslims in the League. The stand 
of the Jam!at was not without good reason^ for Mr. Jinnah 
had J in an exclusive interview to the Bombay Chronicle in 
58 
June 1937, which was latter published in Madina/expressed 
the same desire. 
So the attitude of Mohainmad Ali Jinnah at the very 
first Conference of the Working Committee of f^ uslim League 
- cirliamentary Doerd at Luc-knov; on 13th March 1937 was most 
shocking tc the J^ imiat leadership. Tn one of his letter 
Husain Ahmad Madani v/rites tliat the very tendency of tne 
League nade rhe'n to trasily ponder over as if whether the 
Muslim Leajae was the real protector of the interest of the 
Muslims and the nation as a whole or the dumuing ground for 
59 
the landlords/ reactionaries and vested interest persons. 
57. Khaliquzzaman, o p . c i t , , p . 172. 
58. The 3ombay Chron ic l e s , 3 June , 1937, 
59. A l e t t e r addressed t o la-JU F a ' l u l Ranman Khansahib 
Saidharwi , Azamgarh, Maktubat--_e-Shaikhul I s lam, 
compiled and e d i t e d by Najmuddin I s l a h i , Volume I , 
Maktub No.134. 
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» In this nveeting a resolution was passed which was 
sought to make the gate open for the agriculturists to join 
the League. To finalise the list of the agriculturists, a 
second aieeting was called on 27th March and in the agenda 
of the V?orXing Conmittee a clause was - inserted "to consider 
the resolution of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board which 
was purported to induct in the party those elected members 
of the Assembly who did not fight the election on the ticket 
60 
of the Muslim League. 
There is no denying the fact that the "'uslim League 
had been a olatfor-n of -he aristocrates and the landlords 
who were rightly consic'ered to be the greatest enemy of 
the freedom. These v;ere the classes who remained alv;ays 
in good books of the Government and,got maximum benefits 
for their pro-Government activity in terms of titles and 
power both. It is also a fact that the League mostly con-
sisted of the aristocrat® and landlords on whose finance the 
League was maintaining its existence in politics. Tne land-
lords had been using the League as a pressure group" to 
ventilate their grievances and to get certain concessions 
from the Government, This was because of this fact that 
Mr. Jinnah tried to get rid of them labelling them "as 
opportunists and job seekers." Bat durini the election 
60. See, Agenda, office of the Muslim Leacme Parli-mentary 
Board of r.P., 8 Mr.rch 1937. 
- 91 -
when he realised that there was no way out but to gain their 
f - ^ 
support, due to paucity of fund, he inclined towards them. 
Jinnah v/as very much anxious to revive the then 
dying Muslim League and introducing it to the general 
masses, rhe Muslim League eclipsed under the impact of 
inter party rivalry for leadership, was passing through 
61 
the most cruciel period of its history. It was totally 
cut off from the general Muslim masses due to its wrong 
policies and passive attitude daring the Khilafat Movement, 
the ti-ne when the xMuslims of all shades of opinion assembled 
at a ccmon platfom to make a holy war against the British. 
This can be said as one of the reasons which alienated 
Muslim League from the Muslims. 3ut the Muslim League was 
having a charismatic leader in the personality of Jinnah 
62 
v7ho, after a period of dormant political activity, was bent 
upon suffering all harships in his effort to infuse a new 
lease of life in the League. 3ut Muslim League was having 
no platform of its own to reach the general masses, Jamia't-
ul-Ulema was only a Muslim Organisation which was exercising 
great influence on the Muslim masses right from the days of 
Khilafat Movement, This was quite diplomatically used by 
Jinnah. It has been accepted by his own biographer that 
61. Mohammad Noman, Muslim India - the Rise end Growth of 
Muslim League (Allahabad 1942), p.325. 
62, Ishtiaque Husain Qureshi, Ulema in Politics, op,cit., 
p. 346. 
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"Jinnah sought ther cooperation of the Jamiat in viev; of 
the fact that chances of the MuslLn Lea:rae in the election 
v;as quite dim because by that- time it v;a3 only a gentry of 
self seekers and oolitical opoortunists bearing no any 
63 
access to the Muslim mass." 
The establishment of the Department of Islamics was 
hailed by the Tio-uthpiece of Jamiat-ul-Ulema/ Al~Ja?i^ iat and 
other nationalist nev/spapers. Madina of 3ij.nor in its 
editorial note tried to persuade the nationalist Muslim 
Organisations like the Ahrar and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema to 
64 
unconditionally join the Congress, They emphasised that 
both the Muslims and Hindus had one thing in common and 
that v;as the existence of both exploiters and the exploited 
in them and therefore the exploited .Muslim should ioin 
hands with the exoloited Hindus pushing aside their 
65 
differences. 
Hoodwinked by the Muslim League gimmick the Jamiat 
Ulema looked towards the Congress which they thought was 
more sincere and sympathetic_towards the Muslim problems. 
The other reason was that the Congress creed was in 
63, Hiyat Mohammad All Jinnah, p.231. 
64, The Medina, 17 April, 1937. 
65, Ibid, 
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consonance -with the Jarniat creed in fighting the reectionary 
ele.Tients. The Secretary of Jamiat-ul-Uleraa# Ahmad Saeed, 
met Dr., Ashraf at Allahabad to find ways and means to bring. 
66 
the Jamiat under the banner of Conaress. He put forward 
67 ' 
certain demand, as preconditions of joining the Congress, 
3ut Dr. K.M. Ashraf/in charge of the Muslim Mass Contact 
section of the All-India Congress Committee, authoritatively 
denied that any correspondence regarding the term on which 
Muslims should join the Congress had passed between him 
and Mav;lana Ahmad Saeed of Jamiat-ul-Ulema and he also said 
that it would not be f?re to assign this motive on 
68 
Mavjlana's intended visit to Allahabad, 3ut the stand of 
Ahmad Saeed at the Allahabad meeting of the Muslim nationa-
lists leaders go contrary to the assertion of K.M.Ashraf, 
Here Ahmad Saeed was against the unconditional surrender to 
,69 
the Congress and he made no secret of his stand. 
66, The Madina 21 April, 1937, 
67. The demands put forward by Ahmad Saeed was as follows: 
1, The Government should .not interfere in any case 
in the culture, language, script, religious 
education, missionary activity/ religious insti-
tutions of any religious minorities, 
2, The Government should have no any right to 
'in-jerfere in the personal lav? of the ' Muslims. 
3, Muslim Cazi should be appointed to various 
courts to look after the cases of the Muslims 
pertaining to the religious matters, see/the 
Medina, 21 April 1937. 
68. An,interview to the Associated press of Indie, 22 
April 1937, All India Congress Co-^mlttee Papers, 
file !.^ o.31. p.11. 
69. The Madina, 21 Karc-, 1937. 
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I'lawlana Azad, a shrewed politician, ceased this 
psychological opportunity to wean the Ulerna from the Muslim 
League Parliamentary Board to the Congress, Their active 
support to the Congress was considered as prime importance 
if the programme o_f the Congress sponsored Muslim Mass 
Contact Campaign was to be successful. The Jamiat leader-
ship was having a great access to the Muslim masses which 
they showed during the Qeneral election by providing a new 
lease of life to the then dying Muslim League, Khallguzzaman 
himself admitted this fact in one of his letters to Husain 
Ahmad Madani, Thus a consulting meeting of the various 
Muslim Organisations "'were held on 15th to 17th March 1937 
at Allahabad mainly due to the efforts .of Mawlana Azad. 
The issue at point was to consider wa3^ and means to 
70 
bring Muslims into the Congress fold." 
Jinnah was perturbed at the proposed meeting of 
Congress leaders and U? Muslims. In his statement to the 
Associated Press Jinnah remarked that "...it would be use-
less for any individual or individuals effectively to carry 
Muslims behind-them if any statements arrived with a parti-
cular group or even for the matter of that, said a whole 
province. It is a pity that these round about efforts 
are made. The only object of it can be to creat some 
71 
differences between Musalman..." 
70." A.I.C.C. Papers, file No. 12, p.45. 
.71. Ibid, 
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In this exclusive interview Jinnah also criticised the 
Jajniat leaders who were sauetimes with the Congress and 
72 
sometimes with the League to suit their need • ^^ reply 
to Mr, Jinnah's attack on the Congress Babu Rajendra Prasad 
said, •No Congressman ever thinks of imposing his will on 
any one else be he a Muslim or of any other persuatlon. • • 
there is no conspiracy in this against any Muslim leader 
or Muslim group. It is obviously the only proper course 
73 
for an organisation like the Congress,* 
It was the personal trixaraph of Mawlana Azad to bring 
the whole group of Ulema to his line of thinking. He 
succeeded in getting a fatwa contrary to what had been 
74 
decided at Muradabad to remain with the League. Infect, 
at the Allahabad meeting there emerged two groups with^the 
J(5^ >j^ ir one-led by Hifzur Rahman and Husain Ahmad Madani^was 
in favour of unconditional surrender to the Congress while 
the other-led by Mawlana Ahmad Sayeed and Kefiyatullah.was 
'75 
against this. Ahmad Saeed was a man who was more concerned 
72. Ibid. 
73. A.I.C.C. papers, file No,31, p.7. 
74. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., pp. 156-157. 
75. I.K.55ureshi, Ulema in Politics, op.cit., p.72. 
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with the fate of Muslim India and thought that it would not • 
be in the Interest of the ^ fusli^ s^ to go to the Ccwgress 
bench without any prior assurance for safeguarding the 
culture, traditions, language, and religion of the Muslims. 
- It would have been an act of betrayal of the Muslim Conntunity 
to go to the Congress without safeguards. Perhaps Ahmad 
Saeed was guided by the fact that it was the Congress which 
opposed the separate electorate for which Jamiat had been 
fighting since its inception. Keeping this fact in mind 
he thought it to be an unwise act to unconditionally 
surrender to the Congress, 
In his autobiography Khallguzzaman has tried to put 
blame on Mawlana Husain Ahmad that he left the Muslim League 
Parliamentary Board and decided to Join the Congress at the 
Allahabad meeting in quest for a ministership in the Cabinet, 
This blajne is not supported by any evidence and is only 
an attempt on the part of Mr. Khallguzzaman to exonerate 
76 
himself from the lust of ministership. Madanl cannot be 
that small. He was an undisputed leader of an influential 
group which was exercising tremendous influence on the 
Congress and If he had given an indication of his will 
Congress would have accepted him as it was sure to enhance 
the prestige of the Congress amongst a .sizable number of 
Muslim peculation, Madanlr*s personality still governed 
76. Uraa Kaura, Rationalism and Indian Muslims (l>eihi 1984), 
P,115, 
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the psychology of the Muslim masses which he showed during 
his canpaign for the Muslim League candidates. 
Khaliquzzaman exposed himself in enclosing a letter 
from Ahmad Saeed, the Jamiat Secretary; 
",,, do let me know how far it is true that if seats 
for yourself and Nawab Ismail Khan could be found in the 
Cabinet, a settlenent might have been possible with the 
Congress and the Congress was ready to give one seat but 
you were not prepared to leave Nawab Ismail Khan behind and 
there was no room for him. Therefore, an agre«nent could 
not be reached. Is it also true that Rafi Ahmad Kidwai to 
whom you had offered full help and did not put up a candidate 
77 
against him proved disloyal to you." 
In order to counteract the Congress move to contact 
the Muslim masses over their heads Jinnah appealed to the 
Muslims to stablish Muslim League branches both a^  provin-
cial and district level to recruit the members to the Muslim 
78 
League. Funds were also raised for the same purpose • At 
the meeting of the Muslim League Provincial Parliamentary 
Board held at Lucknow on 6th of May under the Presidentship 
of Nawab Ismail Khan, a plan for Mass Contact was chalked up 
77. Khaliquzzaraan, op.cit., p.158, (a letter addressed by 
Ahmad Saeed, the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema to 
Khaliqu.:szaman) • 
78. The Madina, 25 Aoril. 1937. 
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and the, Muslim League members of the UP-Legislative Assembly 
were asked to collect Rs.lOO each from their respective 
constituency while- the menbers of the Working Conunittee 
were required to pay Rs.500 for the purpose of carrying on 
propaganda among the Muslim masses and keep in close toMch 
79 
with them. 
Press played an important part in the political 
socialisation of the people and so it was felt essential to 
have an independent press for reaching the masses and pro-
jecting their policies and programmes to them. So dona-
tions were made by the influencial and well off Muslims of 
80 
UP for the sajne, 
A clea^ a^ge between the Muslim League and the jamiat 
was thus very much in sight. While the League said one 
thing, the Jamiat said the other. A direct collision thus 
was inevitable. 
The League-Jamiat relation touched the lower ebb in 
June-July 1937, when both the Muslim organisations collided 
81 
with each other in the Jhansi-Jalaun-Hamirpura by-election, 
while they were expected to join hands with each other in 
79, A,I.C.C,Papers, file Ko,16, p,i5? The Times of ^ ndia, 
27 July, 1937, 
80, Uma Kaura, op,cit,, p. H I , 
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deciding the destiny of Muslims in a predominently Hindu 
India. Both the Congress and the Muslim League fielded 
82 
their candidates from this seat. The election was the 
real trial of strength of the Muslim League and the Congress, 
supported by Jaraiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind. Hence a complete 
break in the relation between League and Jamiat followed 
and the latter rushed to Jhansi with full force to impress 
83 
upon the Leaguers their strength and influence on the masses. 
Mawlana Shaukat Ali, the old Khilafatist along with a group 
84 
of League Ulema and workers camped at Jhansi for carrying 
on electionering propaganda in favour of Rafiuddin/ the 
Muslim League candidate. Nehru took keen interest in this 
election and attached a great importance for "a Congress 
victory in this (election) would indeed be a triumph for 
85 
the Congress and our cause and also a point of honour. The 
nationalist newspapers opened their coltxmns in highlighting 
the achievements of the Congress candidate and persuing 
the electorate to support Mr, Sherwani, the Congress candidate. 
82. Congress candidate was Sherwani, ably supported by 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, while Muslim League fielded 
Rafiuddin as the official candidate. 
83. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p.l59, 
84. It included Ulema like Mawlana Jamal Mian, Mufti 
Enayetullah of firangi Mahal,Mawlana Abdul Hamld 
Badauni and host of others. See, Khaliquzzaman, i]SM« 
p.159, 
85. Nehru to Kher, 30 June, 1937, A.I.C.C.Papers. 
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The Congress entered the fray with many advantages 
accuring fran a so-and finance, better organisation and 
support of the press while the Muslim League was passing 
through the most critical phase of financial cricis. It 
was due to the generous help of Raja of Mahmoodabad^ Amir 
Ahmad Khan-that the Muslim League was able to meet the 
^ 86 
election expenses* 
Notwithstanding the vast organisational strength, 
finances, backing of the press and the advantages emanating 
from ministerial authority, the Congress was defeated at 
87 
the polls. Credit for this goes to Mawlana Shaukat All, 
the hero of many political battles, who fought single handed 
88 
both against the Jamiat divines and Nehru*s strength* 
Analysing the election outcome the Madina visualised 
that the main reason of Leagues victory in that region was 
that Rafiuddin was a local man and his caste, Muslim Rajputs, 
constituted 25% of the whole Muslim population, whole-
89 
heartedly supported him. . But the most important factor was 
86. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p* 159* 
87« Out of 4700 votes polled the Congress could get only 
2000 votes, see the Madina, 11 July, 1937. 
88, A history of Freedom Movement, Volume IV, op,cit,p.47. 
89. The Madina, 12 July, 1937. 
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f 
the attitude of the Congress towards the minority problems 
and interest which gave ample opportunity to Jinnah to 
exploit the situation to his advantage. Blame was entirely 
90 
to be put on Babu Rajendra Prasad who speaking at Patna 
on the 3rd March 1937 ruled out the possibility of forming 
coalition with any party which was not in consonance with 
the policy of his party. He further said that two Muslim 
members may be included in the legislature in which one 
should be from Congress and other from that party which 
sign the pledge. This statement was made at the time when 
91 
most of the results were about to come. Nothing perturbed 
the Muslims than this hasty statement of Rajendra Prasad, 
The Muslim League leaders specially Mawlana Shaukat 
Ali was criticised by a host of writers for communalising 
the election campaign by raising the slogan of Islam in 
danger. In one of his letters Nehru complained to 
92 
Khaliquzzaman about the election strategy of the League. 
In a press release, Nehru criticising Jinnah*s attempt tO' 
import religious emotion into politics, said, "the cry 
(in the election) raised ts that Islam is in danger and 
90. Al«Jamiat, 23 February, 1937. 
91. Khaliquzzman, op.cit., p. 153, 
92. Ibid., p.174. 
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non-Muslim organisation have dared to put up candidate 
against the Muslim League»Mr, Jinnah appealed in the name 
of Allah and the holy Quran for support of the Muslim 
League candidate. He knew well that many «ninent Muslims, 
including leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Uleraa like Mawlana Husain 
Ahmad were supporting the Congress candidate. Have they 
93 
ceased to be Muslims because of this!" 
But this is only one side of the picture on the other 
hand the Congressmen also did not behave in a sensible 
manner. In one of his speaches. Ataullah Shah Bnkhari 
labelled the Muslim League as foul smelling dead body and 
the description of the Hindustan Times, a Congress organ 
about the league "as Madaris and Bhands"^ also did not 
94 
give credit to them. 
Meanwhile, Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim resigned from his 
seat, in order to meet the criticism of Muslim Leaguers 
for breach of pledge and sought re-electio^, T^is was a 
rare respect to democratic principle and values. But while 
seeking, re-election he retained the ministerial post which 
was most agitating to the Muslim Leaguers. Khaliquzzaman 
93, An article by B.R.Nanda in The Partition of India -
Policies and Perspective, 1935-1947, editfed by C.H, 
Phillips and~*Hary Dorcen Weinwright (George Allen 
and Unwin limited, 1970), p.158,"quoting from a press 
statement Allahabad, 30 June, 1937, 
94, Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p, 176. 
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complained and criticised the improper action of the Congress 
95 
in the letters to Jawaharlal Nehru. He said, "the Govexm-
ment of India authorised the Governor to appoint a person 
as Minister from outside, provided he secures a seat for 
himself within 6 months of his appointment but it nowhere 
allows a Minister to retain his office as a Minister and 
resign his seat when his appointment was made as a member 
of the Legislature," The objection of the League members 
was quite justified in view of the fact that any one 
seeXing a re-election as a Minister would get undue advantage 
over his rivals. 
This was the most hotly contested political battle 
in which all the prominent personalities fran both sides 
96 
actively convassed for their respective candidates. But 
inspite of the big guns like Mawlana Shaukat Ali and 
97 
Hasrat Mohani, League lost the election, mainly due to 
the influence of >lawlana Husain Ahmad Madani who was 
exercising tremendous control over the minds of the voters 
95. A letter by Khaliquzzraan to Pandit Nehru, published 
in Bunch of letters, see Khaliquzzman, op.cit.,p.l76, 
96. Congress fielded Mohammad Abdul Samee while Hafiz 
Mohammad Ibrahim, once in the U,P.Congress parliamen-
tary board, was the League nominee. 
37. In rhe election the Congress candidate got 2,102 votes 
while the Muslim League candidate got 7,271 votes, see, 
the Madina 1 November 1937, 
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98 
in the region* TSiis success of the Congress was of far-
reaching importance also for it was fought just after the 
Lucknow session of the Muslim League which had boosted its 
morale by jenlisting the support of Sir Sikandar Hiyat Khan 
and Pazlul Hag# the powerful premiers of Punjab and Bengal 
respectively. 
At this time a demand was made from Jamiat-ul-Ulema 
asking the representatives of the Muslim League in the U.P, 
Legislature to resign and seek a fresh mandate because 
they succeeded at the polls only due to the support and 
•• , - 99 
influence of the Jamiat and now they were not with them. 
Thereafter three by-elections took place at Amroha# 
Bulandshahr and Saharanpur and in all these elections the 
Congress got defeat, mostly due to the inexhuastible energy 
of the great Muslim leader Mawlana Shaukat Ali and a hand 
of committed workers who were opposed to be idle and arra-
100 
chair politicians. Among these the Amroha by-election was 
most important from Jamiat point of view because for -the 
98, Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p,177, 
99, The signatories were Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani and 
other prominent leaders of the J^niat-ul-Uleraa see, 
A1-Jamiat, 1 November, 1937, 
100, Khaliquzzaraan, op,cit,, p. 177, 
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,first time a Jamiat representative was contesting against 
the Muslim League on the congress ticket. Great impor-
tance was attached to it by the Jamiat leaders. Both the 
leaders of the Jamiat and the Ahrar down to the Congress 
prominent leaders like Nehru and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan 
101 
actively convassed in support of Bashir Ahmad, Mawlana 
Mohammad Ismail and Habibur Rehman, the Ahrar president 
toured the BMShrao (Araroha) and asked the people to cast 
102 
their vote in favour of the Congress candidate. 
Addressing a huge gathering at Amroha on the eve of 
by-election Jawaharlal Nehru appealed to the people in the 
name of hunger aftd poverty and political and economic 
development of the country as if only the Congress was 
capable of placating the people and remedying the mis-
103 
givings. He tried to remove the apprehension of the Muslims 
that.Congress was against the Muslim culture tradition and 
language and substantiated his speech by the Congress reso-
104 
lution of Calcutta, 
101, Al-Jamiat« 20 October, 1937. 
102, The Madina, 28 November 1937, 
103, Ibid. 
104, In this resolution the Congress took the responsibility 
of defending the culture, language and religion of 
the Muslims. 
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In spite of the convassing of the Congress leader,' 
the League candidate did well and defeated the Congress 
candidate , 
Commenting on the results of the election at Maradabad, 
Saharanpur and Bulandshahr the Madtna remarked, "even though 
Congress could not be successful ca these seats but .one 
cannot deny the factphat the results of the election has 
proved beyond doubt that the majority of Muslims are not 
with the Muslim League because Congress candidate was 
105 
defeated with a marginal difference. Secondly till that 
time Congress had been avoiding in fielding its candidate 
for the Muslim constituenc'^s. But now Congress tried to 
contact the masses directly under its Mass Contact Campaign, 
If in that attempt it succeeded in getting 40% endorsement 
from the electorate then it meant "titiat Muslim league had 
no influence and say in the masses. Congress failed to get 
success only due to the long neglected work among the Muslim 
masses and as a'result the message and programme of the 
106 
Congress could not impress upon their mind. 
105. For example.as Madina newspaper claims, in Muradabad 
by-election Congress got 3441 votes from 7,570 votes 
polled, and the League candidate got 4129 votes 
against the Congress Candidate. 
106. The Madina, December 1937, p.5. 
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i 
Thus by the end of December 1937 the Congress 
107 
campaign of Muslim Mass Contact ha^ met with utter failure. 
Firstly, it was not taken up serioasly and secondly it was 
crushed wherever launched by the vtteel of the Muslim League 
108 
which was rapidly gaining speed, strength and mobility. 
OSie All India Congress Committee file Ko,47 is full of such 
letters complaining and expressing anguish over the immobility 
and lack of commitment to the duty and obligations of the 
Congress workers and suggesting ways and means for the 
109 
o©ntact work. Mohammad Ashfaq» the Secretary of the Young 
Muslim Party, Meerut, in a letter addressed to Jawaharlal 
Nehru, the Congress President, complained about the idleness 
of the Congreae men. He said, "there is a group of prominent 
Ulema under the head of Mawlana Husain Ahmad and Mufti 
Kifayatullah which trying its best for Muslim political up-
lift but reactionaries are more in number and have much -
wealth at their disposal while those venerable Ulema have 
only their lives to sacrifice over the country and Islam." 
He further taking the example of Meerut said, "it is one of 
the cities where the Congress is most powerful and influen-
cial body of the town and the district. But what is being 
107, A History of the Freedom Movement/ volume iv, op.cit., 
p.50. • " ' 
108, Reun Gopal, Indian Muslims, op.cit., p.59; See also 
The All India Congress" Conmittee Papers. 
109, Ibid. 
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done by the local Congress for Muslim Mass Contact. How 
many leaders have been called at Meerut for this object. 
How many Muslims have been enrolled here as a Congress 
members. As far as I think the Qajgress diary is really 
blank ••• what they have done of jpour circular about Muslim 
Mass Contact problem,'^  Have they filled it or thrown it 
110 
in waste paper basket'^  What have they done of it^ 
He suggested various ways and means for the contact 
111 
work. These above mentioned documents show that, the whole 
campaign was worked by disorganization and idleness and 
lack of devotion to the work, « 
Unmindful of the temper of the time and warnings 
112 
even from its friends Congress persisted in its^  Mass 
Contact Campaign and tried to get by Governmental authority 
113 
which it could not achieve through political activity. 
A.I.C.C.fil«. 
110, /N©.47» Contains several such letters addressed to 
Dr. K.M.Ashraf, tlie incharge of the Muslim Mass 
contact Campaign department-see, pp. 83,87,89,91,93, 
111, He suggested several ways and means to be followed 
for the Muslim Mass Contact campaign viz., Muslim 
leaders and Muslim congressn«n like Ma?*lana Husain 
Ahmad Madani of Deoband, Mufti Kifayatullah of Delhi, 
Maulana Ahmad Saeed, Mawlsna Hifzir Rehman of Seohara 
and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan be pressed to tour the 
whole country with a definite programme and objectives. 
Moreover, other Muslim Congressmen may be also asked 
for, to tour their respective provinces and districts, 
Ulema and Muslim leaders would be more suitable for 
the object than our vulnerable Hindu leaders. File 
No.47 p,65 A.I.C.C. papers, 
Contd,..,, 
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Congress thought that through the benefits accuring from 
long experience in political activity, strong financial 
position and backing of the press it could give rude shock 
to the Muslim League leadership and wean away the Muslims 
from the Jaws of the Muslim League, The latter interpreted 
it as an attempt at political Shuddhi of the Muslims and 
114 
took up the challenge in the right earnest. Infact the 
Congress In an attempt to reach over the heads of the 
Muslim politicians and to the rank and file of the Muslim 
voters gave the Muslim league just the occasion it needed 
115 
for a mass campaign. History then saw a remarkable change 
in the Muslim League and eclipsed the Congress influence 
over the Muslim masses. 
(Continued from the previous page) 
112. K.M.Ashraft sounded the warning that new move of the 
Congress with regards to the formation of the contacts 
with the Muslim masses is not being sufficiently 
appreciated by a number of progressive and independent 
Muslim outside^ see A.I.C.C. File No.31, p.15, 
113. A History of the Freedom Movement, Volume 5, 
op.cit., p. 50, 
114. Ibid, p.16. 
115. Ibid., p. 17. 
C H A P T E R III 
THE JAMIAT FROM THE WORLD WAR II 
TO THE QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT 
REACTION TO THE W0RIJ3 WAR II 
The, year 1939 sav the world on the verge of a 
global armed conflict. The conflict occured In Europe 
which soon engulfed the whole world and brought untold 
miseries, sufferings and privation to the millions. The 
genesis of the war lay in the humiliating terms imposed 
by the allies in 1919 on Germany after the First World 
1 
War. The Germans never have forgiven Poland and under the 
spirited leadership of Adolf Hitler, they saw the hope 
of revival and revenge. Hitler after strengthening his 
power and position by bringing Austria and ChzechoSlovakia 
under his sways entered into a treaty of non-aggression 
with Russia on 24th August, 1939. In order to counter-
poise the German designs Britain guaranteed protection to 
2 
Poland on 25th August 1939, Thus the stage was set for 
a world wide conflict, the immediate cause of hostility 
was the conflict over the polish corridor a small territory 
given to Poland to have an access to the sea and as negotia-
tion failed Germany attacked Poland on 1st September 1939. 
On 3rd September Britain and Prance also declared war on 
Germany to make the world safe for democracy and to fight 
1. R,C;MaJumdar# History of Freedom Movement in India 
(Calcutta" 1963),p. 594. 
2. Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., p. 217. 
3. R.C.Majumdar, op.cit,, p. 594, 
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for the preservation of democratic values and ideals and 
for protection of the right of self determination of all 
4 
nations, against the onslaught of Nazis and Fascists. • 
Britain followed the same policy with regard to 
India as it followed in:1914. India was used as a passive 
pawn of British policy and was ceremoniously declared a 
5 
belligerent nation, without even the formality of consult-
ing the Central Legislatures and the will of the people. 
While in regard to the other Commonwealth countries their 
Parliaments met in a special meeting and declared war on 
their own. This very fact convinced the Indians that 
Britain treated India as a creature of its own will, without 
giving a formal recognition to its will in a matter like 
6 
war. 
The Viceroy Lord Linlithgow made a formal broadcast 
to the nation on 3rd September 1939 informing that the 
war had been broken out between Germany and Poland and 
urged the people of India to help British in her lofty 
cause. In a broadcast the Viceroy is reported to have said, 
•»I am confident that India will make her contribution on 
4. Vishnoo Bhagwan, Constitutional History and National 
Movement of India (Atma Ram, New Delhi, 1972), p.251. 
5. R.P.Dutta, India Today (People*s Publishing House, 
Bonbay, 1947), p.439, 
6. Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad op.cit., p.26, 
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the side of htunan freedom as against the rule of force and 
will play a part worthy of her place among.the great nations 
7 
of the historical civilization of the world,* 
The working Committee of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-
Hind in its meeting at Meerut on 16th, 17th, 18th September 
1939 declared its attitude towards the European wsr. The 
Committee giving a most anxious consideration and passionate 
view on the current national and international situation 
in the light of holy teachings of Islam demanded patriotism 
and highest sense of ethics and resolved that considering 
all these factors together, the working Committee found no 
valid reason to support British imperialism in the war. It 
was the considered view of the Committee that in the 
present critical situation the Muslims of India, infact ail 
Indians, should immediately unite to formulate a decision 
which should be in keeping with their national self respect 
8 
and dignity. 
The British claim that it was fighting for the defence 
of the freedom of the -nations sounded paradoxical to the 
Jamiat in view of the perpetuation of British domination 
7, Indian Annual Register, 1940, Volume II, p,21, 
8, Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul»Ulema Kiya hai,(Jamiat-ul-
Ulema (U^.P.), publication Division 1946), Volume ll, 
p. 213. 
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over many nation and adopting a deliberate policy of 
violence and oppression -to keep them in subjugation and 
to suppress their struggle for freedom. It perplexed the 
Jamiat that if Britain had declared war in the guise of 
defence of freedom of the nations, then why Britain kept 
silent and became a dumb spectator over the happenings 
in Chzechosl^vakia* Austria, Abyassinia and Albana where 
freedom was wantonly sacrified and the dictatorship carried 
on a campaign of fire and destruction and perpetrated all 
9 
sorts of terror and barbarity against those free people. 
The Jamiat also regarded the declaration of war by 
the Viceroy on behalf of Indian without consulting the 
Indian public opinion as contrary to her cherished ideal 
of the defence of democracy. Moreover, Britain did not 
care to defend the Spanish Republic and was not willing 
to create a democratic form of Govexmment either in India 
10 
or in its colonies and dependencies. 
The Jamiat failed to understand that if Britain was 
fighting 'for the cause of the oppressed then why she did 
not come to the rescue of Tripoli, Syria, Abyssinia, 
Chzechoslovakia and Palestine which were no less oppressed 
9, A,M.Zaidi, Evolution of Muslim Political Thoughts 1.Q 
India, Volume 5 (S.Chand and Company, New Delhi, 1975), 
pp. 592-593, 
10, Indian Quarterly Register, 1940, Volume I, pp.378-380. 
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than Poland and allowed to be victimised by the oppressors. 
The British plea that they were bond,by the agreement 
with Poland to help her in case of emergency and foreign 
aggression could not convince the Jaraiat-ul-Ulema# for tne 
Britishers never held the promises and agreements in such 
high esteem. They had always been acted as unprincipled 
and indecisive men whose words and professions could not 
be trusted. It were the Britishers who in spite of the 
repeated declaration by responsible statesmen and politicians^ 
regarding the territorial integrity of the various states 
which fought against them in World War I and the sanctity 
of the holy places of Islam, the victorious allies dis-
membered the Turkish empire and violated the sanctity of 
12 
the holy places of Islam with impurity, 
Mawlana Sajjad Ahmad in his letter to the Viceroy 
dated 13th January 1940, elaborated the resolution passed 
by Meerut meeting of the Jaraiat Working Committee, He said 
that the decision of the Jamiat had been based on the 
teachings of religious principles and injunctions of the 
Quran and that the people had nothing to do in any form 
with the war efforts. The Jamiat had the right to propagate 
11, Indian Annual Register, 1940. 
12. Khutbe-e-Sadaarat, Eleventh Session of the Jaraiat-ul-
Ulema# Ai Jamiat Press, available on microfilm at 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. 
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and spread Its religion through missionary activil-y. To 
impose ban even on such activities would be tantamount to 
13 
the interference in religious freedom. 
The Jamiat held Britain chiefly responsible for 
untold miseries and sufferings of the crores of Muslims 
all over the world. It has deprived the various nations 
of their wealth, trade, educational setup. It was Britain 
that had run down the Muslims, deprived them of their 
educational institutions trade, commerce and wealth. 
Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani in his lovely speech concluded 
that the responsibility to oust the Britishers from India 
fell upon the shoulders of all Indians and on the Muslims 
even more, for the Muslims have been living here for cen-
turies and it were the Britishers who have deprived them 
14 
of the position of once a ruler of the sub-continent. More-
over their loyalty to Islam and Islamic countries also 
demand the immediate end of the British rule. He thought 
and quite rightly that it was only due to the ensalvement 
of India that the Britishers had been maintaining their 
hold in Muslim countries of the Middle East like Egypt, 
15 
Syria, Palestine, Sudan and Arabia. Hence in order to 
13. The Madina, 10 February 1940, 
14. Mohaaraad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq. (Al-Jamiat Press, Delhi 
1948), p.113. 
15. Ibid. 
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liberate these countries the Muslims had to liberate India 
from the clutches of British imperialism. When the Jamiat 
realized possible threat to the territorial integrity and 
self-determination of the Islamic countries it warned 
Britain- to dissociate herself fron any move to establish 
16 
her authority over these Islamic countries. The committee 
resolution declared that nothing could satisfy the ^ !uslims 
than independence of the Islamic countries. The Muslims 
would not like any moVe of the outside power to deny 
17 
complete independence of^these countries, -
Husain Ahmad Madani further condemned those who wanted 
to help Britain both financially and militarily in this 
hour of peril and termed them as the co-sharers in the 
barbarians. He thought that the best way to help Britain 
in this situation, when it was encircled with so many 
difficulties in face of the reverses in the European war, 
18 
would be to persuade her to stop such acts, 
THE AUGUST OFFER 
In view of the deepending crisis in the European 
war and to enlist the support of the Indians in the war 
16, Mawlana Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hai« 
op.cit., p, 237, 
17, Ai-Jamiat, 12 June, 1940, 
18, Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Hag , op.cit., p.Ill, 
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efforts the Viceroy Lord 'Linlithgow on behalf of the British 
Government announced a new proposal on 8th August 1940 whicdi 
had offered the immediate expansion of the Viceroy's 
Executive Council by appointing a number of representati\res 
of Indians and the establishment of a War Advisory Council 
consisting of representatives of British India and the 
19 
Indian states to meet at regular intervals But the offer 
fell short of what the Jamiat had been striving for. 
Because it fell short of any transfer of power, Mawlana 
Sajjad Ahmad, the Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Uleraa Hind, 
in his statement ruled out any possibility of cooperating 
with Britain in its war efforts even though the Government 
had promised to extend the number of Executive Council in 
order to accommodate Indians. For there was no common 
ground between Jamiat demand for immediate Complete Inde-
pendence and Viceroy's offer of an enlarged Executive 
20 
Council, Moreover, even if the G ovemment declared India's 
complete independence, declared Mawlana Sajjad Ahmad, it 
would not be possible for the Jamiat to cooperate until 
and unless they are convinced that the declaration has 
been based on reality and they are self-determinent to 
decide their participation in war efforts. Moreover they 
19. The Medina* 13 August, 1940, 
20. The Madina, 17 August 1940. 
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were convinced that Britain was not fighting for the 
protection of the opporessed and weaker nations but only . 
to fulfil their imperialistic design. He condemned the 
reactionary and opportunist elements for their attempt to 
enter into the Viceroy's Executive Council. He specially 
exhorted the Muslim to be guided by the laws of Islam in 
matter of peace and justice and not by the lure of posts 
21 
and worldly honour. 
The Jamiat's opposition to Britain in the war 
efforts would not be taken to mean that it wantdd the 
defeat of the British in the war for this would have 
worse effect in India. A defeiat of England would mean a 
triupph of the Nazis and the fascists which could not be 
in the best interest of India for it would further extend 
the bondage of slavery. Hence the Janiat adopted a neutral 
policy with regard to the European war. This stand of the 
Jamiat taken at the Working Committee Meeting of the Jamiat 
at Delhi in October 1940 was supported by the nationalist -
22 
press like Madina / Bijnor. 
The Jamiat Leaders for their revolutionary and anti 
war activities had to suffer a great deal of hardships and 
21. The TeJ, 18 August, 1940. 
22. The Madina, 9th October/ 1940. 
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privation, A large ntimber of ulema were arrested for tlieir 
inflamatory speeches and statements against the Government. 
Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, one of the leaders of the Jamiat -
ul-Ulema# was arrested under the Defence of India Ordinance, 
1939. He was charged of making 'irresponsible* speeches 
against the war which would have aroused the people in 
revolt and was sentenced to a six years of vigorous imprison-
23 
ment. Many raids were made on the office of the Jamiat-
24 
ul-Ulema and important documents and pamphlets were seized. 
In November, two days before Idd Mawlana Ahmad Saeed was 
also arrested and put behind the bars. These, acts of the 
Government antagonised the Jamiat leaders and its Secretary 
Mawlana i>ajjad Ahmad criticised the Government for its 
irresponsible acts at a time when it was facing great diffi-
culties. The Secretary warned the Government that if they 
continued it, the Jamiat would be compelled to start 
civil Disobedience Movement. He further said that the 
Government would be making great mistake if it thought that 
if could crush the revolutionary zeal of the Indians 
25 
through oppression. 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema responded to the clarian call 
given by Mr, Gandhi for a representative Satyagrapha to 
2 3« The Madina, 29th September 1940. 
24. The Madina, 25th September 1940. 
25. The Madina, 21 November 1940. 
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protest against the war. It was to be no struggle for 
freedom but a symbolic Satyagraha for asserting the right 
of free speech. The Jamiat Working Committee congratulated 
Indians and specially the representatives of the Jamiat-ul-
Uleraa-e-Hind who were serving a Ylgorous imprisonment for 
26 
their anti—war speeches. An appeal was also made to 
maintain law and order situation in the country and not to 
give even a slight opportunity to the enemies of freedom to 
take advantage from this for in that situation only a policy 
of non violence could be beneficial for Indians and violent 
method would bring dangerous consequences because this would 
27 
embrass the Government in a war situation. 
In order to meet the exigencies of the situation the 
Jamiat in a circular to the people proposed for appointment 
of a Khuddara-e-Khalque Volunteers to maintain law and order 
situation in view of the rumours flaoting in the air which 
could be exploited to their full advantage by anti-social 
is 
elements by engaging in loot and plunder. 
26. Minutes of Working Committee, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind 
1940, Microfilm at the N ehru Memorial Museiun and 
Library. 
27. Ibid. 
28. Mswlana Moharnmad Mian, Ja>T.iat-ul-Ulema Kiya Hal, 
o p . c i t . , p , 226, 
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Mawiana Husain Ahmad Madani was highly critical of 
the Muslim League for its policy during the war. In one of 
29 
his letter, addressed- to one Mawiana Ismail of GoJarKhan, 
he criticised the attitude of the League during the war vdilch 
served the cause of British imperialism, 
Husain Ahmad Madani says that although the League 
Was non-committal in the war it allowed individual help as 
a result of which the top rank Leaguers as well as the 
back benchers among them took so much part to aid the Govern-
ment that the parellel of which would not be found any 
30 
where else, 
Husain Ahmad Madani quoted with permission the state-
ment of Mr. Jinnah which was published by the Zamindar» 
Lahore, Mr, Jinnah was reported to have said that at a time 
when Britain was involved in life and death struggle, the 
Muslim League did not want to embrass it and put obstacles 
in its way of recruitment to the army nor would it take to 
any movement. But on the other hand it was neutral and even 
this neutrality was not of aggressive nature. Moreover It 
had permitted some of its office bearers that if they liked 
29, Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat-e.-Shaikhul Islam, Volume 
1, compiled by Nalmuddin Islahi, (Matba Maarif, Azamgarh 
1952), pp, 156-157, Maktub No, 150, 
30. HusalrT Ahmad Madani, Muslim Leacme Klva Hal (Delhi 
1945), p.16; See also The Zamindar, 25 March r$4l. 
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» 
they couia help Britain in their hour of peril. Sir Slkander 
Hayat Khan, the premier of the Punjab who^ ^^ s a prominent 
leader of the Muslim League, had rendered so meritorious a 
31 
military aid as could not be expected from any other man. 
Emphasising the Universality of Islam and the 
principle of extra-territorial loyalty Mr. Jinnah said that 
the "Indian Muslims are a part of that Islanf^ community vdiich 
is spread from the Pacific to the Atlantic. Turkey is also 
a part of this coraminity and Afghanistan and Iraq too, I 
am glad that in the present war these powers have joined 
together with Britain and we, the Indian Muslims, are at 
one with them though in the pest we may have multifarious 
differences and we have every desire to help the British in 
32 
this war " 
Husain Ahmad Madani thinks that the role of Jinnah 
during the war was the betryal of Islam. He criticised 
Jinnah for his help in the passing of the Army Bill, Jinnah 
in course of his speech in the Assembly assured that those 
armies would not be sent to the Islamic countries as had been 
assured by the Viceroy. But latter those very armies were 
31, Husain Ahmad Madani, Muslim League Kiva Kai, op.cit,, 
p.14; See also the Zamindar, 25 March, 1941, 
32, Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, 
op.cit., pp. 156rl57, 
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sent to Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypfc and the Muslim League 
could noi 
3 
Britain. 
ot do any thing or made any practical move against 
0 O 
As a matter of fact Jinnah wanted to use war situation 
as a bargaining counter with Britain. Its cooperation wihh 
the Government was made conditional on its refusal to agree 
to the Congress demand for the right to form a Constituent 
Assembly, as it would be dorainated by the Congress and the 
Musllnis would be bound to be in a helpless minority and 
secondly, on its acceptance of the League's claim that no 
constitutional system in the country would be« evolved wltn-
34 
Out the prior approval of the minority. 
CRIPPS MISSION AND THE JAMIAT«UL~ULEMA-E-HIND 
By the year 1942 the European war took a new turn, 
German^ attacked France and Japan with her dramatic entry 
in the war on the December 1941 shouting the slogan of Asia 
for- the Asian started conquering the countries, of Far East 
35 
and South 2 West Asia. This created a great consternation 
amidst the allied powers like USA, China* UK, France agaist 
33, Husain Ahmad Madani, An open letter to the Muslim League, 
(Lahore 1946), p. 53, 
34, R.Coupland, The Constitutional Problem in India* (Oxford 
University Press, 1945), p.22§^ , 
35, Jal Jipal, Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan, 
(Delhi, 1983),. p. 101. 
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the threat of Japan. Both China and America realised that 
a war in the eastern sector was bound to involve India. 
The leaders of these countries began to advocate that a 
reapproachment between the servant and the master was vital 
for the better interest of the Allied powers. Realising 
the gravity of the situation,on 11th March 1942,Mr. Churchill 
announced the sending of the Cripps Mission to India to 
37 
suggest the constitutional proposals suitable to Indians* 
When these developments were taking place the Jamiat-
ul-Ulema-e-Klnd vas deliberating at its 13th session at 
Lahore under the presidentship of Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani 
who was made permanent president of the Jamiat at the Johnpur 
session in June,. 1940. Although the resolution adopted at 
the open session regarding the Cripps proposals were in the 
form of mere expectation from such a mission but in view of 
the subsequent development this prophesy became an album of 
38 
future. The Conference while calling the proposals as an 
outdated check called upon all Muslims and Muslim Organisa-
tions in India to get together and draw up a common formula 
agreeable to all shades of thought for the purpose of present-
39 
ing to Sir Stafford Cripps. 
36, Tar a Chand, History of the Freedom Movement in India* 
Volxime 4 (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 
Government of India, 1975), p.335. 
37. Jai Jipal, op.cit., p. 101, 
38. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Hao. (Al-Jamiat Publicat ion, 
New Delhi), p . 
39, The Statesman, 24th March, 1942, 
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The Cripps proposals were disapproved by both the 
major political parties like Congress and the Muslim League, 
While the Muslim League saw in the proposal the achievement 
of Pakistan as a remote possibility with a definite preference 
40 
for a new Indian Union* the Congress saw in the non-
acceding clause the possibility of the creation of Pakistan 
by implication for it offered the opportunity of the creation 
41 
of two or more independent unions in India. Moreover the 
demand for national 'Government and complete independence 
had not been conceded either in the immediate present or 
in the future, 
Mawlana Hifzur Rehman# the Secretary of the Jamiat 
42 
Ulema/in his press release said that the proposals are 
nothing but a promise in terms of future prospects and the 
proposals contain no guarantee that in the present time 
Indians would be given a chance to form a responsible Govern-
ment. He condemned the proposals as an unprincipled and 
outdated piece of legislation meant to settle their own 
house in order. Had the Government introduced such proposals 
in the atmosphere of pre-war situation the Indians inspite 
of dislike would have accepted it as tha? had accepted the 
40-, Ibid. 
41. Jai Jipal/ op,cit., p. 102, 
42. The Madina, 13th April, 1942. 
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Provincial Autonomy in the face of bitter criticism. But 
at a time when the clouds of calamity was over India. 
Britain wanted to drag her alone in the struggle for life 
and death. No principled and farsighted political party 
could agree with the proposals so easily. He further 
criticised the British Government for widening the gulf 
amongst the Indians by giving them concessions which were 
43 
contrary and anti thesis of each others claim. 
Infect, the Cripps landed on the Indian soil under 
most unfavourable circumstances. The signing of Atlantic 
Charter raised the hope of the Indians that they were also 
going to be benefited by the principle underlying the charter. 
But the untimely outburst of Churchil contaminated the situa-
tion. Mr, Churchil, speaking in the House of Commons on 9th 
September 1941 said that the principle of Atlantic Charter 
applied only to the countries under Nazi subjugation and 
44 
the question of India was a separate matter. This made the 
Indians apprehensive of the British intentions. In such an 
atmosphere "a gradualist constitutional approach was apt to 
45 
be a miserable failure.** 
43. Ibid. 
4 4 . A His to ry of t h e Freedcxn Movement, (Pakistan h i s t o r i c a l 
Society^yVolume 4 , p . 1 2 1 . 
4 5 . V i s ^ o o Bhagwafi, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l His to ry of I n d i a , 
(New Delhi , 1972), p . 
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Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani was violently critical 
of the Britain for her irresponsible and untimely outbiirst 
in declaring that the principle under lying the charter 
did not apply to the British dependencies. Addressing the 
13th Annual Session of the Jamiat Madani was reported to 
have said, "the Atlantic Charter was exposed to the world 
as a fantastic message to all which would be applied to the 
weaker and downtrodden: . This infused a new lease of life 
in the minds of the Indians. But the September declaration 
of Mr, Churchil in the House of Commons made it clear that 
India was not going to be befitted by the fruits of freedom 
and democracy. This was quite apprehensive to the Indians 
46 
and thus their attitude stiffened, Infact, England was 
negotiating from the position of weakness. This made her 
47 
bonafides and generosity, suspect in Indian eyes. 
Hence the failure of the Cripps Mission and the 
changing of attitude of Sir Stafford cripps between the 
first end second meeting with Mawlana Azad showed the 
evasive attitude of Britain towards the Indian problems and 
48 
their non seriousness in granting Independence to India* 
Only the circumstances had compelled them to show some 
46, The Madina. 5th April, 1942, 
47, Vishnoo Bhagwan, op.cit,, p, 268, 
48, Abul Kalam Azad, op.cit., pp. 43-47, 
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sincerity arid interest. This also confirms the prophesy 
of Jamiat-ul-Ulema which had no faith in the different pro-
posals put forward by Britain as they were only to meet 
the exigencies of time. 
QUIT INDIA MOVEMENT AND THE JAMIAT 
There were great expectations with the Cripps Mission 
but these expectation soon reached its doom with the sudden 
departure of Cripps leaving the Indians in quigmire. This 
plunged the country in despondency and anger. Mahatraa 
Gandhi who had not actively participated in the negotiations 
with Sir Stafford. Cripps was, however, pained to see the 
49 
handling of the situation by the British Government, in 
utter disguise he abandoned his cooperative attitude towards 
Britain and declared an open rebellion. This programme was 
drafted at Wardha meeting and latter passed and endorsed in 
A.I.C.C, 50 
the'Bonabsy meeting of the-/on August 8th 1942. The resolution 
which Is popularly known as Quit India resolution authorised 
Gandhi to start a mass struggle on non-violent lines on 
the widest possible scale. The resolution runs as follows, 
"This committee approves"of and endorses the wardha resolution 
and is of the opinion that events subsequent to it have given 
49. R.C.Majuradar, History^of the Freedom Movement in India, 
(Calcutta, 1963), p. 633. 
50. Bipin Chandra, Freedom Struggle. (National Book Trust, 
New Delhi, 1972),- p. 219. 
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it future Justification and have made it clear that the 
immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent 
necessity both for the. sake of India and for the success 
of the cause of the United Nations 
"The peril of today necessitates the independence 
of India and the ending of British domination. No future 
compromise or guarantee can affect the present situation 
or meet the peril. They can not' produce needed psycholo-
gical effect on the minds of the masses-only the glow of 
freedom now can release that energy and enthusiasm of millions 
of people which will iirenediately transform the nature of 
war. The AICC therefore reptats with all enthusiasm the 
51 
demand for the withdrawal of the British power from India." 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema had already given the message 
of spontaneous revolution on mass level to the Indians in a 
circular issued'by the Secretary of the Jamiat mfti 
52 
Mohammad Kifayatullah. The circular said, the complete 
independence of Injiia was the united and unanimous demand 
of all the Indians. It was in common knowledge of all the 
Indians about the arrogance and stubborn attitude of the 
British Government to accept this unanimous and united dananded 
51, Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, op.cit,, in the appendix, p.279. 
52. Mohammad Mian, Uleroa-e-Hag , op.cit., |bp./S-S"- ^^^ 
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to transfer power of governance to the Indians, In this 
hour of peril when the British Gsvemment was engulfed with 
the -power. It was before 1939, Hence the Indian National 
Congress had prepared a Programme of an all out war to get 
freedonv. The war will be between Indian slaves and the 
imperialist white Masters.* The circular appealed to all 
the Indians and political parties to drop their 
differences through mutual agreement and understanding 
and to unite together to form an united fron which was the 
prerequisite to achieve the cherished goal of Freedom. The 
circular expressed its hope that Mr, Jinnah would not let 
loose this historic opportunity and would realise the 
gravity of situation. The cix»cular also expressed its hope 
that Mr, Jinnah would try to keep the Muslim nation away 
from joining the camps of the enemy of the Freedom and coming 
in the way of the devotee to the causes. The Jamiat hoped 
that this would avoid the defamation of the Muslim community 
and would exhort them to sacrifice for their Mother country. 
The Circular further hoped that the Congress with open 
mindedness and farsightedness would try to clarify the 
various suspicions which has been expressed frcaa various 
53 
cardinal points. 
53. Ibid., /:>. Ibv 
- 131 -
Tiie Government so hopelessly placed against the 
enemies outside India could not tolerate the growth of rebe-
llion inside, for this would have shaken the defence arrange-
54 
ments against the Japanese aggression. The cpvernment right 
from the very beginning had been watchinglthe undercurrent 
from close eye. It was ready to meet any eventual-vy. And 
when the Congress declared open rebellion It decided to 
suppress it with ruthless hands. Before the next day dawned, 
the important leaders like Mawlana Azad, Nehru and Gandhi 
were arrested alongwith large number of Congress workers. 
The Congress was declared illegal and its offices were 
55 
raided. 
The arrest of Important leaders left the people 
without responsible leaders while some of the remaining 
leaders like Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, Jaya Prakash Nar^yan etc. 
had gone vmderground. Passions of the people were ranging 
high. The repressive attitude of the r^ Jvernment and the 
continuing Ordinance of the Raj further inflam,ed the situa-
56 
tion. Mass violence erupted. The people forget the gospel 
of non-violence which had been poured into their ears for 
more than 20 years. The antisocial elements took the 
54. R.C.Majuradar, op.cit., p. 646, 
55. The Hindustan Times. 10th August, -1942. 
56. The Pioneer, 11th Auaust, 1942, ' 
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situation to their advantage and indulged in loot and • 
57 
plunder. 
In view of the changed circumstances when most of 
its leaders including the President Mufti Kifayetullah were 
put behind the bars- and were serving a vigorous iraprisc»i-
mait, the meeting of the Jamiat Working CCKnmittee was 
called under the Chairmanship of Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, The 
Committee passed a resolution regarding the freedom of the 
country from foreign domination and criticised the British 
58 
Gpvernraent for its blind and callous attitude. The Jamiat 
also expressed its firm conviction that their sacrifice to 
the national cause would give them due share in free India 
and hence an appeal was made to join the march of other 
community in the Freedom. The resolution runs as follows, 
"India's lovers of Freedom have been compelled to embark 
upon their present course of action which is based on non-
violent and non-cooperation. There was no other way open 
to India's omniscient and deserving leaders. Britain, how-
ever, still remained blind and obstinate. Not only did she 
refuse to accept a demandl based on truth and justice but 
blind and callous to the consequences, she was now precipa-' 
ted the present origin by arresting the national leaders. 
57. The Hadina, 28th September 1942. 
53. Home Political (1), F.No.3/92/42-?oI.I. 
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This actidm had its inevitable result and India is now 
59 
blazed from one end to other," The resolution further 
condemned the violence which marred the principled Quit 
India Movement. The most regrettable feature^the committee 
viewed^was that these all were taking place in the name 
of Congress which stood for non-violence. The committee 
blamed the Government for such lawlessness because with 
the arrest and removal of the National leaders, the masses 
60 
had been left without control and guidance. 
Pointing out the apprehension of the Muslim League 
that the Quit India Movement had been launched ta order to 
oust the Britishers and established a purely Hindu Raj# the 
Committee felt convinced that if the Jamiat thought for one 
moment that there was the slightest suggestion of the present 
movement being designed for or leading to the establishment 
of Hindu Raj, it would have offered stern opposition. The 
Jamiat held the conviction that its conception of a free 
India was that of a free India where Muslims could enjoy-
61 
cultural, religious and social Freedom.' 
Mawlana Madani quoting the Hadith of Prophet 
Mohammad said that it was incumbent on the Muslims to 
participate in the struggle for freedom for independence of 
59. Home P o l i t i c a l ( 1 ) . F .No .3 /92 /42 -Po l . I . 
60. I b i d . 
6 1 . Y.B.Mathura, OJit India Move-nent (Delni 1979), pp.149-
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the c'ountry »fOuld lead to the Freedom of the mi Hat and that 
only after the Freedom of the country some sort of a Islamic 
laws could be enforced. He said that it would be Harams 
from Islamic point of view to live the life of a slave under 
62 
a foreign domination, Madani exhorted the Muslim to be up 
and doing ^ -^v paralysing the administration of the British 
imperialism through the observance of the principle of non-
violence. He advised the people to boycott their respective 
schools, colleges. Government offices, factory courts and 
organise hartals in the <?overnraent concerns and not to "-
fulfil the Government orders. He further asked the peasants 
to stop the paying depts and organise independent self Govern-
63 
ment in the villages and Tahsils, 
His impression was that huge amount of gold had b§en 
carried out by the Britishers and deposited in the banks of 
America for which India got no material in return. The 
Government used to carry the business with the help of this 
gold and for which India get no dividends. He therefore 
advised the Indians to withdraw their money from the British 
owned banks and not to take money in return of goods which 
64 
they deliver. 
However, the British succeeded in crushing the disarmed 
Indians and by the month of February 1943 the Quit India 
Movement led by Gandhi resulted in utter failure. 
62. Maktubat.e-Shaikhul Islam, compiled and edited by 
Kaimuddin Islahi, volume 4, Maktub No.39, pp. 138-139, 
63. Ibic., p. 142. 
r ' -V,- A ^ ' ii 
C H A P T E R IV 
JAMIAT AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN 
JAMIAT AND THE DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN 
; . - -
Relieved from the Congress rule, the Muslim Leacni« 
met at its Annual Session at Lahore in March 1940 and passed 
the famous resolution which latter dubbed as "Pakistan 
1 
Resolution." The resolution demanded the division of the 
country on communal lines and the establishment of independent 
sovereign Muslim State. The Lahore Session, on 23rd March 
2 
1940, resolved the followings. 
1 .This session of the All-India Muslim League 
emphatically reiterated that the scheme of federation 
is totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar 
conditions of the country and is altogethef tinaccepted 
to Husllm India. 
2 Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the 
whole constitutional plan is considered denovo and 
that no revised plan should be accepted to the Muslims 
unless it is framed with their approval and consent, 
3 Resolved that it is the considered view of this 
session of the All India Muslim League that no 
1, The Lahore resolution had not used the word Pakistan. 
This word latter got currency in the Hindu Press. 
See, A Histoiry of Freedon MovemeQt; The Speech of 
Jinnah at the Delhi session of the Muslim League,Vol.4 
(Pakistan Historical Society, Delhi, 1984), p.101. 
2, According to the reportings of the Hindustan Times this 
resolution was passed on 24tfi March, 1940 and not on 23rd 
March as most of the books refer. Dr,A.?^ .Ambedkar has 
wrongly dated this to 26th" March, 1940. 
See, Dr.A.R.Ambedkar, Thoughts On Pakistan? 
(Bombay, 1971), p.15, 
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constitutional plan would be accepted to the Muslims 
unless it is designed on the following basis, namely 
the geographically contiguous units are demarcated 
into regions which should be so constituted with such 
territorial adjustment as may be necessary that the 
areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a minority 
as in the North-West and Eastern zones of India should 
be grouped to constitute independent states in which 
constituting units shall be autonomous sovereign, 
4 Ihat adequate, effective and mandatory safe-
guards should be specifically provided in the consti-
tution for minorities in these jinits and in the region 
for the protection of their religious, cultural, economicj 
political administrative and other rights and interests 
in consultation with them; and in other parts of India 
where the Musalmans are in a minority adequate,effective 
and mandatory safeguard shall be specifically provided 
in the constitution for them and other minorities for 
protection of their religious, cultural, econcKnic, 
political, administrative and other rights and interests 
3 
in consultation with them. 
3, Saiyid Matlubul Hasgn, Mohargnad All Jinnah: A Political 
Study, (Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore 1953), pp. 689-691, 
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The demand for a separate homeland was mad^ on the 
basis that there are two major nations in Indian subcontinent 
and thus the Muslims being a nation by all cannons of law, 
must have their separate homeland, their territory and 
4 
their state. Jinnah in the course of his extempore Presiden-
tial speech remarked that this misconception of one Indian 
nation had been the cji se of most of their troubles and 
would ultimately lead India to destruction. The Hindus and 
Muslims belonged to two different religions, philosophies 
and social customs, they could n e'ther intermarry nor 
interdine, for they belonged to two different civilizations 
which were based mainly on conflicting views of life. Hence 
to yoke together two such nations under a single state, 
one as a majority and the other as a numerical minority, 
must lead to growing discontentment and final destmiction of 
any fabric that may be so built up for the Government of 
5 
such a State. 
The Lahore resolution evoked a severe criticism fran 
both the Hindus and the nationalist Muslims. The news-
papers and the writers gave it as much space and importance 
6 
in their columns as the war. Savarkar, a prominent leader 
4. M,A,Jinnah, Sar.e Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. 
J inn ah I 2 Volumes; collected and edited by Jamiluddin 
Ahmad (Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore 1952), -p.162, 
5. Ibid,, pp. 160-161. 
6. Jai Jl Fal; op.cit., p. 93. 
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of the Hindu Mahasabha criticised Jinnah and ether Muslim' 
Leaguers and said that his party will fight a teeth to teeth 
7 
war against any move for the possible creation of Pakistan. 
In a series of articles appeared in the Harijan in April 1940, 
Gandhi gave a patient view about the resolution. He said 
that, "If the Muslims insisted on the idea of partition of 
India, the rest of India would have to surrender to the 
Muslim dictation. I do not know of any non-violent method 
of making 8 crores of Muslims to have the will of rest of 
India. The Muslims must have the same right of self deter-
8 
mination that the rest of India had." 
But the first united Muslims reaction came from the 
holding of four day All-India Azad Muslim Conference convened 
on the behalf of Jamiat-ul-Uleraa and other organisations at 
Delhi in April, 1940, This conference was a combined effort 
of seven prominent Muslim Organisations and some leading 
9 
Muslim leaders. The Conference showed its hostility both to 
the Muslim League and the aationalist Muslims who were out 
and out congressite and had less concern with the protection 
7. The Hindu^(Madras), 26 March, 1940. 
8. The Harijan, 27 March, 1940; The Hindustan Tiroes, 3 April 
1940. 
9. The seven important Muslim Political Organisations were; 
. Jamlat-ul-Ulema-Hindj Ahrar Islam Hind; Independent, 
Bihar; All India Momin Conference; Krishak Proja Party, 
Bengcli Anjximan-e-Watan, Bluchistanj All-India Shia -
Political Conference, 
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10 
of the religious rights of the Muslims. They were opposed 
to the Muslim League because of their opposition to the 
demand for Pakistan and secondly they did not like to be 
dictated and protected by the British Government in safe-
guarding their rights. This was amply revealed from the 
speech which Mufti Kifayetullah, the President of the 
Jaraiat-ul-Ulema, gave in the Azad Conference, He was 
reported to have said that "they (the Muslims) had to 
demonstrate to the world that they were not behind any other 
community in the fight for freedom. He declared that they 
did not rely on the British Government for the protection 
of their rights. They would themselves chalk' out the safe-
guards necessary for the protection of their religious rights 
and would fight out any party, however, powerful, that it 
11 
would be. Referring to the Pakistan Scheme Mufti 
Kifayetullah said that "by religion a Muslim was enjoined 
to send the message of Islam to the largest corner of the 
(Continued from the previous page) 
• ~ Among the prominent Muslim personalities were Dr,Syed 
Mahmood, Hafiz Ibrahim, Allah Bux, the president of the 
conference, Mr, Yasin Norie, Mr, Shah Siddiqui Ahmad, 
Mufti Nausher All Khan and Mufti Kifayetullah^ Ahmad 
Saeed, Husain Ahmad Madani, all Jamiat's Prominent 
leaders. 
The Hindustan Times? 28 April* 1948. 
10, Dr. A.R.Ambedker, op,cit., p. 197^ 
11, The Hindustan Times, 29th Apriiri940. 
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world. They coul-d not, therefore, shut themselves in zone. 
Similarly the Prophet of Islam came to free the whole world 
and therefore true Muslims could not be a party to enslave 
or did in keeping themselves in bondage. It was therefore 
all the more incatibent on the Indian Muslims to fight for 
the freedom of India, He added that it was an open fact 
that a section of Muslims were trying to dissuade the Indian 
Muslims to join the struggle for Freedom, These people were 
spreading the idea that the Indian Freedom was detrimental 
to the best interest of the Muslims. The duty of the Muslims 
was quite clear. They must line up with the forces of 
12 
Progres," 
The Conference fully accepted the resolution moved by 
Mufti Kifayfitullah which demanded immediate convening of 
a constituent Assembly elected on the basis of adult franchise 
and exclusive right for the elected Muslim members of the 
proposed constituent Assembly to lay down the safeguards 
for the protection of the rights and interests of the 
13' 
Community. 
While moving resolution on the Constituent Assembly 
Hifz-ur-Rehman said that it was an insult to their national 
self-respect that any foreigner should dictate to them in the 
14 
matter of framing their constitution. 
12, The Hindustan Times, 29th April, 1940,"' 
13, Jai-Ji Pel, op,cit,, pp, 87-88, 
14, The Hindustan Times, 30 April, 1940, 
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Explaining the latter part of the resolution,mentioned 
above/Hifz-ur-Reh/nan said that they wanted the right of self 
determination for the Muslims in respect of their special 
safeguards, necessary for the protection of their religious 
rights. Just as they wanted the application of that principle 
15 
to the whole India. 
Mawlana Ahmad Saeed, the Secretary of Jamiat-ul-
Ulema, supported the resolution sought for the safeguards 
of the Muslims. He further condemned the Pakistan Scheme 
16 
as un-Islamic in its conception. 
.Earlier the observance of Pakistan day on 17th April, 
1940 by Muslim League was countered by an anti-partition 
meetings called upon by Mawlana Hifz-ur-Rahman and Hilal 
Ahmad Zuberi, Municipal Commissioner and editor of the 
17 
Ansari, Meetings were organised and partition scheme, as 
propounded by the Muslim League was vigorously condemned, 
Mawlana Hifz-ur-Rehman addressing the anti-partition day 
meeting, attended by 10,000 people as the Hindustan Times 
claims, said that what had happened to the goal of Complete 
15. The Statesman, 30 April, 1940. 
^^ » The Tribune, 30 Aprol, 1940. 
17. The Hindustan Times, 20 April, 1940. 
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independence for India which the Muslim Ijeague session at 
Lucknow had adopted. In his opinion the idea of partition 
was diametrically opposed to the basic idea of independence 
18 
and therefore the two could not go together. 
The Conference at last came out with the following 
resolutions^ 
This Conference, representative of Indian Muslims 
who desire to secure the fullest freedom of the country 
constituting of delegates and representatives of every,province 
having given its fullest and most careful consideration to 
all the vital questions affecting the interest of the Muslim 
Community and the country as a whole declares the following; 
A "India will have geographical and political boundaries 
of an individual whole and such is the comntion homeland of 
all the citizens irrespective of race and religion who are 
joint owners of its resources. All nooks and corners of the 
country are hearths and homes of Muslims who cherish the 
historical eminence of their religion and <frulture which are 
dearer to them than their lives. From the national point 
of view every Muslim is an Indian. The ccsamon right of all 
residents of the country and their responsibilities, in every 
walk of life and in every sphere of human activity* are the 
same. The Indian Muslims, by virtue of these rights and 
18. The Hindustan Times, 20 April, 1940, 
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responsibilities, is unquestionably an Indian national and 
in every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges 
with that of every Indian national in every sphere of Govern-
mental, economic and other national activities and -in public 
services. For that very reason Muslims own equal respon-
sibilities with other Indians for striving and making 
sacrifices to achieve the country's independence. This is a 
self evident proposition, the tr\ith of which no right think-
ing Muslim will question. This conference declares un-
equivocally and with all emphasis at its command that the 
goal of Indian Muslims is Complete independence alongwith 
protection of their religion anS communal rights and that 
they are anxious to attain this goal as early as possible. 
Inspired by this aim they have in the past made great 
sacrifices and are ever ready to make greater sacrifices," 
B, "This is the considered view of this conference that 
only that constitution for the future Government of India 
would be acceptable to the people of India which is framed 
by the Indian themselves elected by means of adult franchise. 
The Constitution should fuily safeguard all the legitimate 
interests of "the Muslims in accordance with the recommendations 
of the Muslim members of the constituent Assembly, The 
representative of other communities or of an outside power 
would have no fight to interfere in the determination gf 
these safeguards.** 
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C, Tbe provision of safeguards for the economic, social 
and cultural rights of the Muslims also came in the conference. 
"Since the safeguards of the communal rights of different 
communities will be determined in the resolution which the 
conference ha'is adopted, this conference considers it 
necessary to declare that Muslim members of the Constituent 
Assembly will be elected by Muslim themselves." 
D. "This conference appoints a Board consisting of 27 
persons. This Board, after the fullest investigation, consul-
tation and consideration make its recommendations for sub-
mission to the next session of this Conference so that the 
conference may utilise the recommendations as a means of 
securing a permanent national settlement to the communal 
question. This recommendation will be submitted within two 
months. The matters referred to the board are the following: 
1, The protection of Muslim, culture, personal law and 
religious rights. 
2, ' Political rights of the Muslims and their protection, 
3, The formation of the future constitution of India to . 
be non-unitary and federal with absolutely essential and 
19 
unavoidable powers for the Federal Government.•* 
19; Dr. Ambedkar, op.cit., pp. 198-100. 
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The conference,-due td its opposition to the Pakistan 
Scheme and the British Subjugation, was hailed by the 
nationalist newspapers and the Hindus as the- conference of 
friends which could be used as a counter balance against the 
demand for a separate homeland where they c^ Juld enjoy fuller 
religious and cultural freedom but the outcome of the con-
ference left very little to choose between it and the Muslim 
20 
League, 
The third resolution of the conference could not be 
materialised due to some unknown reason. If Humayun Kabir 
ascribed it to the inherent weakness in the organisation of 
the various parties exhibitin*5 conflicting ideologies and 
21 
programme of action* then Ziaul . Hasan Farooqui*s speculation 
is that it could have been due to the Satyagraha launched by 
the Congress and the Quit India Movement and Cripps Mission 
in 1942 when all the nationalist leaders were behind the 
22 
bars. Whatever had been the reason the outcome of the 
Conference was that it threatened the position of Jinnah and 
his satellite as to be the representatives of the Muslims 
in India. 
20. Ibid., p. 197. 
21. - Kumayun Kabir , Muslim Pol i t i c s -1906-1947 and o t h e r 
Essays (Ca lcu t t a , 1969), p . 46 , 
22. Ziaul Hasan Farooqi , o p . c i t . , p . 99. 
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The estab^s|iment of Azad Muslim Conference perturbed 
Jinnah and he became highly apprehensive of this emerging 
force in the way to the realisation of his dream. So long 
as the various Muslim political parties and organisations, 
chief among them was Jamiat-ul-Ulema, were not united Jinnah 
though attacked them time and again but did not regard thera 
as the main rival. However, when combined together on a 
common platform and formed the All India Azad Muslim Con-
ference in 1940,Just after the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah 
became highly critical of it since its very inception!^ 
It must be emphasised here that the Lahore resolution 
was a negation of and departure ftbm what Dr. Sir Muhammad 
Iqbal thought of absolving the Hindu Muslim problem in His 
Presidential speech at Allahabad in 193o!^ iqbal did not argue 
for a Muslim State and only sought a Muslim bloc within the 
25 
Indian federation. it is one of the myths of Pakistani 
nationalism to saddle him with the parentage of Pakistan!^ 
23. Humayun Kabir, op.cit., p. 42. 
24. '^ h^ammad Iqbal, Presi'dential Addres.. ^ Plivered at the 
Allahabad Session^f the AT 1 T^±aIm£liiTLj,ea2ueJLi3P, 
^iiT^"" ^1^ Statements of iqbal, compiled by Shamloo 
(Al-Manar Academy, Lahore, 1948), p.9. 
^^ - ;?°^ " f ^^ '^'' Khilafat to Partit.-nr^  (New Delhi, 1970), 
^:^'^^^='', g^ g -^ -aHlnq of Pakistan - A Study in Nationalism, 
(London, 1967), p.54. ~ ' — 
p. 100. 
26. 
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His idea wa,s to amalgate the Muslim States 'of North-West in 
a single Muslim province as to get advantage through bar-
27 
gaining from the dominant Hindu Centre. It is pertinent 
to note that Assam and Bengal (the erstwhile Pakistan, now 
Bangladesh) did not came in his calculations. It is shee^ 
misleading to call him the originator of Pakistan or the poet 
28 
who dreamt of Pakistan. 
However, the Lahore declaration did not cast such an 
"unexpected shock as it in generally made out to be," For 
the Muslim opinion in India and Britain both was constantly 
aware of this day by day widening gulf and Schism between 
the League and the Congress mainly due to the wrong policies 
and lack of sense of Parliamentarlanism on the part.of 
Congress. When the Scheme was adumbereted it contained in 
it what in the minds of the common people, 
MUTTAHIDA QAUMIAT 
Though Jinnah did not use religion specifically as 
the core of his definition 'yet it was quite implicit in the 
30 . -
demand for a separate homeland to a Muslim nation. This wes 
27. I b i d . , p . 5 4 . 
28 . I b i d . , p . 54; 
29 . I b i d . , p . 60. 
30. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, o p . c i t , , p . 94", 
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quite apprehensive to the Jamiat-ial-Uleraa Hind, w|nich since 
its inception stood for a united Nationalism (Mattahida 
Quamiat).so here lies the basic difference between the 
philosophy and programnie of two principal Muslim organisations 
on the issue of future destiny of BO million Musalmans, 
Husain Ahmad Madani, the chief spokesman of united nationalism, 
forcefully opposed the two nation tiieory as the basis for 
Pakistan and argued for a territorial, as opposed to religious, 
31 
nationalisra'when Sir Mohammad Iqbal challenged the issue, 
Mawlana Husain Ahmad said, that "there are world of differences 
between "Qaua and Mi11at." He held Sir Iqbal for wrongly 
equating the word "Quam and Millat" and as Millat could not 
be made the basis of nationalism so he concluded that Quam 
32 
also could not be the basis of nationalism, Mawlana Husain 
Ahmad Madani in the light of Arabic dictionary proved that 
both the words were at par with eadi other. While the word 
Qaum stands for any collectivity whether its common charac-
teristics was region, common habits, race, colour and creed, 
it should be distinguished from millat which refers to a 
31. In the course of correspondence between Sir Moha.Tunad • -
Iqbal and Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, which appeared 
in the daily Ehsan, Madani denied that the motive of 
the speech in a meeting of Delhi Jama Masjid was to make 
any suggestion to Muslims of India to follow the modern 
definition of nationalism. He only said that now-a-days 
nations are made by nationality. He even denied that he 
had asked that the basis of religion and millat is 
nationalism. Husain Ahmad Madani; Nazarivah-i-Qaumiyat, 
Mawlana Husain Ahmad Sahib Wa Allama labal, e'dited by 
Hazrat talut, (D«ra Ghazi Khan n.d.), Maktub No,4. 
Contd 
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f 33 
collectivity with a Shariah or Din. He said that nations 
were made by homeland and not by religion or race-and cited 
the example of England where members of different faiths 
34 
made up one nation. There ensued a heated debate between 
the office bearers of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the adherents 
35 
of Islamic nationalism. Later in 1939 Husain Ahmad Madani 
published a small treatise under the caption "Muttahida 
Qaumiat Aur Islam" in which he proved in the light of Quranic 
verses and prophetic traditions that nationality is determined 
36 
by territory and not by religion alone. Here it must be 
(continued from the previous page) 
In the last letter Allama Iqbal closed the dis-
cussion saying that Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani had 
conceded that his intention was not to give any sugges-
tion to the Indian Muslims to follow. 
32. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani^ Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam 
compiled and edited by Najrauddin Islahi, (Matba Maarif, 
Azamgarh, 1952), Volume I, 
33. Mi Hat Aur Qaum, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani our Allama 
Iqbal Ki baths. (Multan 1938), p.7, 
34. Ibid., pp. 9-35. 
35. There ensued a heated controversy between the adherents 
of Islamic nationalism (Millatism) and nationalists through 
the magazine Burhan. See, Burhan 113/4, October 1939; 
iii/5, November 1939. 
36. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani, Muttahida Qaumiat our Islam 
op.cit., p.65. 
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cleared that he does consider religion as the basis of 
nationalism but emphasised that 'Wattaniat* could be the 
37 
most effective and determining factor. He said that even 
during the time of Prophet Mohammad such type of nationalism 
existed. To quote him, '*By Muttahida Qaumiat I'mean that 
Muttahida Qaumiat whose foundation was laid down at Madina 
38 
during the time of Prophet Mohammad, He quoted with 
authenticity the treaty which was concluded at Madina after 
the 14th years of Prophethood of Mohammad. Through this 
treaty he formed a Muttahida Qaumiat and Muttahida Ummat with 
the Muslims and the Jews. The essence and spirit of the 
treaty was that:-
1, The executioners of the treaty (Quraish, Muhajirs, 
Ansar and Jews) would be considered as a nation in comparison 
to all those non-Muslims and non executioners of the treaty. 
2. The executioners of the treaty while remaining 
independent in respect of their religion would form a nation 
they will help each other in time of war and will be considered 
39 
as Ummat. 
37. Ibid., p, 63. 
38. Ibid., p. 51. 
39. Ibid.,pp. 53-54, 
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Abul Ala Maudodi In his booklet "Masla-e-Qauraiat" 
has tried to give interpretation that the treaty of 
. 40 
Hudaibiya could only be regarded as a military pact. This 
was what Husain Ahmad Madani wanted to achieve, TSie very 
idea behind this theory of united Nationalism was to form 
some, sort of military pact between the Hindus and the Muslims 
in order to form an united front to oust their concnon enemy. 
Speaking at the Johnpur session of the Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-e-Hind, Madani is reported to have said. *we, the 
inhabitants of India in so far as we are Indians, have one 
thing in common and that is our Indianes which remains un-
changed inspite of our religious and cultural differences..,. 
As the diversities in our approaches, individual qualities 
and personal traits and colour and stature do not affect our 
40. Abu Ala Mawdooai, Masle-e-Qaximiat, (Markazi Maktaba Islam, 
Delhi, 1962), p.93, Mawlana iMawdoodi*s opposition to the 
united nationalism appears. to many the acceptance of 
Pakistan as the sole goal of the Muslims of the sub-
continent. But this is not so. He thought that Pakistan 
was a partial solution because it could neither secure 
security nor possibility of development on Islamic lines 
for the Muslims who will be necessarily be-left in India 
was a matter of vital importance to him. His view with 
regard to the Muslim League was not favourable for he 
felt that it had accommodated within its fold hetro-
genous elements, consisting of Communists, Secularists, 
Muslim nationalists, believers in Islam and non-believers, 
practising Muslims and tho«?e who did believe but their 
belief seldcxn expressed itself in practice or in action. 
How could such a body, he argued, bring about the kind 
of Islamic renaissance that he thought should be the 
goal of all Muslim efforts. 
Abu Ala Mawdoodij Tahrik-i-Azad-i-Hind aur 
Musalman (Lahore, 1964), pp.. 22-23. 
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common hximanness, similarly our religious and cultural 
differences do not interfere with our common associations 
with our homeland, Thereforey like the other millats and 
non-Muslims religio-cultural groups it is incumbent upon 
the Muslims to have concern with and struggle for the attain-
ment of national interests and fight against the evils that 
hamper the country's progress and prosperity..... This duty 
which arises out of our common sharing in the happiness and 
misery of our motherland, is obligatory to all. Religious 
differences in no case serve as an impediment in the way of 
fulfiling this obligation. This is what I mean by the 
Muttahida Qaumiat. The other meanings which the people are 
attributing to it are wrong and baseless. The Congress, hav-
ing the same stand (as ours), has made provisions in its 
fundamentals for the protection of all religions/ cultures 
and languages. The European conception of nationalism or 
the outlook of (certain) individual Congressman regarding 
the different interpretations of the Congress fundamentals, 
is unacceptable to the Jamiat-I denounce it and is totally 
41 
against it," 
In one of h is l e t t e r s addressed to one Hafiz Siddiqui' 
of Muzaffargarh (Punjab) Madani c i ted the Hadith of Hazrat 
41 , Husain Ahmad Madani* Khutba-e~Sadrat, delivered at the 
Thirteenth session of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Johnpur,1940, 
"t^l Jamiat-Press, Delhi 1940), available Cr rrdcrof i lm.-
at Nehru memorial Museum and l ib ra ry , Kew. Delhi. 
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Salma which said that if the infidels asked their Musalraan 
captives to wage a war against the conunon enemy then it 
might be permissible provided that the infidels promised 
42 
that after the termination of war they would be freed, 
Mawlana Husain Ahmad says that, in the light of these condi-
tions of cooperation the Indian Muslims could cooperate with 
the infidels on the assurance that after the independence 
of the country they would be having a ...* decisive share in 
Government of the country, their culture and personal law 
would be safeguarded and complete autonomy would be guaranteed 
to them in this respect, then the cooperation with-the Hindus 
43 
would not only be permissible but necessary also, 
Islam is a flexible religion which adopts itself with 
the need and requirement of the time. To make the Islam rigid 
is to close its doors to others. If this had been the policy 
and principlepf the Prophet of Islam then Islam could have 
confined itself to the Desert of Arabia*Islam, infact, is 
a living force which adopts itself vith the changing condi-
tions of time, Mawdoodi or for that matter Jamaat Islamt 
believes in complete isolationism. It is against sharing 
a common life with others. This very principle made it 
42. Mawlana Kusain Ahma^ Madani, Maktubat-e-Shaikhul Islam, 
op.cit,. Volume IV, Maktub No,33, 
43. Ibid;', p. 128, 
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Impractical and devoid of reality. Do the Indians not share 
a common life with other non-Muslims in the country in every 
walk of life social, political/ economic # should one say 
that Indian Muslims have ceased to be Muslims and absorbed by 
the majority. The Indian Muslims, infact, are best represen-
ting Islam than any other Muslim countries. They are more 
conscious for their culture and personal law in the Hindu 
India and at the same tine forming a nation with other commu-
nity of the divided India, It is a fantastic idea to say 
that in a hundred years, perhaps in a shorter period, the 
44 
Muslim people may cease to exist in India, This is the 
psychological justification for the division of the country, 
Infact, the theory of nationalism propounded by Sir 
Mohammad Iqbal and Mawdoodi which was latter adopted by 
M.A.Jinnah was the product of western Europe. The rise of 
this type of nationalism in Western Europe had given rise 
to the concept that the political boundaries of a nation 
should conform to the national characteristics of the people 
living within it. In the word.s of Macartney, "the rise of 
the problem of majority was a logical consequences of a 
doctrinal ascendancy of nationalism. Nationalism which 
consolidated dominant position in the Western Europe and 
44, I,H.Qureshi, the Foundation of Pakistan Culture, the_ 
Muslim World, XLIV/1, January, 1954, 
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begging i t s global sweep, injected into poli t ics a profound 
significant idea. The principle that nationalism and state 
boundaries should concide; the s ta te should nationally ^ 
45 
homogenous and nation should be politically limited. 
Though Iqbal and Masdoodi showed great hostility to 
the European concept of Nationalism they unconsciously edged 
nearer to it. The Jamiat on the other hand viewd this 
problem fran purely Islamic point of view and kept the Quranic 
verses and prophetic traditions before them as a torch bearer. 
Husain Ahmad Madani suspected a British hand in the 
propbsed division of the country. According to him the 
division proposal did not come at a Lahore resolution or 
46 
in the minds of Rahmat All. The seed was sown' long before 
by the British which found a fertile soil in the minds of 
some Muslims who were opposed to federation as the principle 
47 
of Government. In support of his contention Husain Ahmad 
Madani cited the letter of Mr, Plowden, a British officer 
45. Macartney, The National States and the National 
Minorities wnvFnrr>^  1934) p. 160. 
46. Chaudhary Rahmat All, a Cambridge Student, in 1933 " 
published a pamphlet entitled, now or never in which 
he looked for the formation of an independent Muslim 
State comprising the Punjab, the North West frontier 
province, Kashmir Sind and Bluchistan, in complete 
independence of the rest of India and in close alliance 
with the Muslim states of the Middle East. 
K.K.Azizr the Making of Pakistan, op.cit.,p.54. 
47. Husain Ahmad Madani, Pakistan Kiva Hal, Part I, (Delhi 
1946), p.17, 
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in the United Provinces, written to someone in England 
which was leaked out to the press and was published by the 
Sunday telegraph. In that letter M.Plowden had advised 
the division of the country into a Hindu India and Muslim 
India as the only solution to the Indian problem ."we had 
to resort to the same method in Irland to end the Catholic 
and Protestant tangle after a long parliamentary battle of 
36 years," aaid Mr. PLouden. "If the Hindu would be 
unwilling to have trade relation with the British then 
Karachi, will serve the same purpose as 3ombay, at that 
time... This will sure happen, then why we should not 
establish business contact with them at the earliest 
48 
possible time," 
Madani was also suspicious of the interview which 
Mr. Jinnah had given to the news Chronicles, London on29th 
February, 1944 on the Pakistan issue. He is reported to 
have said that "if the British Government divide India into 
two, after a short period not exceeding there months, the 
Hindus will be silent and so long as the two parts of India 
do not renain at peace with each other, the British control 
of the army, foreign affairs is necessary, in this case 
48. Ibid , p.15. 
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49 
we would be free at least internally like Egypt," 
Referring to the statement of Qaid-e-Azara Dr.Syed 
Abdul Latif# one of the ^ ropo-,,nders of two nation theory, 
warned the Muslims particularly the Leagues with grecit 
excitement/ "Let the Muslims see which way they are being 
led on by the Qaid-e-Azara. I knew it from the very beginn-
ing that Qaid-e-Azam was not sincere about the demand for 
Pakistan. Now he has revealed that he is not at all in 
favour of free Pakistan. He wants a state without 
sovereign rule. This is sought to be achieved in a long 
tutelage and following Egypt's pattern till it is like 
Egypt which constitutionally free but in every matters of 
its own internal and .external administration looks to friendly 
50 
gestures from the British side." 
Madani thinks that the Muslim League was nurtured 
by the hands of British diplomacy right frcsn its inception. 
He says, quoting the criticism of Mawlana Shibli, "the 
Simla deputation was the first foundation stone and whatever 
practical shape the League may take in future, the future 
51 
spirit of the Simla deputation will be represented in it," 
49. Husain Ahmad Madani, Muslim League Kiva Hai,. (Delhi 
1946), p.17; See also "The Madina (Bijnor), 5 March, 
1944. 
50. The Ajmal(Daily), 6 March, 1944. 
51. -Husain Ahmed Madani? An Open letter to Muslim League, 
(Lahore, 1946), pp.49-50, quoting from Hiyat-e-Shibli 
by Saiyid Sulaiman Nadwi, (Darul-Musannifin, Azamgarh, 
1943), p.618. 
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Moreover, Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk was reported to-have ' 
said while addressing the student of Muslim University, 
Aligarh, "if (May • god prevent mishap ) the British Rule 
ceases in India, we will have to live as the subject of 
the Hindu." 
If the Musalmans of India posses any remedy of 
avoiding this danger it is that the British Rule should 
remains for ever duly deep in India," 
"Our existence and that of the Government are 
complimentfiry to each other'.If the Muslims ere with England 
with 
/the very core of their heart nobody can turn them out of 
India Therefore in your hearts this idea should always 
be uppermost that to help this empire is your national 
duty,,,,,you should earlier consider yourself^ to be the 
52 
soldiers of the British army," 
Madani thinks that the Muslim Lea-guie policy during 
the world War II served the cause of the British imperialism, 
A reference of which has clearly been made in the previous 
chapter, 
Jinnah showed no desire to ascertain the fate of "the 
Muslims living in the Hindu majority provinces , He got 
S2, Ibid., pp. 52-53, 
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his ovm idea about the Indian State. He attached i ss 
importance to the Eastern State than to the North v.'t "-em 
Provinces which could if choosen amalfamate in the fede, -
tion of the Muslim homeland after coming to a reasonable 
settlement with them. This scheme was also silent on the 
ways and means to be adopted to safeguard the interest of 
the minority as envisaged in the Fourth Resolution of Lahore 
54 
declaration. Jamiat was more concerned with the protection 
of the religious and cultural rights of the Muslims than 
any other Muslim Organisation. It warned the Indian Muslims 
not to be the victim of Leagues'gimmick which was trying 
to build its castle on the ruins of the Indian Muslims who 
were going to be the citizen of the Indian Union. 
Analysing the Lahore Resolution Mawlana Mohammad 
Sajjad of Bihar remarked that the resolution would not be 
judicious to the Muslim living in the Hindu majority 
provinces as a minolrity community and bewidlered es to how 
the Muslim provinces ccula be a guarantee thet the Muslim 
in a Hindu majority provinces would be treated in a better 
55 
way. 
53, Mohammad Ali Jinnah; Some Recent Speeches and Writings 
of Mr. Jinnah, Volume II, collected and edited by 
Jamiluddin Ahmad, (Mohammad JBsbraf, Lahore, 1947) , 
pp. 159-160. 
54. Ziaul Hasan Farooc'jl, op.cit., p. 111. 
-55. Mawlana Ahmad Saeed; Kutba-e-Sadrat~ul~Jamiat-ul~Ulema 
Conference, (Meerut Division), February 1946 (Hamdard 
Press, Delhi, 1946), pp. 26-27. ' . 
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Madani also expressed the same view and characterised 
the Pakistan proposal as a death knell to the Muslim, living 
56 
in Hindu /Majority areas. The Ja/niat regarded this hostage 
theory of the League as not only a political nonsense but 
57 
also against the holy law of the Muslims. As far as the 
political reality was concerned Madani argued that in 
Pakistan provinces the population of the Muslim majority was 
58 
55.7% and that of the Hindu majority was 44.3%, In this 
situation how it would be possible, said Madani, for the 
Muslim majority to impress and keep the majority in efieck 
while the difference in population was just meagre and the 
non-Muslim minority were in a better position of influence 
on accounts of their education, monopoly on trade, economy 
and industry. On the other hand in the divided India, the 
Muslim who would constitute 11% of the population due to 
their proportional representation and other weakness 
56. Sayed Mohammad Mian, Ulemap-i-Haq, Volume II (Kutub 
Khanah-i-Fakhriyah, 1948), p.136. 
57. As early as in 1942 Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, once a front 
leader of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, written a book, entitled 
"Hamara Pakistan, in which the author prophesised that 
a substantial number of non-Muslims in Pakistan would 
ensure a better treatment of Muslim minority from the 
majority community in India. Shabhir A.Usmani, Hamara 
Pakisty^ n, Khutbah-i-Sgdarat, Jamiat-ul-jlema-i-Islam 
(Lahore, 1946),pp.45-46, 
58. Husain Ahmad Madani, Kashfa-e-Haqiqat, (Delhi, 1946), 
pp. 160-61. 
- 161 -
(aducation, economy etc«) would neither from an effective 
front in the Assemblies nor their boycott in Legislatures 
would cast', effect on normal working. Moreover, the non-
Muslims in Pakistan provinces would not be much in need of 
safeguards than the Muslim minority in the Indian provinces 
because the former would be exercising greater influence 
59 
due to their education and sound economy. Moreover, Islam 
would not permit to take a revenge for a sin committed by 
60 
a non-Muslim of U.P, from the non-Muslim of Punjab. 
In nutshel this appeared astonishing and devoid of 
wisdom to sacrifice two crores of Muslims in order to librate 
7 crores of Muslim in the provinces where they were already 
in a majority, Mr. Jinnah in an address to the minorities 
was reported to have .said, that "as a self-respecting people 
we/in the Muslim minority provincess, say boldly that we 
are prepared to undergo every suffering and sacrifice for 
the emancipation and liberation of our brethren in regions 
61 
of Muslim majority." Speaking at Ahmadabad Mr.Jinnah said, 
"Let the Muslims of the Hindu provinces suffer, but let us 
come forward in order to librate our breth ren"living•in 
59, Ibid., pp. "60-62? See also Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, 
Tahrik-i-Pakistan per ek "azar, (Delhi, 1946),p.12, 
60, Mawlana Hifzur Rehman; Tahrik-i-Pakistan per ek Na7ar, 
(Delhi, 1946), pM3. 
61, JaTiiluddin Ahmed* op.cit., p. 267. 
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Majority provincess. So that they may form the Government 
' 62 
in accordance with the Islamic shariah,* The idea behind 
the demand for Pakistan was that in an independent India 
the Muslim as a minority would be swamped by the majority 
comtiunity then the question arises that if the Hindu majority 
could be ruthless enough in perpetuating atrocities in their 
provinces, as reported in the Pirpur Report when the Muslims 
were in effective minority then there was strong possibility 
that it would be more ruthless towards the Muslims who would 
be in a smaller minority, controlled by a strong Hindu 
63 
centre. 
The Jamiat leadership was violently critical and 
suspicious of Mr, Jinnah's Claim that the proposed Pakistan 
would be an Islamic State based on Shariah and Sunnah. They 
thought the League leaders like Jinnah and Liaquat Ali 
Khan as incapable of establishing an Islatiic State for neither 
their mental make up nor their way of life and educational 
64 
training was capable of attaining such ideal. They had not 
been only^concerned with the cause of Islam but at- places 
violently opposed them in an open session. It was still fresh 
62. The "Tian. Pakistan Number, Lahore, 28 February 1941. 
63. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p, 114, 
64. Ibid., p, 118, 
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in their memory how Jinnah lobbied against the passing of 
the Sharia Act of 1937 giving preference in the Court of 
British India to the Shariah over local customs and not 
joining hands with them in opposing the interference with 
the Islamic Law, in the dissolution of the Marriages Bill 
65 
of 1939, The aim of the Shariah Bill, writes The Madina. 
was to make enforceable on the Indian Muslims the Islamic 
66 
Shariah regarding the. Marriages, divorce, Khula, Mehar, 
inheritence etc. Till that time these issues were decided 
in accordance with the customary Law which was against some 
pure Islamic injunctions. But when the bill was about to 
became an Act after its third reading, meeting the demands 
for which it was introduced, Mr. Jinnah, the President of 
the Muslim League and the saviour of Islam and its culture, 
devoted his whole juristic ability to cut the Sharia Law 
into pieces and introduced some amendments with much 
shrudeness that the very purpose of the bill was defeated. 
The effort of Mr, Jinnah was that the Act should not be called 
a Law which could had been binding on the concerned .. and in 
Case of conflict between the Sharia Act and prevalent English 
made Law the latter will prevail. When Jinnah was reminded 
that it was defecting the very purpose of Islamic Law Jinnah 
65. Husain Ahmad Hadanl, Con-resS/ Muslim league, and J ami at-
ul-Ulema Kl, SlyfiSl pnf^1Hon(Lucknow 1945), p,15. 
66, Ibid, 
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replied that he do not like to support the proposed bill 
which could not be applicable. 
Madani says that "if these are the Quranic injunctions 
which the Muslim League _. - leaders are anxious to apply 
in Pakistan, If these are. the Islamic culture and tradi-
tion for whose safety the establishment of Pakistan was 
essential .... new the Muslims have to think whether or not 
the actions of the League was a clear revolt against the 
Islamic Shariah, Quran and Hadith as well as against 
68 
Islam." 
The stand taken by Mr. Jinnah with regard to the 
Muslim Marriage Bill was also'very shocking to the Ulema. 
The aim of the bill was to secularise the marriage whereby 
a Muslim could also marry with a non Muslim from non«-Ahl-e» 
69 
Kitab. Mr, Jinnah speaking at the Viceroy's Council supported 
70 
the bill in most strong words and lobbied for the bill. 
6''» The Madina/ 25 September 1937. 
68. Husain Ahiaad Madani, Shariat Bill eur Leacfue, (New 
Delhi, 1945), p.9. 
69. Husain Ahmad Madaiii, Civil marriage aur League (New Delhi< 
1945), p.16. This small booklet was written by Madani 
during the days of the general election, 1945 in order 
to make the Muslims aware of the hallowness of the Muslim 
League's claim for safeguarding the Shariah_and striving 
for establishing an Islamic State, 
70. Government of India Gazette , Department of Law,pp.16-
161, quoted in Madani, Civil marriage our league, oD.cit. 
pp. 7-11. 
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Madani says that this shows the religious belief which 
Mr.- Jinnah had towards the Quran and the Islamic injunction 
and which type of laws he wanted to pass in the Assemblies. 
Neither he considered Quran as the variegated Law nor thinks 
it applicable all the time. We have to think now that how 
then the League and its members of the Assembly could project 
the Muslims and their religion in the legislative Assemblies 
He asked, to the Muslims that if even after knowing these 
facts they think it proper to choose a man as Qaid and vote 
for him who possess all these "Qualities". The Muslims had 
to think which way they are being led •son by the Qaid-e-
71 
Azam. 
These events and other day to day Interview of the 
League leaders convinced the Jamiat leaders that the proposed 
Pakistan was not going to be an Islamic State but of a 
national worldly Government end so they were not prepared to 
perfonn the rnartydom of the Muslims of the Hindu Majority 
provides for a secular State, 
As early as in 1940 Madani addressing 12th session 
of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema at Johnpur remarked; 
•'These days the Pakistan movement is very popular aniong 
the Muslim masses* If it means the establishment in the 
71. Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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Muslim majority provinces of an Islamic state based on the 
prophetic traditions and the Qisas and others, then it is 
really a very noble cause and no Muslim will have any 
objection to it. But the fact is that under the present 
circumstances nobody can imagine the possibility of such a 
72 
venture," 
Although there were meti like Nawab Ismail and Shabbir 
Ahmad Usmani who gave the Impression that the tenents of 
Islam will bejthe governing principle in Pakistan, Yet 
Mr, Jinnah at several places clearly said that the future 
constitution of Pakistan would not be governed according to 
the injunction of hbly Quran and Sunnah," In an interview to 
the Associated Press of America Jinnah said, "Pakistan would 
be a democratic country and I hope that the big industries 
and corporation would be handed over to the nation on the 
74 
socialist pattern," In an another interview to the News 
72, Husain Ahmad Madani, Khutba-e-Sadarat, Twelth Session 
of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind, Johapur, 1940,{Hamdard 
Press, Delhi, 1940) Translation quoted from Faroogui, 
op.cit,, p.119, 
73. Shabbir Ahmad Usmani had said that the Pakistan would be 
an Islamic State ruled by the Shariah and teachings of 
Islam. He held the .criticism of Nationalist Muslims, 
th?t the Pakistan would be an irreligious state, run by 
irreligious people, as totally absurd and misleading. 
Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Hamara Pakistan, (Lahore, 
1946), pp. 65-66. 
74; Manshurah. 11 November, 1945; AnJeiL, .12 November, 1945, 
- 167 -
Chronicles Jinnah is reported to have said that the Govern-
ment of Pakistan would be democratic one. Both Hindus and 
Muslims will be the share.r in the Legislative Assemblies 
75 
and Ministers elected on the basis of population." The 
•DAWN*, the tjfficial wing of the Muslim League writes, 
"Jinnah has always termed Pakistan as a worldly state and 
took strong objection to think that it would be Muslim State, 
Whosoever term Pakistan as ccxnplimentary to the Pan-Islaaism 
76 
were the greatests enemy of unity." Speaking at the Aligarh 
Muslim University Union on 2nd November 1941 Mr. Jinnah said, 
"telling them (The Hindus and the Sikhs) that it (Pakistan) 
would be a religious state excluding them from all power is 
77 
entirely untrue." Mawlana Hif^ur Rehraan in his scholarly 
The 
analysis of the Pakistan issue quoted/ .Dawn' s article that 
there can be no religious state in a future Pakistan because 
78 
there will notjonanimity of religious belief.* 
THe 
75. /shahbag. 27 October, 1945, quoting from the Dawn. 
Mawlana Hifzur Rehman quoting this interview said 
that how the Pakistan Government can be called an 
Islamic state based on Hukm-e-Ilahi when it had been 
accepted that tbe non-Muslims would be given share in 
the legislature and cabinets in accordance with their 
numerical strength while in a Islamic state a non-Muslim 
can live as a Dhimmi but he cannot interfere in any 
Department of Government and administration what to talk 
of legislative Assembly, 
See, Hifzur Rehman, Pakistan Per Ek Nazar, op.cit., 
p.7, 
76. The Dawn, 9 September 1945, 
77. The Dawn, 25 September, 1945, p.6, 
78. Mawlana Hifzur Rehmani Pakistan per ek Razar op.cit., 
p.7? See al*so Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat, op.cit., 
Volume II, p.250* 
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i Jinnal\ seemed to have been inspired by the revolut-
ionary hero of Turkey Mustafa Kamal Pasha, and wanted to 
built his P^akistan on the line of Mustafa Kamal Pasha* 
Speaking at Patna at the Annual Session of the All India 
Muslim League Mr, Jinnah asked to the people to follow 
the footsteps of Mustafa Kamal Pasha. He is reported to 
have said, that "in Kamal Ataturk the Islamic world has 
lost a great hero. With the example of this great hero 
in front of them as an inspiration will * ,'the Muslims of 
79 
India still remain in quagmire] Again in an speech to 
the constituent Assembly on the 11th August 1947, Jinnah 
said "You may belong to any religion or cast or creed that 
have nothing to do with the business of the State.,.You 
will find that in course of time Hindu would cease to be 
Hindu and Muslim would cease to be Muslims, not in the 
religious sense, because it is the personal faith of each 
individual, but in the political sense as citizen of the 
80 
State, 
This was what Jamiat-ul-Ulema had been emphasising 
right from "the days of Pakistan movement. But Muslims 
unfortunately lacked that vigour and insight to give a thought 
79, Mohammad Ali Jinnah; Some Recent Speeches and V«ritinqs 
of Mr, Jinnah, Volume I, p,761 quoted by Ziaul Hasan 
Faroogui, op.cit., p, 120. 
80, Mohammad Ali Jinnah; Qaid^e-Azam-Speaks, Fak publicity, 
Karachi, nid. pp. 98-99, 
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over what the leaders of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema pointed out 
to them. Driven to the League's false propaganda that the 
Pakistan would be an Islamic state, the Muslim Youth embarked 
upon giving it a concrete shape, for which they got nothing 
in return. 
K.K.Aziz in his books, 'Makintr of Pakistan' raised 
a very interesting question that if the Jamiat-ul-Ulema 
supported the Pakistan demand, had the League leaders 
81 First 
pledged that the State would be an Islamic State/of all# 
the very personality of Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan were, 
suspicious for they had been showing less regard .to the 
Islamic values and Principles. Secondly^  the Jamiat was 
against any proposal for partitioning the country because 
as they thought, the partition would not be the solution 
of Hindu-Muslim problems and it would bring less benefits 
to the Muslims and detrimental to the missionary activity of 
Islam in a divided India. However, Husain Ahmad Madani 
ruled out that the new order would be entirely on the Islamic 
82 
standards, for in his view the situation was not- favourable 
for a Muslim Raj in the light- of Shariah and Sunnah, He had 
before him the example of Islamic stalwarts like Sayyid Ahmad 
Bareilvi, Mawlana Ismail Shaheed, Haji Imdadullah, Mawlana 
81, K.K.Aziz, op.cit., p. 180. 
82. Hu&ain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat, op.cit.. Volume II, 
p.117. . 
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Nanautavi, Mawlana Gangohl an<5 Mahmoodul Hasan, To hi.-n it 
was impossible to establish an islamic State when such 
of 
Islamic heroes in spite/ their, indefatigiable efforts had 
83 
failed in their venture. However, in an independent undivided 
India, Madani argued that the Muslims will g'et greater 
freedom to shape their future on an Islamic model. Their 
success depended upon their skill in propagating Islam. 
Moreover in a system of provincial autonomy they would enjoy 
greater freedom to act according to the Islamic Shariah 
if they so desired. Independence would not close the way 
for the Muslimslto act according to the Mandate of Islamic 
' 64 
Shariah to a certain extent. 
However, in an undivided independent India the 
Shariah will have a restricted scope of activity depending 
upon the free will of ordinary Muslims, and be continued to 
observe 
/religious rituals and social relations such as. marriage 
divorce inheritence etc. The state coercive power will not 
available for inflicting penalties in case of disobedience 
to Shariah because the state would not be wholly in the hands 
85 
of the Muslims. 
83, lhiA.» Volume, I, pp. 395-97, 
84. • Ibid,, Volume II, pp. 117-119. 
85, Peter Hardy, Pgrtners in Freedom and the true Muslims, 
I^ e Political Thought of some Muslim Scholars In British 
India 1912-1947 (Sweden., 1971), p.39. 
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It is obvious from the above writings that the Ulema 
were nationalist only in the sense that they wanted India to 
be free from the British. But they desired to^  keep education 
in their own hands which as Husain Ahiaad Madani thought would 
remind them what they did not share with other communities. 
The more the Muslims of an undivided India were to be educa-
ted in Islam more they would become conscious of what they 
did not share with their fellow countrymen. Culturally as 
separate to acknowledge themselves as . separate entity# in 
86 
political alliance only with Hindu against foreigners. 
The Jamiat-ul-Ulema also opposed the partition from 
the point of view that it will hinder the missionary activi-
ties of the Ulema in a divided India. In their view Islam 
has been a proselytising religion which demand an atmosphere 
of peace, friendship and goodwill for its nourishment. The 
division of the country, marked by hatred and antagonism, 
would give a jolt to this peaceful missionary activity. The 
atmosphere had already been contaminated by the demand of 
87 
Pakistan. Writing to Abdul Bar! Nadwi in 1931 Husain Ahmad 
Madani said, "...mutual relationship result in the removal 
of mutual hatred and bring people to the fold of Islam,while 
86. Ibid., p. 41. 
87. Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit., p,114. Mawlana Hifzur 
Rehman, Tahrik-i-Pakistan Per ek Nazar, op.cit., 
pp.*"37-38. 
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mutual hatred results in stubborness in an overlooking of 
other's good points and constitutes an impediment in the 
progress of Islam. Islam being a missionary religion^ it 
is its duty-as far as possible to absorb others in itself, 
88 
not to reject them," 
Again addressing the Ulema at Delhi in September 1945 
he echoed the same sentiments, when the said, "At the ter-
mination of the Muslims in India, within a period of less 
than a century their number increased upto 100 millions. 
The missionary work of the Ulema has a share in this 
increase. Compassion, and Kindness, justice and equity, 
mutual good relationships and service to mankind these are 
the fundamental principles for the preaching of Islam, 
These principles when acted upon, have led to the progress 
of Islam.,* 
"The great object of an overall spread of Islam in the 
whole of India cannot be realised by appealing to passions of 
hatred and antagonism, • It is the non-Muslims who are the 
field of action for the tabligh of Islam and form the raw 
material for this splendid activity. Today, by propagating 
hatred towards the Hindus, this field is being lost and this 
material is wasted. It is contrary to the universal message 
88, Husain AhiTiad Madani, Maktubat, op.cit.. Volume I, 
pp. 157-158, 
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of our great Prophet (Peace be on hira), ' 
'•Our object is to bridge the gulf of hatred which is 
being created by the protagonists of the scheme of Pakistan, 
We are opposed to the idea of limiting the right of missionc 
activities of Islam within any particular area. I^ e Muslim 
has got a right in all the nooks and corners of India by 
virtue offehe great struggle and grand sacrifices of their 
ancestors in this country. Now it is our duty to maintain 
that claim and try to widen its scope, instead of giving 
89 
it up." 
The Jamiat leaders were also critical of Pakistan 
scheme from economic viewpoint, Ttiey warned the Muslims 
that they would be worse off and be left in the lurch in 
any scheme of partition. They thought that Pakistan would 
be a financially weak state which will invite the outside 
powers to step in and thus the whole foreign policy would 
be dictated by Kussia or Britain, it would not be able to" 
meet the defence expenses due to its weak and crippled 
economy which would make.it a safe cround for foreign 
9 0 ' • • " 
intrigues, Mawlana Husain Ahmad Medani in .a letter to 
Hafiz Muhammad Sadiq of Muzaffargarh (Punjab) reflected the 
same view. He said, "in view of the econcxnic backwardness 
99, Mohanvmad Mian, Ulema-e-Haa. Volume II, pp, 340-41, 
English translation quoted from Farooqui, op.cit., 
p. 117, 
90. Husain Ahmad Madani, .Maktubet, Volume II, op.cit., 
Maktub No.33, 
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f 
of the Muslim majority provinces and the active resistence 
of an effectiveywell-organised and ? -numerically strong 
minority, Pakistan will have to face difficult problems 
and will be required in order to maintain itself, to seek 
the support of some Foreign Power, As a result, its economic 
life will have to be controlled by Foreign Governments and 
non-Fakistan capital. Moreover, due to the lack of its 
resources and further increase in its expenditure It will 
not be strong enough to give an effective assistance to 
Muslim countries. On the contrary, it will turn out to be 
a playground of political intrigues of England and Russia' 
The situation, finally, will give England a golden oppor-
tunity to take full advantage of Indo-Pak prejudices and 
rivalries and thus, inspite of the virtual termination of 
British rule in India it will eventually come to dominate 
91 
Pakistan and Hindustan again." Mawlana Hifzur.Rehman, in 
his thought provoking book, "Tahrik-e-Pakistan per ek Nazar", 
analysing the economic perspective of Pakistan remarked 
that in the world of today economic and financial considera-
tions are vital. On its depended the commerce, development 
and progress. The chief resources of economy had been the 
mines and mineral wealth. The provinces which were gcin? to 
oe amalgamated in Pakistan possess • a small number of 
91. Husain Ahmad Madani, Makatib-l-3haikhul Islgm, compiled 
by Sayyid Faridal-Wahidi, (Qaum Kitabcrhar, Deoband, 
n.d.), pp. 52-53. 
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working mines. There was one salt and coal mines in Punjab 
and Bengal has some deposit of coal with some iron mines. 
The remaining provinces are blank. The rest and bulk of 
iron, coal, mica, copper. Silver, Gold, Aluminium, Petrol 
mines and deposits are in Hindu Hindustan mostly located 
in aihar, Central provinces and Madras. The industrial power 
in the world is based on the trinity of coal, iron and oil. 
Together coal and iron are the foundation of industrializa-
92 
tion. 
It was true that there were several mineral deposits 
in Sind, Bengal but in order to operate them .crores of 
^rupees would be required which would be beyond the reach 
of Pakistan. And if they invite some Hindu industrialists* 
as some Leaguers claim, to invest their money in Pakistan 
in order to operate these deposited minerals, then it would 
be a Suicidal to Pakistan itself. For if any Government 
. wanted to be econcxnically crippled and slave in the hands 
of other countries then the best way is to Invite the 
multinationals with a view to develop the economic condition 
93 
of the country. 
Hence, Hifzur Rehman concluded that the Pakistan 
scheme on the one hand deprived the Muslims of the benefits 
92, Mawlana Hifzur Rehman, Tahrik ,i,pakistan per ek Kazar« 
op.cit., pp. 19-20%' 
53. Ibid., pp. 20-22, 
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occuring from Geographical resources and minerals deposit 
of the vast land of Hindu Hindustan while on the other 
invited the Hindu industrialists to invest the money and 
ultimately become the master of war and peace in line with 
94 
the European Jews industrialists. 
The main issue involved was that of a constitutional 
problem. The Ccbngress unnecessary repeated the possibility 
of a strong federation with one single Government in India 
agreeable to all^ but Jinnah pressed for a separate home-
land for the Muslims. They argued that in case of one central 
Government the minority would be at the mercy of the 
majority who then would exclude them from the political 
power. Congress did not concede to this demand as it would 
hamper the national unity. This eventually lead us to the 
95 
issue of autonomy of the constitutional units. 
This was what Jamiat-ul-Ulema had been talking and 
arguing about as a means to solve the Muslim problem in 
India. As early as 1931 when the Hindu Muslim question was 
being discussed at the Round Table conference and different 
political parties and communities were in search of an 
agreeable solution of the problem, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind 
94. Ibid,„ p. 23. 
95. Moin Shakir, op.cit,, p, 205. 
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having a greater s-nse of responsibility carae out with its 
own formula. The Jamiat working Committee in its meeting 
at Saharanpur on 3rd Auv^ ust 1931 presented the following 
formula for the people as an alternative to Pakistan. 
The com-Tiittee resolved that the Indian political 
system would be a federal in v/hich the constituent units 
would enjoy complete autonomy. The federal Assembly would 
be given only those powers or subjects which demanded uni-
formity of treatment throughout India. The residuary powers 
would be vested in the provinces which might be subjected to 
transfer to the centre provided a majority of units agree 
96 ' 
to it. 
The committee not only talked about the political 
freedom but the religious safeguards were also included 
in the resolution. The Working Committee recommended that 
the Government would not interfere in the religion, culture 
language of the various commt^ nities inhabiting India. 
Moreover, an special clause was also inserted in the consti-
tution that the Government would not in any case interfere 
in the personal law of the Muslims. The Muslims judges would 
be appointed to hear the cases wnich required a Muslim Qazi 
97 
to interpret, it recommended reservation of seats for 
96. Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul-Ulema Kiya ^ ai (Delhi, 1946), 
pp. 'lie-ISO. 
97. Ibid., p. 179. 
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different communities in Punjab and? Bengal according to thei 
numerical proportion while in other provinces there should 
be reservation of seats for minority co^ smunity with a right 
to contest additional seats. A Supreme Court would be cons-
tituted with representatives of various communities to hear 
98 
the cases of grievances of the minority communities. 
When the Lahore declaration became acute and a flood 
of literature started coming out of the press and when peoplt 
were in search of an alternative to the Pakistan resolution 
the Jamiat with more clear insight came out with the follow-
ing formula which was popularly known as the Jaraiat formula; 
1« "Our goal is complete independence, 
2, In a free India, Musalmans and their religion and 
culture will be free. They will not accept a 
constitution which does not approve of these freedom 
3, We stand for the fullest and unrestricted autonomy 
of the provinces. The centre will enjoy only those 
powers which the provinces of their own accord hand 
over to it and which concerns equality with all 
provinces, 
4, It is our considered opinion that a federation of 
autonomous provinces of India is essential. But a 
federation in which Ninety million Muslims with a 
98. Ibid., p. 180, 
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distinct culturfe of their own dre left an the mercy of 
a numerical majority will in no case be acceptable to 
th«n; the centre is to be on such principles that give 
a clear guarantee to the Muslims with regard to their 
99 
religious, cultural and politixal freedom." 
In 1945 at its Lahore Session Jamiat-ul-Ulema exhorted 
the Indian Muslims to be the finalist of their own destiny 
and appealed to them to agree to the formula presented at the 
Thirteenth session of the Jamiab at Johnpur in 1942, and 
present an unanimous demand to the British Government as it 
would- be in the greater interest of India in general and 
Muslims in particular. Explaining the scheme it contemplated 
that "the Jamiat is not ready to discard or sacrifice the 
religious, political and cultural freedom of the Muslims. It 
is true that it likes a federal Government and one centre 
because in its view it is more beneficial for India in 
general and Muslims in particular. But the establishment 
of this federal Government is stipulated with this condition 
that -the complete autonomy of the provinces be accepted. 
And that the federation should be so constituted that the 
non-Muslims majority at the centre could not apprehend the 
religious political and Cultural rights on the basis of its 
numerical strength. Centre to be so constituted as to leave 
99, Ibid., pp. 241-42; English translation quoted from 
Ziaul Hasan Faroogui^ op.cit.^ pp, 95-100, 
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100 
little chance for the majority to oppress." 
101 
The alternative proposed by Dr. S.A.Latif, one of 
the propounders of two nation theory and at the same time 
an advocate of an All India Federation was, though theoreti-
cally perfect but impracticable mainly because the transfer 
of populations would affect about 2/3 of the whole population 
of India* would involve removal in some cases over long 
distance and into xincongenial climate and would be prohibi-
102 
tedly costly. 
100. Ibid., p.274. The session also came out with a tentative 
proposal to be reviewed by the Muslims and non-Muslims 
organizations. The proposals runs as followst 
(1) The federal parliament should be composed on the 
basis of parity between the Hindus and the Muslims; 
for example, the proportion should be; Hindu 
45%, Muslim seats 45% and other minorities 10%. 
(2) In the federal parliament, if the 2/3 majority of 
the Muslim members are of the opinion that a par-
ticular bill or proposal is prejudicial to their 
religious, cultural and political interests then 
that Dill or proposal will not oe presented before 
or passed by the House. 
(3) There should be established a Supreme Court ccHti-
posed of equal number of Muslim and non-Muslim 
judges would be appointed by a committee having 
equal number of representatives from the Muslim 
and non-Muslim provinces. This Suprene Court should 
be err^owered to give final verdicts on Muslim 
arising out of disputes between the centre and the 
- provinces, between one province and other or 
between two coimminities in the country.And also if 
under the provision No.2 the majority of the 
Federal Parliament differs from the c^lnion of the 
2/3rmajority of the Muslim members with regard 
to-a bill being or not being opposed to the 
interests of the Muslims, the matter will be 
referred to the Supreme Court. 
Contd,..... 
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Dr. Shawkatullah Ansari in his thought provoking 
103 
book, also viewed the transfer of population as wholly 
unapplicable in the Indian context. He argued that the 
transfer of Turkey and Greek population which S.A.Latif 
had cited as an analogy would not be a safe analogy of 
(Continued from the previous page) 
(4) Any proposal agreed by tie parties concerned. 
Sir, Mohammad Mian, Jamiat-ul~Ulema Hind Kiva 
Rai, op.cit., pp. 274-275', English translation 
quoted from Ziaul Hasan Farooqui, op.cit,, p.100. 
101, Dr. S.A.Latif held th=t partition was neither a 
necessary nor a desirable alternative. The India may 
be united. He proposed for division of India into 
central block^streching from the eastern border of 
Patiala to Lucknow with Delhi as its centre) and 
eleven Hindu^ ''^i'ne Incian states interspread all 
over the country may be distributed between the diff-
erent zones in accordance with their natural affini-
ties. Each zone will form a homogenous state with a 
highly centralised form of Government within ••• but 
filling alongwith similar states into an All-India 
federation. 
See, S.A^Latif,the Muslim Problem in India, 
(Bombay, 1939), p.30.""^  ' ' 
102, R.Coupland, The Constitutional problem in India. 
Part-Ill (Oxford University Press, rtampheey Milford, 
1945), p.203i 
103, Shaukatullah Ansari; Pakistan the Problem of India, 
(Lahore, 1944); the author had been the Chairman of 
the reception committee of All-India Jamiat-ul-Ulema-
e-Hind Session in 1939. He was elected the general 
Secretary of the All-India Azad Muslim Conference 
held in JLpril,1940. 
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exchange of population. For it concerned Greeks (orthodox 
church) who went and settled in Aaatolia and Turks (Muslims) 
who had gene and settled in Greece while Muslims and Hindus 
are rationally in no way different to each other and both 
have lived together in this country for about a thousand 
years. The conversion from one religion to another taking 
place from time to time during co^ nmon histoiry,,,,Pakistan 
can in no way be said to be underpopulated nor it has the 
financial resources for meeting the cost of an exchange 
104 
of population." 
Hence in the light of above discussion the Jamiat 
formula alone appeared applicable to solve the problem. 
As a matter of fact, partition was neither necessary 
nor a desirable alternative, nor it could had solve the 
conniunal problem which it sought to solve. It left about 
1/3 of the Muslim minority on the mercy of the Hindus. 
Secondly the basis on which the partition was demanded was 
illogical because the areas which it sought to be separated 
•were already a majority provinces. Hence the alternative 
rested with the Jamiat formula. The solution of the Muslim 
problem in India was not partition but a true federation. 
Coupland remarked, "regionalism meets half the Muslim claim. 
104. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
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It conc6»des the first demand of the Pakistan resolution,,,. 
it provides the Muslims with a National home, which they can 
call their own. They would be autonomous state, not 
105 
secondary or subordinate units of administration. It is 
one of the myths of Indian politics that the Congress did 
not agree for a loose federation as their mind was not 
prepared to consider any alternative to the official plan 
of a Constituent Assembly,and as a reaction,in the atmos-
phere of tension and strife that was prevailing, the :iuslim 
106 
attitude stiffened." 
Had tie Jamiat formula been accepted by the Muslims, 
the Ulema could have been in a position to bargain with the 
Congress for more safeguards and better treatment. The 
Muslims might have been in a position to demand 40% represen-
tation in the Assemblies and other Governmental services. 
Moreover in a loose federation with complete autonomy in 
home affairs the Muslims could have enjoyed more or less 
the same religious cultural and political privilege as in 
105, R,Coupland} op,cit., p, 126, 
106, Ibid., p, 206; Though the Congress,to meet the temper 
of time/passed a resolution in favour of a loose 
federation with complete residuary poviers in the 
provinces. 
But the resolution remained confined to the 
files of Congress Working Committee and was never 
taken up seriously. 
See, R.Coupland, op.cit., p. 296.-
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proposed Paiistan. In U.P, and Bihar they could have been 
16% to 14% respectively while at the centre they constituted 
27%, just 1/4 of the whole strength of seats which could 
have been an effective majority to creat deadlock in time 
107 
of crisis. Moreover, the partition resulted in the migration 
of leading upper class Muslim intelligentia which proved to 
be a great community loss, a community which had just started 
catching up v/ith the temper of the time; had to complete 
with a better placed, economically and educationally, Hindu 
Chauvinism. 
In fact the leadership of the Muslim League mostly 
consisted of middle class. The Muslim bourgeosi,'e class 
were not courageous enough to face this competition from 
their Hindu counterpart. Pakistan appeared to them a safe 
heaven where they would be in possession of all important 
Governmental posts, industry and commerce. This temptation 
108 
was having a great appeal to their insance mind. But no 
movement could be successful unless it becomes a mass move-
ment. To achieve this the common man was made to believe 
th^t the fight for a Muslim state was a fight for brightening 
their future where they would flourish in an identical manner 
and would not be spending a hand to mouth life. The Muslim 
107. Husain Ahmad Madani, jKashfa-e-Haqiguat,op.cit.,p.62. 
108. P.Moon; The future of India, (London,1945), p.27, 
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masses easily believed it for "with their tradition of 
political servitude and consciousness of economic Inferiority 
of 
the prospect /Hindu - monopoly of political power appeared 
109 
alarming and intolerable. 
The demand for Pakistan throws light on the irra-
tional traits of the Muslim mind. It was a self defeating 
110 
project and an escape from nard realities. One can not 
deny, that there are differences between the Hindus and 
Muslims at least in religious sphere if not in cultural 
sense. But only a difference between two com-aunities in 
religion could not be a sound logic to argue for a separation, 
This was against the very logic of Islam, 
The defeat of the nationalist Uleraa in the General 
Election of 1946,which ves infact an issue of deciding the 
issue of Pakistan, sealed the fate of the Muslims of this . 
Indian sub-continent. The Muslim voters were asked to cast 
111 
their vote for the glory of Islam in Pakistan and abroad. 
Though the middle class Muslims voted for Pakistan in order 
to get rid of Hindu exclusiveness but an everaae Muslim voter 
109. H,Bolitho, Jinnah-Creator of Pakistan, (London, 1954), 
p, 158. "^  ~ " 
110. Hoin Shakir, op.cit., p, 205, 
111 . Pe te r Hardy, The Muslims of B r i t i s h -^ndla, o p . c i t . , 
pp . 243-248, 
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saw in Pakistan not only the chance to restore the physical 
112 
but also the moral authority of Islam. A dream of Islamic 
state was more attractive to them than any other considera-
tions. 
It would be pertinent to note that a small section 
of the Deobandi Ulema were against joining the Congress from 
the very beginning. The chief spokesman of this group had 
been Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi. Even during the time of 
Non-cooperation and Khilafat Movement some Ulema had been 
113 
critical of joining the Congress. But they were not then 
organised as a group. Their pronouncements were merely 
of an individual capacity, Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi did not 
agree with the view of other leading Ulema that the Muslim 
League was capable of embarking upon the establishment of 
an Islamic State at first. He considered both the Congress 
and the Muslim League as useless. 3ut his contention was 
that the Muslim League was b-etter than the Congress for it 
woijld be ea?y to chanac the Muslim League from irreligion 
to religion. But this was not possicle in case of the Congres; 
which was essentially a Hindu dominated organisation. He 
considered the Congress as a blind man and Muslim League as 
a one-eyed man. Hence it could be easy to purify t^e League 
for if a man with perfect sight was not available the one-
114 
eyed person could always be preferred. 
112, I b i d , , p . 240. 
113, See, Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanvi and o t h e r s , Mut ta l ique 
De lh i , 193, a l s o Musalman aur S i ^ i l Nafarmani Ke 
Muta l l i q Shar i Fatwa (LucVnow, n , d . ) , 
114, Mohammad Ashraf Al i Thanvi , I fadg- t , - - i -Ashraf iyah dar 
m a s a i l - i - S i y a s i y a , e d i t e d . Mufti Muhammad Shabi , 
(Deoband, 2nd ed. 1945) , p . 9 6 , 
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This group of the dissatisfied Ulema founded in 
1946, under the leadership of Mawlana Shaboir Ahmad Usmani, 
the Jamiat-ul-Islam with the blessings from Jinnah in order 
to counteract the activities of the Jaraiat-ul-Ulema. He 
was opposed to the United nationalisii and countered 
forcefully the claims of the nationalise ulema in this 
115 
favour. This organisation was ably used by Jinnah to win 
over the Urdu-educated Muslim voters for the advantage of 
116 
the Muslim League. Now every religious shot . fired on 
the British also hit the nationalist forces. The logic 
used by the nationalist Ulema to organise Muslims against 
the foreign power began to be utilised against them by 
their adversaries. Previously, the nationalist Ulema had 
tried to prove their one nation theory on the basis of the 
Quran and the Hadith. Now the pro-League Ulema looked to 
the same Quran Hadith but only to prove that the two nation 
tleory was inconsonence with the Islamic Shariah and any 
move against this motion would be tentamount to be un-
117 
Islamic, They riewed the establishiSient of Pakistan as the 
beginning of the end, the end being to. establish the God's 
Quranic Kingdom on earth. Any move to undue tbe League 
115. I.H.Qureshi, o p . c i t . , pp. 359-361. 
116. Peter Hardy, Muslims of Bri t ish India, o p . c i t . , p . 2 4 2 . 
117. . 31-iabbir Ahmad Usmani, Paygham Banam Mutmar Kul Hind 
Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam 1945, P P . 43-.A^.' 
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miss ion would mean t h a t the Muslims themselves have defeated 
118 
the unique opportunity to establish His rule on the earth. 
But inspite of the propaganda ' of Pro-League Ulema, 
the Jamiat continued their religious ar^ xxments to justify 
their political stand on the issue. Mawlana Husain Ahmad 
and his colleague Mawlana Mohamniad Mian wrote a pamphlet, . 
Hamara Hindustan aur Uske Fuzailin which they tried to 
prove that India was their 'Watan*. To justify this view 
they argued that the Prophet Adam according to the Island.c 
books, descended from heaven to India and settled here. 
Hence the entire India was the Islamic land and its parti-
U S 
tion was undesirable. 
During the General election of 1945 both the groups 
of ulema tried their strength against each other to win 
the Muslim votes to their viewpoint. The nationalist Ulema 
made frantic appeal to the Muslim voters not to cast their 
s 
votes in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan would mean abandoning 
the mosqaes, shrines, religious seminaries and the centres 
of Muslim culture, Muslim must not all^w these to be 
120 
ruined. As the counter attack Shabbir Ahmad Usmani declared 
that "every one knows that the Prophet did not carry with 
118. Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
119. Husain Ahmad-Madani, Hamara Hindustan aur Uske Puzail, 
(Delhi, 1941), p.- 3. "" 
120. Ibid., p. 11. 
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him the Shrines of Madina, The Prophet did it because he 
121 
wanted to transform Madina into Pakistan," 
As a matter of fact Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani was 
hoodwinked by the false propaganda of the League that the 
structure of the Gpvernment and Society of Pakistan would 
be modelled on the Islamic principles. He challenged the 
criticism of nationalist Ulema that the Pakistan would be 
a heretic state ruled by irreligious people as totally 
122 
absured and ."nisleading. But while levelling such criticism 
he failed to diagnose the real motives of the Leaguers and 
was moved by the lofty and lovely dream of an Islamic State, 
One thing which came out of the establishment of 
Jamiat-ul-Islam and its prudent utilization by Jinnah to 
further his ends was that the Lea-guers realised the need 
and help of the Ulema and followed their lead, who were held 
by the Leaguers as incompitable to lead the Muslims, 
The defeat of the Muslims Ulema was not due to the 
fact that they lacked a case to argue but they failed to 
put across the minds of the common people who were not ready 
123 
to hear any thing than the Pakistan. The Jamiat-ul-Islain 
121, Mawlana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, Hamara Pakistan included 
in his Khutbah-e-Sadarat Suba Punjab^ J ami at,-Ulema-i-
Islam, (Lahore, 1946), pp, 47-49. 
122, Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, op.cit,, pp, 65-66, 
123, Ibid., p. 245. 
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founded by Mawlana Shabblr Ahmad Usmani with a blessings 
from Jinnah to counter the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, proved to be a 
decisive factor in attracting the Muslim voters to the 
124 
Muslim League. 
The other factor was that the common Muslim voters 
failed to differentiate between the programme of Jamiat-
ul-Ulema and the Muslim League. So much GO that the Muslims 
tnought that if the Ja-niat was so much apprehensive of a 
Hindu majority as to demand exclusive safeg-aards with regard 
to their religion and culture then they might as well demand 
Pakistan. The Muslim League was offering them the physical 
Partition of India; the Ulema from the Jamiat platform were 
offering them the mental partition of India. The former 
was to cut through the map of British India, the latter to 
125 
scarify it. 
By February 1947 almost all political parties 
gradually came close to the acceptance of the partition 
plan for one reason or another. But it were only these 
Muslim divines who did not loose heart and carried their 
struggle to the end. They from the Jamiat platform tried 
their best to maintain the territorial integrity of the 
nation. But what pained the Jamiat much was that the 
124. Peter Hardy, op.cit., p.41. 
125. Peter Hardy, Muslim of Br i t i sh India , o p . c i t . , p . 2 4 5 . 
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Congress, its long and trusted friend, also accepted the 
plan and thus put the death seal. The Congress not only-
accepted the division of the country but also favoured the 
partition of Punjab on the basis of Hindu and Muslim majority. 
Hence, the Jamiat further severely criticised the Congress 
for her breach of plea and assurances that it was fighting 
for an united India. By putting the seal of approval the 
126 
Congress had accepted the two nation theory. The Ja-riiat made 
it clear that it did not like either the proposed Pakistan 
Scheiae of the Muslim League or the Akhand 3harat of Mahasabha 
127 
neither the proposed division of rhe Punjab by the Congress. 
In fact, the Jaraiat was against any type of partition, mental, 
moral, intellecrual,ethical, or physical. 
The Jamiat reiterated its stand that only the 
acceptance of the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission plan 
could solve th'=' problem. This would best be in the interest 
of the country in general and Muslims in particular. It also 
exhorted the Muslims of Bengal and Punjab to be up in opposina 
the bifurcatidn of their provinces which would bring great 
128 
miseries and sufferings to the millions of Muslims. 
The Jamiat came heavily on the independence of India 
Act, 1947, It viewed in the proposed division of the country 
126. Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq, Volume II, p. 536. 
127. UDI^, p, 536. 
128. Ibid., p. 536. 
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by the British authority as an attenpt to break the terri-
torial integrity of India. The British Government not only 
proposed for the bifurcation of the country but also cut 
the Punjab and Bengal into pieces. The Jamiat's apprehen-
sion was that the creation of this type of situation would 
naturally be beneficial to the British to intervene in the 
home affairs of both the country. This type of situation 
would be beset with hatred and bitterings amongst the 
communities. The Jamiat also criticised the India Inde-
pendence Act of 1947 from the view point that it had not 
only divided the Indian Muslims into three parts but also 
made the five crore Muslims subservient to the twenty five 
129 
crore majority of the people, • The Jamiat-ul-Ulema criticised 
both Muslim League and the Congress. Muslim League was made 
the target of attack due to their perception that it was 
responsible for what was happening. The Congress was 
condemned for the breach of principle in accepting the 
partition of their motherland. 
The forebodings of the Jamiat turned out to be true. 
Even before August 14, 1947 there v/ere rumblings of discord 
and strife in the Punjab, Immediately after independence, 
violence-erupted in different parts of the country and 
especially in the North Vfestern areas of the sub-continent. 
Millions were^uprooted and forced to migrate across the newly 
129. Ihi^«i pp. 537-53. 
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created frontiers. After Punjab the fire of communualism soon 
penetrated into Delhi, where the Muslim minority was uprooted 
from their own home and their properties were raised to the 
ground. Winter was fast approaching and there was" no 
"adequate arrangement to meet the situation, thousands suffered 
130 
due to cold and starvation, infact, the sufferings and 
hardships of the people were beyond description. 
The last occasion when the Jamiat-ul-Ulema tried to 
maintain the territorial integrity of India was their 
campaign in Sylhet to turn the referendum, held on the issue 
of i>ylhet which was to go to East Pakistan cr continue to 
form part of Assam, in their favour. The contention of Mawlana 
Pakistan 
Husain Ahmafi Hadani vas that if referendum go in favour of East/ 
it would be nominal and would not bring than any substancial 
benefit but it would surely affect the balance of the Muslims 
in Assam who would be reduced to the teeming minority, subjec- -
131 
ted more to the dictates of the majority community. His 
efforts failed and the subsequent development shows that 
Husain Ahmad was right in his thesis. 
130. Mawlana Abul.Kalam Azad; India Wins Freedom, (Bombay, 
1959), pp. 191-192. 
131, Mohaimiad Mian, op.cit., p. 540. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
In the twi l ignt of a vague r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l discon-
tent of the 1919's^ a vigorous campaign the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-
e-Hind; sprang up among the Indian Muslims, ccinprising of 
the Ule-na of a l l shedes of opinion, i t was^the exigency of 
time v;hich produced the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. The ;>luslira leadership 
at t ha t time was he lp less ly placed and divided amongst 
themsevles over ideological and doctr inal differences. I t 
goes to the c red i t of Mawlana Abdul 3ari who t i r e l e s s l y 
t r i e d to forge an united front with the help of the Ulema 
and bring them on a common platform. I t vas h is organising 
a b i l i t y and ^ersuat ion tha t brought Ulema of a l l shades of 
opinion on a coirroon platform and infused in then the need 
to organise themselves in to a r e l i g i o - p o l i t i c a l body for 
safeguarding the Islamic Shariah, The achievement of 
.independence was also one of i t s goals . Though the Ulema 
were making t h e i r presence in d i f ferent organisations in the 
individual capacity, they always f e l t the need of an Al l -
India associat ions of Ulema« through which they could ven t i -
l a t e ' t he i r grievances and act as a pressure group on the 
Government and to speak more uni tedly and au thor i ta t ive ly 
on behalf of the Muslim India. 
The chief concern of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema was the 
safeguarding of Islamic Shariah in the l igh t of the Quran 
and Hadith and giving the >Tu5lims a lead in the p o l i t i c a l cum-
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religious matters. But it goes to the credit of the leaders 
of the Jamiat that their determination to safeguard the 
Islamic Shariah did not come in their way to contribute to 
the cause of freedom. They made a happy blending of 
religion -^"'^  politics and thus justified through their role 
that where was no need of divorcing religion from politics, 
3oth could operate side by side, provided the hold of string 
remained in the hands of men of qualities as the Ulema proved 
to be. 
The Jamiat considered the very existence of the 
British rule to be the cause of all ills in the Indian body 
politics. Jamiat considered the dominance of British in 
India to be the root cause of the British supremacy over 
all lands including the Muslims countries of Middle East. 
On account of this perception the Jamiat thought it to be 
its religious as well as national duty to fight against 
British imperialism. Its determination and adherence to 
safeguard Islamic Shariah and struggle for the freedom of-
th6 country never meant for establishing an Islamic state. 
The motivating force behind all the programme of action of 
the Jamiat was the persecuation of Islamic law by the Muslims 
themselves while living in friendship with other sister 
communities. 
The period of 1940*s presented an interesting 
pict^ ure of the Muslim politics in Indie. Bv that time the 
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two principal centres of Muslin? learning - Aligarh and 
Deoband - emerged as the rival camps, each projecting the 
view of the rival Muslims political parties - the Muslim 
League and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema respectively. It is interest-
ing to see theit both quite sincerely desired ihe welfare 
of the xMuslim comnmnity but differed in their approaches 
to the problem. They were strange travellers to the path 
of the same destination - the welfare of Muslim community. 
They perceived the solution of Muslim problems from different 
angles and viev;points. If the Jamiat-ul-Ulema thought that 
the Muslim interest could best be secured in an undivided 
India, the Muslim League viewed that once the British left 
the country they v;ould become more and more subjected to 
the tyrannical rule of the Hindu majority, the fruits of 
v/hich they had already tasted during the Congress minis-
teries between 1927-39. Here lies the basic difference 
between the Jamiat and the Muslim League. The Muslim League 
stood for .free Islam which could only be realised if they 
v?ere given free home to nurture it. l^e Jamiat leaders 
were not ready to share the views and sentiments of the 
Muslim League. They had their own plan for the future 
destiny of Muslims in an undivided India. The people thus 
failed to distinguish between the programme and ideologies 
of the Jamiat and the xMuslim League, This had been one of 
the reasons of the def'.at of nationalist Ulema. 
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It had been discussed in the foregoing pages that 
the Jamiat was very much concerned with the preservation 
of the Islamic Law in an undivided India, In view of their 
emphasis on the Islamic culture and preservation of Muslim 
Personal Law it puzzled the readers that v;hy they opposed~ 
the creation of Pakistan, where they could have got a 
conjugal and favoura'^ le atmosphere to embark upon and 
establish an independent society based on Islamic Shariah 
and Sunnah? The reasons are many fold. First of all cOTies 
the question of leadership. The Ulema^ welih/ersed in Islamic 
Law and Hadith, considered themselves to be the chief 
interpreter of Islamic Law, They thought that the Muslim 
Leaguers, trained in the atmosphere of '-''estern culture and 
tradition/^ were incapable of establishing an Islamic State, 
They thought that the leaguers were neither well versed 
in Islamic teachings nor interested in implementing them. 
On the other hand the leaguersrsuspected the capabilities 
of the Ulema to cope with requirements of the new world 
as they thought them to be conservative and traditional 
minded. 
Closely related to the question of leadership was 
the clash of dualism in the Muslim educational system -the 
Ulema and the Western educated intelligentia. The nationalist 
Ulema seeing the strings of the Muslim League in the hands 
- 198 -
of the progressive liXe Jinnah and Llaqat Ali Khan, were 
suspicious of tifieijr role to give a true lead to Islam. 
Moreover, their activities in opposing the implementation 
of Islamic lavs and favouring the enforcement of man made 
laws elarmed the Uleraa of the future fate of Islam in 
Pakistan. It was still fresh ~tn the memory of the Vlema 
that hovj Jlnnah lobbfed against the passage of Shariat Act 
and cooperated in this move with Bhupendranath. He also 
favoured the Muslim Civil Marriage Bill, the Anoy Bill, 
Annulment of Marriages and Endowment Bill etc* and these can 
be cited as an examples, Madani was aware of such antl-
lalamtc activities of Jinnah and could not trust his leader-
ship. The letter of Husain AhraaS Madani to Tiia disciple 
complaining about th© un-Islamic behaviour of the League 
leadership reflect the distrust of Ulema to the Westernised 
1 
Muslim leaders. These negative approach of Jlnn^ streng-
thened their belief that Pakistan was not going to be a safe 
place for Islam and the whole system would be based on 
secular principles. The speech of Jinnah at the Consti-
. tuent Assembly of Pakistan fully confirmed the farsightedness 
of the Ulema, in viewing the plea of establishing an Islamic 
State as nothing but fake promises. Even men like Shabbir 
Ahmad \Jsmani could not assess the situation and was hoodwinked 
1. Husain Ahmad Madani, Maktubat-i-Shaikhul Islasa; Volume I 
compiled byl^ ajirouddln Islahl, (Matba Waarif , Azamgarh 
1952), p. 254, 
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by the lovely dream of an Islamic state based on the prin-
ciple of Hadith and Sunna^. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani 
even tried to persuade him but all failed to open his eyes. 
Mawlana shabbir Ahmad Usmani was the man whose name was ably 
exploited by the Muslim Leaguers in showing to Muslim India 
that even a Deobandi Alira was amongst them. It was chiefly 
the personality of Shabbir Ahmad Usmani which brought the 
Muslim League victorious at the election of 1946. All the 
promises of an Islamic state had gone into oblivion. Even 
after forty years we do not see any sign of Islamisation 
in Pakistan. It were the Indian Muslims who suffered a lot. 
The Muslim India could have felt some psychological satis-
faction that their sacrifices have not gone wa«te had 
Pakistan ever tried to become an Islamic State. One could 
say that Jinnah and Liaqat A H Khan could not get sufficient 
time to guide and control their mission. 
In fact/ the leaders of the Muslim League were not / 
clear about the system of Government to be adopted in 
Pakistan. Various speeches of their leaders as mentioned 
in the fourth chapter speak the intellectual backwardness 
of the Muslim League leaiers* Its leaders were heard using 
contradictory statements with regard to the future system 
of society. The concept of Islamic democracy. Islamic 
socialism and the like were used interchangeably which spoke 
of the ideological confusion and intellectual bankrupcy of 
the Leaguers. 
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The uleraa were aware of all this and they never truste 
their leadership. In one of his letters Mawlana Husain 
Ahmad Madani said that who will not desire and dream of 
establishing an Islamic State, Such type of possibility 
excite the Muslims to the full. If at any time their -activi-
ties convince me that they are sincere in their claim then 
I will be the first to join them. But I know that they 
are neither sincere in their claim nor capable of going 
2 
into such a venture," 
Ihe Ulema were rightly convinced that the creation 
of Pakistan was not going .to solve the Muslim problem for 
even after the bifurcation a considerable number of Muslifts 
would be left in an even weaker minority in a divided India, 
It appeared to them illogical that in order to liberate 
seven crore of Muslims,where they were already in majority 
and having their own Government, they were ready to leave 
behind two crore of Muslims, What would happen to than,' 
who would look after the deserted places of worship were 
some questions for which the Uleraa did not get any 
satisfactory reply. 
As a matter of feet that the Jamiat thought that in 
India there was much possibility of Dawah work especially 
2. Ibid,, Volume II, pp. 159-60, 
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amqng the oppressed conununitles which constitute majority 
of the total population. The Jamiat viewed such an oppor-
tunity with great interest. Missionary activities need an 
open society in which much spade work for proselytisatlc» 
can be done. The-cherished aims of the Jasniat was to see 
that the land of Allah be governed by His divine commands 
and put an end to all man made tyranny and oppression. 
The two nation theory and a demand for separate 
hc»neland for the Muslims have been defended on the apprehen-
sion of possible assimilation of the minority in the majority 
community. The adherents of this perception holds that 
to achieve the artificial homogeneity the majority made the 
minority to abandon their ethnic, religious, cultural and 
linguistic characteristics which differentiate them frcxn the 
dominant group. They are also asked to relinquish their 
insistence on being different from the majority and thus 
merge themselves within the national mainstream. 
Here It roust be ei'T$>hasi8ed that Islam has been a 
proselytizing religion. For the progress and development 
of Islam a peaceful atmosphere and goodwill is essential* 
To achieve this objective one has to live within the non-
religious peoples. Had Islam cared for such remote possi-
bility it could have confined to itself the desertland of the 
Arabia, Moreover, the apprehension of the gro-two nation 
tneory has been found ill based. At the time of independence 
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the population of the Indian Muslims was 9% while at present 
they constitute 14% of the whole population, according to 
the Government records. The actual member may even shootup. 
Hence the apprehension of being swamped by the majority 
community has been defeated. What is more the Indian Muslim 
are presenting the tr^ e^ picture of Islam than their counter-
parts. They .are . conscious- and capable enough to defend, 
preserve their culture and personal law in a divided 
India. 
It has always been alleged by many historians that 
the Jaraiat-ul-Ulema throughout its existence unconditionally 
cooperated with the Congress and acted as its satellite • 
This is only to defame the organisation and It is not 
testified by historical truth. We have seen in the preceding 
chapters that the Jamiat always Joined the Congress after 
being assured that Muslim interests would be best secured, 
report and 
It was only after the Congress rejected the Nehru V accepted 
complete independence as its creed and came out with a 
promise to safeguard the Muslim interest that the Jaralat 
agreed to join the Congress in the Civil Disobedience 
Movement of 1930. Again, after the 1937 election the Jamiat 
joined the Congress, only after being deceived by the Muslim 
League in the pre-election assurances and that too not tin-. 
conditionally. Although we did see that at the Allahabad 
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Conference of Muslim leaders, convened by Mawlana Azad a"^  
section of the Jamiat leaders were in favour of uncondition-
ally cooperating with the Congress', But a large nximber of 
group led by Mawlana Ahmad Saeed and Mufti Kifayatullah was _ 
against unconditional cooperation and~emphasised that it 
would not be in the best interest of the Muslim to go to 
the Congress bentches without any prior assurance that the 
culture, language and religion would be safeguarded. 
In fact the Jaraiat cooperated with the Congress in 
so far as it did not come in the way of Muslim interests. 
History of the Indian National Movement is replete with such 
instances when the Jamiat leaders went on to criticise the 
policies of the Congress, During the Khilafat Movement both 
Abdul Bari and Abdul Majid Badauni were highly critical-Of 
the Gandhian creed of non-violence and his reluctance to 
announce the complete independence as the creed of the 
Congress, Moreover, the suspension of the Khilafat and 
non-cooperation Movements was met with severe condemnation 
by Mawlana Abdul Bari and Abdul Rauf Danapuri, The Jaraiat 
adopted the official resolution against it at the Ajmer and 
Patna conference of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, 
The Jamiat severely criticised the way the Congress 
behaved with Muslim sentiments in regard to fill the vacan-
cies created by the absence of Muslim League members under 
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the interim Government. The contention of the Jamiat was 
that the Congress would have consulted the nationalist Muslim 
political parties before filling the vacancies at its owa 
3 
choice. Moreover, those ncxninated to fill the vacancies 
temporarily were not given any inqportant department what-
soever. The Jamiat viewed this attitude of the Congress as 
an insult to the nationalist Muslims. The Working Committee 
condemned the Congress way r tackling the issue as objec-
tionable fran national viev olnt and hoped that immediate 
steps would be taken to makt the interim Government a 
4 
representative and useful body. ISie Jamiat-ul-Ulema also 
condemned the Congress at its meetings where Mawlana Hifzur 
Rehman severely criticised the Congress which was also 
5 
upheld by the nationalist newspapers*. 
The Jamiat also did not like the Congress accepting 
the partition proposal of India. And Mawlana Husain Ahmad 
Madani could no conceal his sentiments at the painful deve-
ment on the part of his trusted and long friends on the road 
to independent. Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani viewed this 
attitude of the Congress as making the theory of tinited 
3, Mohammad Mian, Ulema-e-Haq (Al-Jamiat-book depot, 
Delhi, 1947), pp. 399-400, 
4, liiiii., pp. 401-402. 
5, The Madinah, 25 Septenber, 1942. 
- 205 -
nationalism nugatory. «Mawlana Hifzirr Rehman also went to 
the historical session of the Congress held at the consti-
tution house, Delhi, where the Congress accepted the 3 
June, 1947 Plan^and spoke against the Partition, It was onl] 
the personality of Hifzur Rehman who-in most strong words 
condemned the proposal of partition and tried to desist the 
6 
Congress to sign the death knell of united India* 
Inspite of its glorious role in the Freedom Movement 
the role of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema has been a subject of 
conflicting assessment and criticism. A nximber of historians 
have tried to high light the communal character of the 
nationalist Ulema. Regarding the role df the Jaaiat R.C, 
MajuiBdar observes...,."still the fact remained that all 
their proclamations were issued in the name and interest 
of Islam andbheir appeal was only to the Muslims... The 
support of Hindus were never asked for, and It hardly could 
be done without violating the basic doctrine of the movement 
which s4ught to eradicate from India all power and influence 
7 
other than Islam." 
This is the tribute given to an organisation which 
to 
since its inception tried/foster Hindu-Muslim unity. It 
were these leading Ulema who from the Jaraiat platform acted 
as a bridge of contact between the Muslims and Hindus during 
6. IMd*, 16 June, 1947. 
7. R.C.Majiumdar, British Paramountcy in India, Volume II, 
p. agT." 
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the Khilafat aid Non-Cooperation Movement and continued to 
be so throughout the freedom struggle down to the indepen-
dence. The Jamiat leaders during the Khilafat even aslced 
the Muslims to desist from the sacrificial ceremony of 
killing the cows, as a mark of respect to their Hindu 
bretheren. It was this organisation idiich made swarai 
Shraddhananda, an Arya Samajist, to address the Muslims 
frcxn the pulpit of the Jama Masjid, a rare sign of tolerance 
and friendship. But unfortunately large heartedness is not 
the part of our country men. Infact in the long and 
chequered history of Indian National Movement the Uleraa in 
general and Jamiat in particular occupy an important place. 
They have set high standards of patriotism, devotion to the 
cause and sacrifice in the annals of India's struggle for 
who 
Freedom. It were the Ulema/resisted the illegitimate 
authority and dominance of the East India Company and the 
British Government, After Independence it was hoped that due 
recognition would be given to their services for the cause 
of the liberation of India from foreign domination. But it 
is sad that our historians lack objectivity ' They have 
been biased in accoxintlng their heroic deeds and gigantic 
contribution to the cause of freeing India from the foreign 
Yoke. There is very little mention of the contribution of 
Muslim Ulema in mobilising the people to take up arms against 
the British colonialists, organising them and leading them 
to the struggle against the British. 
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APPETTDIX I 
LEAFLET ISSUED 3Y THE NAZIM-UMUMI 
(GENERAL MANAGER), 'DARUL-ISHAAT-I-HIND*, DELHI 
The religious Patwa of the Ulemas of all India-
CD It is not permissible to become a member of the 
Government councils, 
(2) It is not permissible to plead as vakil before the 
British Courts, 
(3) It is not permissible to read in Government or semi-
Government schools. 
(4) It is not permissible to keep Honorary Magistracies, 
other honorary posts and the titles conferred by the 
Government. 
(5) All Government services by which Government is helped are 
(haram) forbidden; specially serving in the Police and the 
Army is a great sin, because they heve to fire upon their 
in 
breth rn. God says/the holy Quran,Surah Mairaj,'One who 
kills a Mussulman deliberately will be subjected to the 
eternal hell fire.* The prophet has said 'Whoever took 
up arms against Muslims he ceases to be a Muslim,* 
S o u r c e ; Hcxne D e p t . Po l 1 9 2 1 , P . N o . 1 3 7 . 
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APPENDIX I I 
(AJ C . I . D . LIST OF MAULVIS SIGNING THE FATWA 
1 , Mawlana K i f a y e t u l l a h of D e l h i 
2 , Mawlana S a y i d Su la iman Nadwi 
3 , Mav/lana Abul Kalam Azad 
4 , Mawlana Daud Ghaznav i 
5 , ! lawlana S a n a u l l a h of A i n r i t s a r 
6 , Hav/lana Az iz -u r -Rehraan , Muf t i of D a r u l Uloom^Deoband 
7 , Shah Su la iman P h u l w a r i , a l e a d i n g S u f i of B i h a r 
8 , Mawlana Abdul B a r i of Lucknow 
9 , Mawlana Husa in Ahmad 
1 0 , Azad Subhani of Cav/npur, 
S o u r c e : Home P o l i t i c a l , A 1920, F i l e N o s . 4 1 5 - 2 6 . 
(B) C . I . D . LIST OF MAULVIS RIFUSING TO SIGN THE FATWA 
1 . Mawlana Abdul Haraid 
2 . Mawlana Abdul Maj id 
3 . Mawlana A s h r a f A l l Thanvi 
4 . H a b i b u r Rehman Khan Sherwani of A l i g a r h 
5 . Mawlana H a f i z Mohammad, R e c t o r of D a r - u l - U l o o m Deoband 
6 . Mawlana Raza Khan B r e l v i , 
» 
Source: Home Political, A. 1920, File Nos. 415-26. 
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APPENDIX III 
DEMI-OFFICIAL LETTER FROM C.A. 30RR0N 
CHIEF COMi'lISSIONER OF DELHI, TO H.D. CRAIK, 
SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 
Delhi, 2 September 1921 
In my fortnightly report for the second half of August 
I have referred to the serious s^te of ill-feeling which is 
being worked up among the lower class Mahommedans in Delhi 
over the confiscation of the fatwa leaflet, and said I was 
submitting a more detailed report. 
The local Jamiat-ul-Ulema at once telegraphed to 
Gandhiji for permission to start civil disobedience, but he 
counselled doing nothing in a hurry. Several private 
meetings of the local Maulvis were held at which it was 
decided to refer the guestion of further action to the Jamiat-
ul-Ulema-i-Hind tor advice and orders. The first big public 
meeting on the subject was held on the evening of the 2 3rd 
August at Pat audi House, It: is reported that there was more 
religious enthusiasm among the Mahommedans at this meeting 
than had been witnessed since the Ulemas' Conference last 
November, A very great crowd assembled, amongst whom a fairly 
strong fanatical element was ooserved. The leading speakers 
were Maulvi Syed Hussain Ahmed Madni, Mahajar of Deoband, who 
presided, Maulvi Ahmed Syed of Delhi, Maulvi Ibrahim of 
Sialkot, and Mufti Kifaitullah of Delhi, The president in a 
lengthy address lasting nearly two hours reviewed the various 
occasions in the last 200 years when Christian powers had been 
the view that the prescribed 
opposed to Islam.Ahmed Syed emphasisecl/fatwa as prepared by 
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nearly 500 Maulvis was an abstract of the orders' of God 
an-" the Prophet and its confiscation v/ould not be tolerated; 
the question of disobedience of the order had been referred 
to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, and if they ordered disobedience 
non-violence v;ould have to cease end the responsibility for 
bloodshed would rest on the Government and on those who 
had not informed Government of the gravity of the situation; 
Pharaoh was no more, and the Czar had been shot by his own 
men; if people asked why they should help that Turks now 
when they had not helped the Mahommedans of India in 1857 
the answer was that the Turks were thenselves in difficulties 
at that time. Kifaitullah,said he had been asked by many 
zealous Mahaiunedans v;hy they v/ere sitting silent when God's 
orders had been prescribed, but he had pacified them by saying 
the matter had been referred to the Jamiat-i-Hind. A local 
firebrand named Anwar Beg objected to waiting for . any such 
decision and began to talk of Jihad, on which shouts of Allah-
ho-Akbar came from the crowd, and the speaker was made to 
stop by Ahmed Syed. The resolutions passed at the meetin.g 
were: 
(i) This meeting of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema of Delhi condemns 
the action of the Government of Delhi of prescribing 
the fatwa of Jamat-ul-Ulema-i-Kind by the police and 
views it as a great insult of Islam and the Ulemas 
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and expresses its deep indignation against it and 
requests the Janiiafc-ul-Ulema-i-Hind to call its 
meeting immediately and let them know what course they 
should follow. 
(ii) This meetina congratulates Arif Hussain, M. Nisar 
Hussain of Cawnpore and other patriots, v/ho are in 
jail/ for the ske of their religion and country 
on their merits and prayes God to enable them be 
firm in their intentions. 
(iii) The espies of the resolutions passed to be sent to 
the nev;spapers for general information. 
Source: Government of India/ Home Department, 
Political, 1921, F.No. 137, 
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